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1Introduction
This book will seek to provide an anthropological account of the lives of 
young British-born Muslim men of South Asian origin in the English town 
of Luton. Luton is a satellite town in close proximity to London, situated 
around thirty miles to the north of the city. It is an important town. Many 
of its inhabitants work in London, which is a convenient forty minutes’ 
train journey away. Luton also boasts an international airport that plays a 
significant part in providing air-travel needs for most of southern and cen-
tral England. The town is further served by the M1 motorway, which con-
nects London with Leeds in the previously industrial north of the country. 
In a previous life, Luton was an industrial town in its own right: famed for 
its manufacture of hats and, later, commercial and domestic motor vehi-
cles. Since the turn of the century, however, these industries have all but 
vanished with the manufacturing industry being steadily replaced by the 
services sector – a phenomenon consistent with national trends. Histori-
cally speaking then, Luton is not a remote town. Its sophisticated transport 
links, coupled with once thriving industry, has encouraged people from 
up and down the country to pass through, work and settle in its environs. 
Among these settlers is a substantial Muslim community – around 19% of 
the overall population of the town which is approximately 200,000 peo-
ple. These Muslims predominantly reside in a concentrated neighbour-
hood situated in and around the Bury Park area of the town. Like many 
of the town’s inhabitants, they were attracted to Luton during its indus-
trial zenith, taking up employment in the Vauxhall Motor Company, its 
brickyards and engineering factories. Over the years, Muslim residents 
have burgeoned into a sizeable settled community where new genera-
tions, who were born and raised in the town, now call it their ‘home’. My 
fieldwork was conducted in this post-industrial landscape among this new 
generation of Britons. The bulk of it was conducted between 2008 and 
2010, with further observational visits undertaken in the years since.
The chief concern of this book is to demonstrate, through obser-
vations of their everyday lives, the various ways British-born Muslim 
men in Luton develop understandings of themselves that transcend 
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the monolithic contemporary image of British Muslim communities. I 
suggest that young Muslims in Luton are developing hybridised forms 
of Islam in an attempt to find alternatives to the culturally exclusive 
state narratives of nationality and citizenship. I argue that the syncretic 
experiences within the habitus of the South Asian Muslim ‘home’, cou-
pled with influential interactions with ‘mainstream British society’, has 
led to the rejection of both points of reference. Rather, young British 
Muslims are looking to Islam – its ‘glorious past’ and the international 
Muslim community (ummah) – as a means of reconciling both the alien-
ating cultural practices of the home and the perceived Islamophobia and 
defilement of society beyond. By resorting to an abstract re-articulation 
of Islam, young Muslims are re-adapting their communal affiliations to 
suit the social and cultural terrain of Britain, while simultaneously creat-
ing a counter-discourse to accepted notions of ‘Britishness’ and national 
belonging. Although a substantial and credible corpus of sociological and 
anthropological literature has emerged in recent decades seeking to sit-
uate and problematise British Muslim communities, this study will fur-
ther illuminate the inherent complexities and resultant ‘messiness’ of this 
task. Furthermore, I aim to provide an analysis of Muslims in Britain that 
attempts to depart from certain conceptions that view diaspora Muslims 
as a separate cultural bloc, and move towards an understanding that 
identities are historically fluid, constantly in flux and continuously shift-
ing social categories and markers.
***
I have chosen to focus this account on young Muslim men for two rea-
sons. Firstly, I had relatively more access to men than I had to women. 
Although I did interact with and interview women (and some of their 
insights are implicit within the analysis), I was mindful of cultural sen-
sitivities pertaining to mixed-gendered interactions. Although women 
were generally keen to partake in the research, participant observation 
was limited to schools, colleges, and other public spaces, mostly during 
the daytime. On the other hand, I was able to access male informants in 
both private and public spaces, to share residential trips with them, and to 
stay in their homes. Secondly, while much anthropological attention has 
been bestowed on Muslim women in diaspora, particularly with regards 
to the hijab debate1 there is far less attention on Muslim men going about 
their everyday lives in the West.2 I find this group particularly interesting 
as, like the ‘hyper-masculine’ inner city black males before them,3 they 
have increasingly become categorised as the archetypical ‘folk devil’ by 
 INTrODUcTION 3
bourgeois society. Claire Alexander (2000) argues that the public per-
ception of Muslim men reflects ‘a growing concern with the “problem” of 
Asian youth – and more specifically, with the problem of Muslim young 
men.4 If they share the same well-established tropes of racial alienation 
and social breakdown that created, and continue to create, moral pan-
ics of Rastafarian drug dealers, black rioters, muggers and Yardies […], 
what they also reflect is a new cultural formation’ (Alexander 2000:4 
original emphasis). A year after her book was published, young Muslim 
men of Bangladeshi and Pakistani heritage made national news after 
race riots in the former industrial northern mill towns of Oldham, Burn-
ley and Bradford, in which 200 police officers were injured. According 
to Arun Kundnani, these riots represented an out-spilling of resentment 
after decades of state-endorsed segregation along ethnic and racial lines:
By the 1990s, a new generation of young Asians, born and bred 
in Britain, was coming of age in the northern towns, unwilling to 
accept the second-class status foisted on their elders. When racists 
came to their streets looking for a fight, they would meet violence 
with violence. And with the continuing failure of the police to tackle 
racist gangs, violent confrontations between groups of whites and 
Asians became more common (Kundnani 2001:108).
Negative perceptions of Muslim men were, of course, compounded by 
the events of 7/7, when four British Muslims, three of whom were of 
Pakistani origin, raised in Yorkshire, were posthumously found to be 
responsible for the attacks. The image of the male Muslim ‘folk devil’ was 
further crystallised by various all-male Muslim grooming gangs operat-
ing during the night-time economy in towns and cities across the coun-
try. Most recently, London and Manchester have witnessed a sequence of 
terror attacks orchestrated and executed by young British Muslim men. 
In addition to these, the British press has, since the declaration of the 
‘war on terror’, been consistently reporting on Muslim men travelling to 
Syria to join ISIS, plots to detonate homemade bombs in public places, 
and ideological ‘hate preachers’ running British mosques.5 This book, 
therefore, is an attempt to explore the lives of young Muslim men with 
these associated connotations in mind. Furthermore, I found that not 
only were young men acutely aware of these wider perceptions, but many 
engaged in sardonic and ironic performances in affirmation of such ste-
reotypes. ‘If you call someone an extremist for long enough, he might just 
become one’, one of my key informants reminded me. Thankfully, I did 
not come across many would-be or actual terrorists during my time in the 
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field. I did, however, meet with plenty of young men deeply annoyed and 
emotionally saturated by derogatory impressions of them in the public 
sphere. Almost twenty years on from Claire Alexander’s The Asian Gang, 
young Muslim men remain, it seems, a social ‘problem’.
One area where a sense of masculinity was particularly pronounced 
was in the realm of making money. My informants were committed to 
securing livelihoods that yielded maximum financial rewards. They were 
often encouraged to get a job and secure employment as soon as they 
possibly could by parents and grandparents. Once in a job, wages and 
profits were habitually funnelled into the family purse. The more earning 
power a given man had, the more social capital and gravitas he enjoyed 
among his peers and family. My informants were always quick to remind 
me that their parents or grandparents had ‘come here with nothing’, and 
that Britain provided a fertile ground to make money and ‘get rich’. They 
would compare themselves with cousins in Pakistan or Bangladesh, con-
cluding that they were fortunate to be in Britain, with all the economic 
opportunities that came with this. This memory of migration, and the will 
to work and provide, was a major component of what it meant to be a man. 
Here, my informants’ ‘style of masculinity’ resembled what Osella  and 
Osella refer to as the ‘gulfan’ in Keralan communities with a history of high 
migration to the Persian Gulf. They argue that the newfound wealth and 
status of returnee migrant workers from the Gulf accentuated characteris-
tics already locally associated with essentialised categories of masculinity.
The gulfan […] belongs to an intermediate category, not yet fully 
adult but with a central characteristic of adult maleness, money. 
Focus on cash as the defining characteristic of failed or successful 
gulfans, and the focus on consumer items brought and the expend-
iture while on visits at home, articulate with an idealized male 
life-cycle. Given that most gulfans begin their migration as young 
bachelors, leaving the village as immature youths (payyanmar), 
visits home are opportunities to demonstrate not only financial, but 
also age and gender-related progress. (Osella and Osella 2000:122)
Similarly, in Luton, young men conformed to essentialised or hegem-
onic notions of masculinity6 that I suggest are relational to temporal-
ities of migration and working-class socio-economic conditions. Being 
‘seen’ as rich and, therefore, ‘successful’ was a preoccupation for many 
of my male informants. In some cases, this desire even led to careers in 
criminality. In fact, being a criminal was highly desirable for many of my 
younger interlocutors, who aspired to possess the power and prestige 
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of locally known gangsters. There was a significant number of young 
men who left school without sufficient qualifications and entered a life 
of petty-criminality – usually dealing drugs or committing small-scale 
fraud. Once convicted, they found it near impossible to find legitimate 
employment. The worry for young Muslim men in Luton, therefore, is 
not that they are destined to become religious extremists, but whether 
they find a job before getting a criminal record.
The chapters of this book will provide a detailed ethnographic 
description of the everyday lives of my informants in Luton. I have 
organised the book into four core ethnographic chapters: ‘Luton’; 
‘Family’; ‘Friends’; and ‘Religion’. The logic is to introduce the reader 
to the various arenas of socialisation and identity construction that 
young men in Luton are familiarised with from an early age and carry 
into adulthood. In doing so, my hope is to provide a holistic picture of 
concomitant expectations and pressures that young men continuously 
juggle in their everyday lives. The chapters also shed light on how my 
informants develop novel ways to manage, allay and rearticulate famil-
ial and social expectations and perceptions as a pioneering generation 
in their own right.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the town of Luton and, in par-
ticular, Bury Park where the largest concentration of the town’s Muslims 
reside. It provides a geographical, social, and methodological context to 
the ensuing study. No other town in the British Isles with a significant 
Muslim population has received so much negative exposure since the dec-
laration of the war on terror. Ever since the 7/7 bombers rendezvoused in 
the town prior to travelling on to London, Bury Park has been associated 
with a string of terrorism-related controversies. In 2009, a protest was 
held in Luton by a militant Islamist group objecting to the homecoming 
march of an army regiment returning from a tour in Afghanistan. This 
incident received considerable media coverage at the time and sparked 
off fresh debates pertaining to what constitutes acceptable protest among 
Muslim communities. In 2010, an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen detonated 
two bombs in the centre of Stockholm, Sweden, causing his own death 
and injuring two passers-by. This individual had spent much of his adult 
life residing with his wife and children in Luton, where he was per-
ceived as a ‘normal’ member of the Muslim community. Luton is also the 
town where the radical far-right anti-Muslim organisation, the English 
Defence League (EDL) was founded in response to the above-mentioned 
protests held by Al-Muhajiroun in 2009. The EDL, originally named the 
‘United Peoples of Luton’, is a street protest movement that opposes what 
it considers to be a spread of Islamism, Sharia Law and Islamic extremism 
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in the UK. More recently, Luton has enhanced its reputation as a ‘site of 
fear’ with the brutal murder of Lee Rigby, a soldier in the British army, 
on the streets of London by two British Muslims claiming to act in the 
name of Islam. Rigby’s murderers had been ideologically associated with 
some individuals from the town. In addition, a number of young British 
Muslims have recently travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Islamist militias 
in the region. With these wider contexts in mind, the chapter will seek to 
question perceptions of the town, and ask whether it really is a hot bed 
for political radicalisation and cultural segregation.
Chapter 2 moves on to shed light on my informants’ relationships 
with family and the wider Muslim community. The vast majority of Luton’s 
Muslims are of South Asian origin (mainly from Pakistan and Bangladesh), 
and are descendants of pioneer economic migrants that came to Britain 
from the New Commonwealth in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
in order to satisfy labour shortages at the time. Although some returned 
to South Asia once their financial needs were met, the vast majority opted 
to remain and permanently settle in the UK. Despite the fact that families 
had made the commitment to stay, the significance of maintaining links 
with South Asia and, in particular, cultural notions of kinship and commu-
nity became very important. Community ‘elders’ were keen to enact South 
Asian etiquette, social relations, and moral/religious instruction within 
their households. This led to innovative re-enactments of South Asian fam-
ily norms in a British setting. Whereas such norms were broadly accepted 
and expanded upon by many within the second generation – a signifi-
cant proportion of whom moved to Britain as children or young adults – 
subsequent generations that have been born and raised in the UK were 
challenging the legitimacy of their South Asian heritage in providing a 
suitable cultural framework through which to live ostensibly ‘British’ lives. 
This chapter draws out some of these generational tensions and shows 
how young Muslims successfully manage expectations from the home 
alongside pressures from the wider society. The chapter demonstrates the 
way in which young Muslims accept and/or reject influences from both 
the ‘South Asian home’ and ‘white liberal society’ to create unique identi-
ties and subjectivities that succeed in undermining established notions of 
what it means to be British in the twenty-first century. The chapter charts 
the generational evolution of the community, bringing in voices from 
three generations of Luton’s Muslims. It provides ethnographic insights 
into how early migrants settled in the town, their encounters with racism 
and exclusion, and the ways in which community solidarity helped them 
overcome those early challenges. These accounts are contrasted with how 
young Muslim men now manage to juggle the expectations from home 
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with those from the outside world. This includes discussions pertaining 
to the ever-dwindling institution of arranged marriages, the development 
of intra-family gender relations, and expectations of moral conduct and 
‘honour’ within family and community spaces.
Chapter 3 explores my informants’ exposure to the world of work, 
making friends and having ‘fun’. Even though Bury Park is a predomi-
nantly South Asian area of Luton, young Muslims were exposed to oth-
ers from different ethnic and religious backgrounds from an early age. In 
addition to influences from the home, such interactions have profoundly 
shaped the way young Muslims self-identify and how they view others in 
society. In many cases, non-Muslims were regarded as close friends, men-
tors, colleagues, teammates, and even lovers. This chapter explores the 
role of social environments and spaces – such as school, university, sports 
and social clubs, and the workplace – in making friends and socialising. 
Muslim parents in Luton generally encouraged education, in line with 
broader trends within the wider South Asian diaspora. Consequently, a 
large number of young Muslims were pushed to regularly attend school 
and sixth-form colleges, and some went on to university. It is within these 
educational spaces that strong and lasting bonds were established with 
peers from all backgrounds. Similarly, those who did not continue with 
further education created relationships with neighbours and colleagues 
at work, were members of sports teams, attended youth centres, and 
visited the local mosque. Through these interactions, my informants 
were not only able to challenge and re-shape perceptions regarding their 
community, but also developed the ability to adopt and adapt to wider 
cultural and political paradigms. The chapter will aim to highlight how 
this process is necessarily integrative yet seldom remarked upon, and how 
it contributes to broader processes of multiculturalism that go beyond 
established state orthodoxies in policies and outlook.
Finally, Chapter 4 of the book investigates relationships and atti-
tudes that young Muslims have developed with Islam and being Muslim 
in post-9/11 Britain. Since the declaration of the war on terror, British 
Muslim communities have come under considerable pressure to deal 
with the threat of radicalisation. Often, Muslim communities have been 
blamed by the state for the creation of closed, culturally segregated envi-
ronments necessary for extremism to allegedly thrive. This has led to the 
enacting of numerous counter-terrorism laws and state-sponsored pre-
vention strategies that disproportionally target British Muslims, causing 
community-wide resentment and suspicion towards the government. In 
addition, media depictions and discussions of Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ 
within society and a ‘social problem’ have cemented public discourses 
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regarding Muslims that are recklessly reductive and homogenising. 
Curiously, in response to a wider atmosphere of hostility, young Muslims 
in Luton have seemingly gravitated more towards their religious identity 
as a means of expressing resistance to wider social perceptions, but also 
in solidarity with other Muslims both in Britain and around the world. 
For many young men in Luton, being a Muslim did not abrogate or under-
mine identifying with Britain, and they were keen to point out how they 
seamlessly merged. This chapter will seek to demonstrate how ‘return-
ing to Islam’ has become an embedded symbol of resistance against 
Islamophobia, and how a distinct political identity plays out in the every-
day lives of young Muslims. The chapter explores how notions of piety 
and spiritual devotion entangle with everyday political expressions of 
defiance against popular Islamophobia underpinned by responses to 
draconian legislation. It illustrates my informants’ solidarity with fellow 
Muslims in other parts of the Islamic world, who are perceived as victims 
of aggressive Western foreign policies in the era of the ‘war on terror’.
Notes
1. See Abu Lughod 2002; Ward 2006; Jouili 2009; and Fadil 2009.
2. Compare with Alexander 2000; Archer 2003; Alam 2006; and Hopkins 2008.
3. See Alexander 1996.
4. Compare with Archer 2003.
5. See Morey and Yaqin 2011.
6. See Archer 2003.
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This book is a contribution to scholarly approaches to the anthropology 
of Islam, both past and present. Anthropological approaches to the study 
of Islam and Muslims have been much contested in the sub-discipline’s 
relatively short history. Initial interest was sparked by Clifford Geertz’s 
(1971) famous thesis on the importance of religious symbols in provid-
ing cosmological meanings to individuals’ everyday lives. This ‘cultural’ 
view was challenged by Ernest Gellner’s (1981) sociological interven-
tions, which argued that Islam is a means by which society is ordered. 
Gellner suggests that, since Islam is a scriptural religion that lays down 
permanent laws and principles pertaining to how to organise society, and 
given that that scripture was ‘completed’ by the mission of the Prophet 
Mohammed, Muslim society is one where religion and the state become 
enmeshed as one. Sociological order, therefore, is sustained by a class of 
proto-politicians who are also religious authorities at the same time, much 
like the Prophet himself. Further, it is this class of scholar-cum-politician 
that provides for social order and consequent solidarity in Islamic com-
munities. Michael Gilsenan (1982), however, took a different approach. 
He argued that Islam or religion should not necessarily be the primary 
focus for anthropologists when studying Muslim societies. Rather, other 
social, economic and political factors need also be incorporated if one 
is to attain a holistic ethnographic account of the people and communi-
ties under study. For Gilsenan, then, Islam was indeed a core component 
of life in the Middle East. However the weight of other conflicting and 
parallel social phenomena co-existing with ‘the religious’ meant that any 
account where religious symbols or agents provide a totalising coherence 
to quotidian lives did not suffice as an accurate ethnographic picture.
In tandem with these epistemological developments, was the idea 
proposed by Abdel Hamid El-Zein (1977) that there is no such thing 
as an ‘anthropology of Islam’. His work implies that both Geertz and 
Gellner were guilty of ‘essentialising’ Islam in their respective symbolic 
and sociological approaches. For El-Zein, ‘Islam’ was only relevant in 
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local contexts where the religion took particular vernacularised and idi-
osyncratic social forms. How Islam was socially articulated in Tanzania 
is quite different from, say, Indonesia, for example. The logical conclu-
sion, therefore, is that ethnographic evidence suggests that there is no 
one Islam, but a collection of Islams that exist and have always existed in 
various parts of the world. It is thus the task of the anthropologist to draw 
out these differences for the purpose of comparative analysis which, he 
posits, is the intellectual basis of the discipline. Perhaps the most ardent 
critic of this perspective is Talal Asad (1986). In his seminal essay ‘The 
Idea of an Anthropology of Islam’, Asad attempts to identify and define 
Islam as an ‘analytical object of study’. He argues against his forebears 
that Islam can be reduced to a system of symbols and social structure, or 
that it is a ‘heterogeneous bundle of beliefs, artefacts, customs and mor-
als’ (1986:14). Instead, Asad claims that Islam is a ‘discursive tradition’ 
which is ultimately based on reference to the Qur’an and Hadith (bio-
graphical accounts of the Prophet). He suggests that all Muslims defer 
to the holy texts of Islam, and place them above all other forms of onto-
logical reference. In order to conduct a ‘proper’ anthropological study 
of Islam, therefore, one must be prepared to locate particular religious 
or theological discourses that inform Muslim practitioners. Moreover, 
Asad alerts us to the idea that all Muslims seek and strive for a sense of 
religious ‘orthodoxy’ in their lives, regardless of the respective sectarian 
differences that exist between different Muslim groups. All Muslims, he 
claims, are invested in practising Islam in ways they deem to be accept-
able in the eyes of God, linked to particular conceptions of temporality. 
This ‘discourse’ is always associated with scripture but manifests in dif-
ferent ways in different social contexts:
Orthodoxy is crucial to all Islamic traditions […] [It] is not a mere 
body of opinion but a distinctive relationship – a relationship of 
power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, 
require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, under-
mine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy. 
The way these powers are exercised, the conditions that make them 
possible (social, political, economic etc.), and the resistances they 
encounter (from Muslims and non-Muslims) are equally the con-
cern of an anthropology of Islam, regardless of whether its direct 
object of research is in the city or in the countryside, in the present 
or in the past. Argument and conflict over the form and significance 
of practises are therefore a natural part of any Islamic tradition. 
(Asad 1986:15 original emphasis)
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Discerning ‘correct’ practices from ‘incorrect’ ones, therefore, is 
the vital part of any anthropological toolkit when exploring the lives of 
Muslims, according to Asad. Any endeavour that does not begin from the 
concept of a discursive tradition relating to the founding texts of Islam – 
‘as Muslims do’ – is futile since Islam is, first and foremost, ‘a tradition’.
Asad’s sophisticated and seemingly radical contention was well-re-
ceived by some, and a number of notable works have since emerged 
where Islam is indeed understood as a discursive tradition.1 These works 
broadly trace the role of religious law in informing ethical practices in 
the lives of ‘pious’ Muslims. Although they do not deny the existence of 
a world beyond the mosque or religious court per se, protagonists are 
usually located within a habitus where religious seeking for the sake 
of spiritual coherence is pronounced. This can be misleading, since not 
all Muslims are seeking ethical and spiritual perfection all of the time 
(if this is indeed possible). Moreover, a number of more recent ethno-
graphic accounts have demonstrated that Muslims are, more often than 
not, constantly oscillating between and traversing through a number 
of concomitant ‘moral registers’, ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘multiple identi-
ties’.2 These scholars propose that, instead of focusing on textual Islam 
as an informative source for conducting ethnography, a more nuanced 
approach would be to demonstrate how Islam is ‘lived’ by its adherents. 
Through this method, anthropologists can observe the points of disjunc-
ture, ambivalence, and everyday slippages that litter the lives of Asad’s 
‘discursive’ Muslim searching for orthodoxy. At the same time, the lives 
of ‘non-practising’, ‘lapsed’ or ‘nominal’ Muslims can also be absorbed 
into the anthropological gaze. In so doing, a more beleaguered, torn 
and incoherent subject is brought to the fore, thereby demonstrating the 
complexities and contradictions of Muslims lives. In fact, Samuli Schielke 
(2010), a keen advocate of the ‘lived Islam’ approach, has even suggested 
that ‘there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam’.
Although there is much to take note of from Schielke’s intersectional 
insights as a methodological starting point – particularly with regards 
to moving focus away from the ‘ethical habitus’3 – my own exposure to 
Muslims in Luton suggests ‘Islam’, ‘the text’, and a quest for ‘orthodoxy’ 
maintained resonance with all of my informants (I did not meet anyone 
who claimed not to believe in Islam). Moreover, ‘being Muslim’ not only 
meant striving for moral coherence (however difficult and thankless), 
but brought with it a distinct political identity that, I suggest, is particu-
lar to and seemingly acute among Muslims living in the West.4 The vast 
majority of my informants struggled with being a ‘good Muslim’,5 but 
this did not deter them. Moreover, being Muslim in the post-9/11 world 
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engendered my informants with a will to ‘represent’ and ‘defend’ their 
religion against a perceived tide of antagonism and suspicion from White 
liberal society. I spent time with young men who purposefully missed 
prayers, refused to fast, dealt drugs, fornicated regularly and yet argued 
that women should wear the hijab, planned trips to Mecca for pilgrimage 
and always ate halal food. This ‘ambivalence’, as Schielke rightly puts it, 
stood side-by-side with a cogent, conscious and coherent sense of being 
‘Other’ within their own society. This manifested most prominently in a 
suspicion towards the discursive and institutional influences of the state,6 
and a longing to be contingent with the utopian habitus of the interna-
tional fraternity of Muslims (ummah).7
In the post-9/11 world, being a young Muslim in diaspora offers up 
a particular set of challenges. There is a qualitative difference between 
my informants and their peers living in Muslim-majority countries.8 It 
is premised on a particular history and retrospective memory of migra-
tion that is intrinsically linked with the global flow of colonial labour in 
the aftermath of the Second World War.9 These economic ‘push factors’,10 
coupled with subsequent immigration restrictions11 led, eventually, to 
the permanent settlement of mostly Caribbean and South Asian families 
in Britain. Of this cohort, Muslims comprised the largest ethno-religious 
group (predominantly originating from Kashmir, Punjab, Gujarat and 
East Bengal).12 My young informants in Luton were well acquainted with 
stories of such migration, the struggles that pioneer migrants faced when 
they first arrived and, importantly, how the fortunes of their family (both 
in Britain and South Asia) were revolutionised as a result.
Once settled in Britain, these working-class ‘strangers’ were con-
fronted with a host of institutional and political hurdles, particularly 
in the struggle for ethnic and racial recognition.13 Despite a sustained 
period of unified race-based political mobilisation in the 1970s (the dec-
ade when immigration from the New Commonwealth was permanently 
curtailed), previous unity became fragmented following the advent of 
Multiculturalism as state policy in Britain. This was implemented in reac-
tion to a series of race riots in the early 1980s, staged within ethnic ‘ghet-
tos’ across the country.14 The British government’s response to structural 
racism, (on this occasion, in the specific form of police brutality), was 
to instigate a set of policies that sought to ‘celebrate cultural diversity’.15 
In effect, it disintegrated previous class solidarities, as various ‘ethnic’ 
groups jostled for newly ring-fenced state funds and recognition. This 
period of structural change, I suggest, produced certain material and dis-
cursive conditions that succeeded in cementing particular conceptions of 
the British Muslim community (both internal and external) that survive 
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to the present day. Moreover, arguably no other event (including 9/11) 
has played a more significant role in simultaneously illuminating and 
demonising British Muslims than the ‘Satanic Verses’ affair of 1989.16 
Multiculturalist policies implemented throughout the 1980s attempted 
to institutionalise essentialist conceptions of minority ‘cultures’ by 
encouraging different minority groups to vie for government subsidies: 
‘Different ethnic groups were [thus] pressed into competing for grants for 
their areas. The result was that black communities became fragmented, 
horizontally by ethnicity, vertically by class’ (Kundnani 2002:69).
British Muslims, being one such group, were propelled into the pub-
lic imaginary by the fervent protests and public burning of The Satanic 
Verses in Bradford, a northern ex-mill town where a substantial Muslim 
community continues to reside. These scenes were received with horror 
by White liberal society, as sensational images of people burning books, 
circulated in the press, brought back memories of Nazi Germany.17 Prior 
to this watershed moment, British Muslims were seen as ‘Asians’ or even 
as politically ‘Black’.18 The Satanic Verses affair separated British Muslims 
from other minority groups. It made them ‘visible’. Moreover, it was a 
public expression of the Multiculturalist vision, albeit an unintended 
one. Muslims became identified along ethno-cultural lines, along with 
other minority groups, such as British Sikhs for example.19 Culturally, 
they were no longer ‘British-Pakistanis’ but were now primarily recog-
nised as ‘British Muslims’. The controversy created a seminal shift in both 
how the wider British public viewed Muslims within their midst, and 
also how Muslims themselves self-identified. By the time my ‘millennial’ 
informants witnessed the events of 9/11 and, later, the London bomb-
ings of 2005 (7/7), they were already socialised along ethno-religious 
lines. Multiculturalist policies and public discourse, therefore, played a 
direct role in cultivating communal identities. Notably, the implemen-
tation of such policies followed on from the breakdown of trust between 
ethnic minority groups and the state, caused by fundamental structural 
inequalities. Moreover, although similar patterns of settlement could be 
observed throughout Europe and North America at the time,20 the British 
case is specifically contingent on a particular colonial genealogy.21 Any 
credible ethnographic inquiry into British Muslims of South Asian origin, 
therefore, must be sensitive to these formative historical machinations.
Such conditions, specific to diaspora, provide an additional met-
onymic node to the anthropological study of Islam in order to move 
beyond classical fixations on tribes, harems and ‘men of piety’.22 I sug-
gest that its catchment must include the study of diaspora, post-colonial 
subjectivities and transnational social forms. This book thus attempts to 
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supplement anthropological works situated in the ‘centre’ of the Islamic 
world, through an appraisal of its ‘peripheries’. It draws ethnographic 
attention to how state narratives and policies possess the potential to 
balkanise its citizenry, explores the teleological impact of migration and 
generational renewal, and demonstrates how Muslims born into minor-
ity status are developing novel political identities in the post-9/11 world. 
In doing so, I hope to expand on classical and contemporary debates 
within the anthropology of Islam, and provide an area of inquiry that 
embraces both textual and quotidian approaches to studying Muslims. 
Moreover, an inquiry that sheds ethnographic light on the lives of those 
Muslims who, as Olivier Roy (2004) argues, are ‘culturally’ and ‘territori-
ally’ detached from the Islamic world.23
***
By the time the events of 9/11 became known, Multiculturalist doctrines 
were fully embedded. As the fallout from the atrocities unfolded, Mus-
lims in Britain already shared a common identity that was, as we’ve seen, 
endorsed by the state. The months following on from those events were 
a particularly tense and anxious time for British Muslims. Many faced 
various forms of discrimination, from bearded men being refused entry 
onto public coaches, to the overnight termination of large commercial 
contracts with Muslim-owned businesses, to veiled women being abused 
in the streets.24 All of my informants retained significant memories of this 
period, and many of them held strong political views on the subsequent 
‘war on terror’. It is also important to note here that many of my inform-
ants came of age in a political milieu dominated by events concerning 
Muslims from around the world. I have already discussed the significance 
of the Rushdie affair in 1989 in pushing the British Muslim community 
into the public gaze. The Rushdie affair was shortly followed by the out-
break of wars and violent skirmishes involving civilians in a number of 
Muslim-dominated regions in Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo), and 
Asia (Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir). Notably, they all took place prior to 
9/11. Images and reports of destroyed mosques, widespread displace-
ment and carnage, and high civilian death tolls were consumed by my 
interlocutors on a regular basis. British Muslims, who considered them-
selves as part of the international Muslim community (ummah), were 
active in campaigning in support of the victims, consistently lobbying the 
government to reach resolutions. So many of my informants (particularly 
those old enough to remember) claimed that they felt the same sense of 
solidarity with Muslims from other parts of the world as they did with 
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fellow British Muslims.25 Moreover, this is precisely the arena where the 
emotional efficacy of a common ‘discursive tradition’ as Asad describes 
it, can be observed.
The idea of the ummah is one sanctioned by the holy scriptures in 
Islam. Specific nuances of its meaning and definition have often been dis-
puted by theologians. However, the notion of a common humanity and 
solidarity between Muslims is one supported by unequivocal references 
in the Qur’an and Hadith literature:
Indeed, [all] Muslims are brothers (Qur’an: Al-Hujarat: 10).
The example of Muslims in their mutual love, mercy and sym-
pathy is like that of a body; if one of the organs is afflicted, the whole 
body responds with sleeplessness and fever (Hadith-Muslim).
These references were often memorised and recited by my interlocutors 
to demonstrate the encompassing Islamic obligation to stand united with 
co-believers across the world. Such transnational loyalties almost always 
contradicted British foreign policy throughout the 2000s, (including dur-
ing my own fieldwork). Particularly pertinent for our purposes here, how-
ever, is the almost universal consensus among my informants, young and 
old, that Western foreign policy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine was 
unacceptable and tantamount to a ‘war against Muslims’. Many claimed 
the only motivation for military interventions in Muslim lands was due to 
a scramble for natural resources. My interlocutors were thus highly critical 
of the British state, with their loyalties clearly aligned to the fate of co-re-
ligionists rather than the interests of their country of residence. Terence 
Turner posits such divided loyalties as the ‘postmodernist reaction to the 
delegitimization of the state and erosion of the hegemony of the dominant 
culture in advanced capitalist countries’ (1993:423). He suggests that:
[P]eople all over the world have turned to ethnic and cultural iden-
tity as a means of mobilizing themselves for the defence of their social 
and political-economic interests. The increasing political importance 
of culture as an ideological vehicle for the new forms of ethnic nation-
alism and identity politics that have accompanied the weakening or 
collapse of colonial empires and multiethnic states, has made it a 
favoured idiom of political mobilization for resistance against central 
political authorities and hegemonic national cultures. (Turner 1993)
My informants in Luton certainly maintained an unmistakable cama-
raderie with those they perceived to share a common cultural and 
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historical heritage. Many attended and organised marches, rallies and 
lectures in solidarity with Muslims in Palestine and Iraq, for example. 
Unity with international Muslims was complemented by unity with 
those living in the UK, who were also included within the aegis of the 
ummah.26 Here, too, fellow Muslims were perceived to be victims of the 
‘war on terror’, most pronounced through the manner in which Mus-
lims had been profiled in the media;27 and, perhaps more significantly, 
in reaction to the government’s PREVENT strategy, designed to tackle 
extremism and radicalisation. Studies have shown that British Muslim 
communities have been largely suspicious of the latter28. Counter-terror-
ism policies are grounded in ‘intervention strategies’ that theologically 
challenge ‘extremist’ positions. Such strategies rely on the cooperation 
of Muslim communities in identifying and participating in interven-
tions, while also paradoxically targeting them as a ‘suspect community’29. 
Being seen as a target community and, at the same time, being expected 
to lead the charge against radicalisation has led to widespread confu-
sion and resentment among Muslims and mistrust towards government. 
Muslims felt compelled to ‘apologise’ for their religion as a result of the 
actions of militants around the world who purport ideas and actions that 
many consider to be acts of overt political transgression rather than any 
attempt at scriptural conformity.30 In the face of the perceived interna-
tional persecution of Muslims as a result of Western foreign policy, and 
the further marginalisation of Muslims at home, depicted as a ‘suspect 
community’ or ‘fifth column’, the conception of the ummah as an eman-
cipatory social form and ‘site for resistance’ took root among my young 
informants. Feeling for the ummah was not only a religious obligation, 
but also a political necessity for the times. By being conscious of and, in 
many cases, overtly expressing resentment and criticism of British for-
eign and domestic policy towards Muslims, my informants were actively 
in the process of subverting established state narratives of citizenship 
and belonging. Moreover, my informants were able to navigate this ‘dou-
ble consciousness’, as W.E.B. Du Bois aptly put it, in one of two ways. 
They had recourse either to an abstract, imagined utopia of the ummah in 
the face of wider hostilities, or to what Franz Fanon claimed to be ‘some 
very beautiful and splendid era whose existence rehabilitates us both in 
regard to ourselves and in regard to others’ in order to escape ‘the mis-
ery of everyday life, self-contempt, resignation and abjuration’ (Fanon in 
Hall 1993:394).
The ummah thus acted as an abstract ‘space’, that Gupta and 
Ferguson (1997) describe as ‘a neutral grid’ within which post-mod-
ern transnational communities inscribe ‘cultural difference, historical 
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memory and societal organisation’ (1997:34). However, ummah, as my 
informants understood it, further subverts this idea to necessarily cre-
ate a space that is devoid of culture, history, or society in order to suit 
the culturally flattening conditions of diaspora. Moreover, my inform-
ants politicised its meaning. It was a utopian habitus where categories 
of class, race and gender collapsed. The ummah was an inclusive realm 
within which all Muslims of the world were united. The way in which 
Muslims in Luton conceptualised the ummah forms a fundamental 
component of my argument in this book. I argue that young Muslims in 
Luton are increasingly becoming attracted to what Olivier Roy refers to 
as globalised Islam (2004). He suggests that Muslims living in the West 
resist culturally alienating state narratives, as well as the equally alien 
South Asian ‘culture’ of their parents, by valorising their Muslim iden-
tity, which transcends national or ethnic allegiances. Roy argues that the 
combination of globalisation, westernisation and the increase in world-
wide Muslim diasporas has led to a reimagining of the ummah. A ‘global 
Muslim’ can mean either:
Muslims who settled permanently in non-Muslim countries (mainly 
in the West), or Muslims who try to distance themselves from 
a given Muslim culture and to stress their belonging to a univer-
sal ummah, whether in a purely quietist way or through political 
action. (2004:ix)
Roy claims that second and third generations in diaspora are particularly 
attracted to the doctrines of globalised Islam due to the fact that they 
are ‘de-territorialised’ from the Islamic heartlands. Moreover, they are 
dissuaded by the alienating cultural proclivities of both the host com-
munity, and particular non-Islamic cultural preoccupations of preceding 
generations. Instead, the appeal of being a member of the ummah, united 
by a common belief that transcends race, ethnicity and nationality is par-
ticularly powerful. In the post-colonial world, the ‘ummah no longer has 
anything to do with a territorial entity’, but now must be ‘thought of in 
abstract or imaginary terms’ (2004:19 my emphasis).
He goes on to suggest that Muslims in diaspora are also captivated 
by the notion of a ‘glorious Islamic past’ promoted by various reform-
ist thinkers and groups. This conception of history resonated with many 
of my interlocutors in Luton, especially those disenfranchised by the 
regional ‘folk Islam’ professed by members of the older generations.31 
Young Muslims regarded the Islam practised in the home to be more ‘cul-
tural’ than ‘religious’.32 They argued that their parents often conflated 
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South Asian ‘cultural’ practices with Islam. This realisation led many to 
engage in debate and discussion with their parents, mosque imams and 
elders in the community.33 The pursuit for a ‘pure’ Islam, devoid of pol-
luting cultural influences, is consistent with what Roy’s defines as ‘decul-
turalised Islam’:
The construction of a ‘deculturalised’ Islam is a means of experienc-
ing a religious identity that is not linked to a given culture and can 
therefore fit with every culture, or, more precisely, could be defined 
beyond the very notion of culture […] The new generation of edu-
cated, Western born-again Muslims do not want to be Pakistanis or 
Turks; they want to be Muslims first. (2004:22–5)
Homi Bhabha (1994) suggests that explorations of the fragmented cul-
tural identities of post-colonial subjects, particularly those generated 
within the modern diaspora, must escape essentialist paradigms and seek 
to unearth the discursive spaces that exist ‘in-between’ dominant politi-
cal and ontological discourses. Bhabha’s proposition of the ‘third-dimen-
sion’ is particularly pertinent for our purposes here. He argues that the 
historical ruptures and transformations which occur as a result of mass 
movement of people across continents profoundly disrupt the applicabil-
ity and generation of previously held ‘traditions’. Confronted with a new 
environment, minority subjectivities embark upon a process of novel and 
innovative re-articulation. He claims that:
What is theoretically imperative, and politically crucial, is the need 
to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and 
focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the artic-
ulation of cultural differences. The “in-between” spaces provide the 
terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or commu-
nal – that initiate new signs of identity, an innovative site of collabo-
ration, and contestation, in the act of defining society itself. (1994:2)
Bhabha focuses on the idiosyncratic character of new ‘hybrid’ forms of 
identity that occur as a consequence of cultural interaction. He identifies 
a ‘third-space’, which is ‘invisible’ to prevalent homogenising discourses 
of the nation-state, where cultural meanings and subjectivities are con-
tinually reproduced and innovated to create cosmopolitanisms that 
transcend and undermine national narratives of cultural homogeneity. 
Bhabha’s approach corresponds with the way my own informants gen-
erated new identities in the ‘in-between’ spaces of the home and wider 
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society, informed by the attitudes and discourses that dominate both 
spheres, and yet are distinct from it.
Diaspora cultural (re)production of this kind is further verified by the 
works of Paul Gilroy. Based on research conducted among Britain’s post-war 
Afro-Caribbean communities, Gilroy locates the production of black iden-
tities in the diaspora within the milieu of anti-racism struggles in Britain 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. He focuses on the popular appeal 
of politically subversive Afro-Caribbean music produced in this period. 
Through various cultural mediums, Gilroy contends that black youths 
developed dynamic forms of political resistance that were unique and flexi-
ble and that went beyond classical forms of proletarian organisation.34 He is 
critical of traditional Marxist cultural approaches that seek to simply situate 
working class ‘black expressive cultures’ as characteristically ‘anti-racism’. 
He suggests that Black-British culture transcends the narrow confines of the 
politics of anti-racism and ethnic absolutism and incorporates all the tax-
onomical complexities of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’ and ‘culture’, as well as 
‘class’, to produce something new and unremarked. He writes:
Black Britain defines itself crucially as part of a diaspora. Its unique 
cultures draw inspiration from those developed by black popula-
tions elsewhere. In particular, the culture and politics of black 
America and the Caribbean have become raw materials for crea-
tive processes which redefine what it means to be black, adapting 
it to distinctively British experiences and meanings. Black culture is 
actively made and remade. (1987:202)
Gilroy alludes to a process of ‘cultural syncretism’, which emerged within 
the black diaspora in Britain that had galvanised at a particular political 
moment. Yet, at the same time, he reminds us that the diaspora should 
not be analysed as separate from the British social fabric. Black culture, 
he argues, should be considered a significant interlocutor within the 
‘ever-in-process’ British cultural mosaic:
An intricate web of cultural and political connections binds blacks 
here to blacks elsewhere. At the same time, they are linked in the 
social relations of this country. Both dimensions have to be exam-
ined and the contradictions and continuities which exist between 
them must be brought out. (1987:205)
This approach is entirely apposite within the context of my interlocutors 
in Luton. Like black youths in the 1980s, young Muslims have developed 
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politicised identities in the face of turbulent global events and the bur-
geoning of local suspicions against them. In contrast to Gilroy’s black 
youth, it is not necessarily their ‘race’ which is divisive in social relations, 
but their religion. Moreover, it is the dual cultural and political capacity 
of the imagined ummah that ‘binds [Muslims] here to [Muslims] else-
where’ within a domain of mutual struggle and solidarity against neo-lib-
eral forces of domination.
Similarly, Stuart Hall reminds us that identity should not be viewed 
as an already accomplished fact, but as a ‘production which is never com-
plete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation’ (Hall 1993:392 my emphasis). He posits that displaced 
communities attempt to collectively essentialise identity in an attempt 
to impose a ‘shared culture’, even where this process seems difficult to 
engender.35 Cohesion, he argues, is achieved through displaying unified 
projections of ideological solidarity even where such solidarity is super-
ficial or artificially imposed. Borrowing from Fanon, he suggests that 
the experience of colonisation has contributed towards the ‘emptying of 
the natives’ brain of all form and content’. Colonial authorities, he pos-
its, reshaped the historical trajectories of the subject populations to the 
extent of ‘distorting, disfiguring and destroying them’ (1993). Once fully 
conscious of these historical mutations, the colonised attempt to unearth 
that which the colonial experience has buried and overlaid. He concludes 
that:
Cultural identities are the points of identifications, the unstable 
points of identification, which are made, within the discourses of 
history and culture … not an essence but a positioning … hence 
there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position, which has 
no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental law of 
origin. (Hall 1993:395)
Black-British identity has emerged from heterogeneous roots as slaves 
were taken from different countries, tribal communities, villages, linguis-
tic groups and religious traditions. However, the specific conditions of 
displacement and diaspora have led to the generation of novel Black-Brit-
ish subjectivities that seek to reach beyond the confines of the exclusivist 
nation state. Black-Britishness functions as a unifying counter-culture 
against the trials of social marginalisation. Similarly, in Luton, the ummah 
was conceptualised as an effective means of reconciling a sense of per-
ceived ‘Otherness’ in society, made possible by Orientalist stereotyping 
of Muslims as exotic, visceral and violent in the popular imagination.36 
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My informants, self-identifying as they did, must thus be contextualised 
within specific historical, social, economic and political developments 
that have shaped their intersectional and often contradictory opinions, 
emotions, and loyalties throughout their lifetime. These conditions have 
given rise to unique vernacular and hybrid forms of British Muslim iden-
tity based on national and transnational solidarities, personal piety and 
salvation, and a recalibration of what it means to be British in today’s 
post-colonial Britain.37
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1
Luton
Luton is a horrible town. I commuted there first from my home in Surrey 
and later from my new residence in East London. Sometimes I drove but 
usually I took the train. My field site was mainly centred around Bury Park, 
an area close to Luton’s town centre. Bury Park is a very interesting place. 
There the majority of Luton’s share of post-war New Commonwealth 
migrants live and, in particular, it is the home of Luton’s substantial Mus-
lim community.1 The majority hail from Muslim-majority parts of South 
Asia, particularly from Pakistan and Bangladesh.2 I did not know it at the 
time of research but Luton is also home to the English Defence League 
(EDL). The EDL is a far-right protest movement with branches all over 
the British Isles. Although they claim not to be racist, its supporters are 
unapologetically Islamophobic.3 Luton itself has often been criticised by 
the EDL (as well as some outside observers) as being a hub for religious 
(read: Islamic) radicalisation. This is thought to be taking place within 
its Muslim community. ‘Militant Islam’ as the former leader of the EDL, 
Tommy Robinson, described it. Robinson (real name Stephen Lennon) 
grew up in Luton, but not in Bury Park. He lives instead in a predomi-
nantly white working-class part of the town. He does not often venture 
into Bury Park because, in his own words, it’s a ‘Muslim part of town’. 
His town. Years of publicly ranting against Muslims and their religion has 
made him a marked man on the other side of town. Being a pariah in his 
own town is said to be a driving force behind his activism. That and the 
endless attention he receives from the British mainstream media.
The straw that finally broke Robinson’s back, however, came in 
2009, a few months after I had completed fieldwork. Luton was set to 
host the homecoming march of the Royal Anglian Regiment, returning 
from a tour in Afghanistan. It was to face resistance. A dozen or so mem-
bers of the hard-line Salafi4 group Al-Muhajiroun (AM) – mainly from 
outside of Luton – organised a counter-rally. They heckled the troops, 
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shouting out ‘Terrorists’ and ‘Butchers of Basra’ as the returning veterans 
marched past. They also held up placards with ‘Shariah for the UK’ and 
‘Hands Off Muslims’. Back then, AM believed in establishing a worldwide 
‘Islamic’ caliphate.5 Their ultra-literalist creed (and political ideology) 
dictates that establishing Shariah rule is a fundamental tenet of faith 
(aqeeda), and Muslims everywhere and anywhere should be steadfast in 
the fulfilment of this duty (fard). Naturally, of course, for AM this call 
also applied to Muslims living as a minority in the UK. Interestingly, at 
the time, AM only operated in the UK. It had no branches, influence or 
followers (for that matter), in any majority-Muslim country. In response, 
Robinson and his friends created the United Peoples of Luton (UPL). The 
UPL later morphed into the nationwide EDL as it grew in momentum and 
consolidated its identity as an anti-Islam nationalist movement.
Bury Park is also infamous for being the home of the so-called 
‘Stockholm bomber’, Taimor Abdulwahab al-Abdaly – an Iraqi-born 
Swedish citizen who detonated a homemade bomb in the centre of 
Stockholm in 2010, killing himself and injuring two passers-by. He was 
said to have lived a ‘normal life’ in Luton with his wife and small children. 
Abdaly attended the same Salafi mosque where I conducted fieldwork, 
and was known as a quiet but ‘decent’ family man by members of the con-
gregation that knew him. Furthermore, Michael Adebolajo and Michael 
Adebowale, the two men that killed the British Army soldier Lee Rigby in 
2013, were also identified as having strong links with Luton. As members 
of AM, the two regularly appeared in the town for missionary (dawa) 
purposes, and on many occasions tried to recruit some of my informants. 
Since these events, ISIS established its version of the caliphate in parts of 
Iraq and Syria. Some AM members consequently left Britain to join the 
movement. AM’s leader, Anjem Choudary, was jailed in 2016 for support-
ing ISIS. He too was a regular visitor to Luton, delivering public speeches 
and campaigning for the caliphate in the streets of Bury Park. In 2017, 
Khurram Shazad Butt, a member of AM, was responsible for the London 
Bridge attacks, killing eight members of the public. Most recently, Khalid 
Masood, the 2017 Westminster Bridge attacker, who killed five people 
and injured over 50 more, was also a one-time resident of Luton. In fact, 
he was employed as an Arabic teacher at the very mosque where I had 
conducted fieldwork. His views and activities at the time, however, were 
unknown to most in the congregation.
Luton, then, has seen some very unsavoury characters. It has often 
been perceived as a ‘site of fear’ due to its links to terrorism and various 
forms of radical political groups. It is also a post-industrial landscape and, 
as such, it is a bit of an eyesore. Not least around Bury Park. The centre 
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of town – where I got off the train – is located about a ten-minute walk 
away. It has a rather unremarkable pedestrianised high street containing 
the usual chains of retail outlets and banks. Bury Park is located to the 
north-west of the centre and, to get to it, one has to negotiate a gauntlet 
of grubby steel and concrete in the shape of ring-roads, roundabouts and 
urine-infested subways. A sharp turn and the landscape changes, as well 
as the decibel levels. Bury Park itself is home to row upon row of poky 
red-brick terraced houses from a bygone era. The tiny ‘gardens’ behind 
the front walls were usually jammed full of an assortment of green and 
purple ‘wheelie’ bins, and the occasional inflatable crocodile. The faces 
are also different from those in the centre of town. The majority of the 
residents here are South Asian in origin and Muslim in religion. This 
is most tellingly illustrated by the assortment of mosques that I pass 
by. Luton has a total of twenty-five mosques, the majority of which are 
located in Bury Park. Mosque congregations here are dependent on sec-
tarian orientation, ancestry and pragmatism. I pass a mosque attended 
predominantly by the town’s Konkani Muslim Community,6 another 
aligned to Saudi Arabia, and another with a majority Bangladeshi-origin 
congregation.
Eventually my path converges with Dunstable Road, the busiest sec-
tion of which is a semi-pedestrianised retail district, stretching for approx-
imately a quarter of a mile. This is where it all happens. The thoroughfare 
is home to dozens of saree shops, halal butchers, fast-food outlets, restau-
rants and grocery stores – the majority of which are owned and staffed 
by people who are ostensibly of South Asian origin. Dunstable Road is 
always busy with people shopping, eating, catching up with friends, and 
even preaching. Once a week, the chaos calms for an hour or so, as hun-
dreds of Bury Park’s Muslims jostle past each other in different directions 
towards their preferred mosque in order to observe the Friday (Juma’a) 
prayers. This colour and vibrancy does well to mask the stark and quite 
visible social and economic deprivation of the area. After a while (and a 
curry or two) it does not seem so horrible.
***
Dunstable Road is surrounded by a large residential area on either side. 
Except for the main road arteries, the minor roads are all punctuated by 
speed humps in order to reduce questionable driving. A good number of 
locals, however, have cleverly by-passed this problem by owning large 
off-road vehicles. These vehicles can not only drive straight over the 
humps as if they were not there, but also serve as status symbols for their 
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owners, especially for the older generations. The younger generations, 
however – mostly young men – have developed a preference for custom-
ised sports cars. These cars have lower, more rigid suspension systems 
that require time and delicacy to negotiate the unwelcome obstacles. The 
residential roads often become quite congested with a trail of cars, to the 
sometimes vocal fury of the 4x4 owners, clearly upset that their shrewd 
investments were failing to yield.
This neighbourhood is majority-Muslim, and the terraced houses 
here consist of three or four bedrooms. At the time of fieldwork, there was 
a popular trend of extending houses in order to accommodate burgeon-
ing extended families. Households are known to compete with each other 
over the quality, size and aesthetics of such extensions. In addition to the 
cramped front garden, the back gardens where small children will often 
play during the summer months are also quite compact. Inside, the rooms 
are small and space was often congested due to the number of people 
living there. Households consisted of three or more generations. Parents 
would usually live with their children until they either got married and 
left (in the case of daughters), or there was no more room left due to the 
number of grandchildren (in the case of sons). In the latter case, a nuclear 
group would either detach from the main household and move nearby, 
or the entire household would relocate to a larger house, if they could 
afford it. The latter option, however, usually meant moving out of Bury 
Park; an option to which many of my informants were resistant. As a con-
sequence, Bury Park is quite distinct as far as residential areas in Luton 
are concerned. It is over-populated and intergenerational – a collection 
of large, extended British-Asian households living side-by-side in small, 
often eccentric, terraced and semi-detached houses. This part of town, 
however, shares marked aesthetic, social, economic and cultural similari-
ties with a number of other areas of the UK with a high density of post-war 
South Asian economic migrants from the New Commonwealth.7
***
The presence of Muslims in Luton extends as far back as the 1960s, con-
sistent with the mass migration of South Asian and Caribbean workers 
in that period.8 Initially, mainly male migrant workers came to Luton in 
order to seek employment in the then flourishing manufacturing indus-
tries situated in and around the town. Luton is thirty-two miles north of 
London, and is served by major intercity rail networks. It is also located at 
Junction 9 of the M1 motorway, which was built in 1959 as a major high-
way connecting London and Leeds. Luton also boasts an international 
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airport, serving London and the south of England. The town’s close 
proximity to the capital, and its rich access to major road, rail and air 
networks, along with cheap land and renting tariffs, facilitated the estab-
lishment of a substantial manufacturing sector throughout the twentieth 
century. According to my informants, many of the pioneer migrants first 
sought work at the Vauxhall Motors plant. Established in 1905, Vauxhall 
Motors employed around 30,000 workers from the neighbouring areas 
at its height.9 It was not only new migrants who flocked as workers to 
Luton, but also many settled migrants from northern mill towns, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the British textile industry in the 1960s and 
1970s.10 Some of those who were made redundant in the northern mill 
towns moved south in search of work. As was common at the time, they 
were often employed as unskilled manual workers on low wages.11 Even 
so, workers were able to sustain their immediate families and continue to 
provide remittances to relatives ‘back home’. Pakistani migrants were the 
majority here,12 mainly from the rural hinterland of Mirpur province.13 
Migrants also included a substantial number from the Sylhet region of 
present-day Bangladesh.14 Both Mirpur and Sylhet were economies 
based on pastoral and agrarian pursuits, and both places remain over-
whelmingly Muslim.
Malik was a sixty-four-year-old man who owned a grocery store 
on Dunstable Road. He first moved to Luton in 1973 not from Pakistan, 
where he was born, but from Bradford. He came to Britain in the mid-
1960s and started work in a textile factory, along with other migrants 
who came from his home district of Kotli, in Mirpur province. After 
the factory was shut down, some of his friends moved south and found 
employment at the Vauxhall plant. Malik soon joined them.
I worked at the factory until 1987, when I decided to open my own 
business. I remember so many Pakistanis were working in the fac-
tory in those days. It was a good living. We all earned enough to buy 
our own houses and bring over the families. [We also bought] land 
in Pakistan and supported our family members there.
Malik was particularly proud of the fact that he has supported (and con-
tinues to support) his family members both in England and Pakistan, 
and was keen to point out that such attitudes were changing among the 
younger generation. Younger Muslims are no longer willing to continue 
the burden of remitting their earnings to relatives they barely knew – a 
common subject of conversation and passionate debate among the youth 
with whom I spent time: ‘we hardly know them, why should I give my 
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money to them?’; ‘they have it better than us’; and ‘they’ll never have 
enough’ were some popular retorts.
In 2002, Vauxhall Motors closed its factory in Luton. Workers even-
tually lost their jobs, although the laying off of workers was staggered 
over a period of time in order to minimise impact. Many of the town’s 
Muslims again faced an uncertain future. They were largely unskilled, 
with significant financial commitments, and with large families both in 
the UK and South Asia. In the absence of replacement jobs, a significant 
number of Muslim men (the primary breadwinners) sought self-em-
ployment, or diversified into the service sector. Taxi driving and small 
businesses ownership became popular options. Liaqat was a fifty-seven-
year-old man and a taxi driver by profession. He used to work at Vauxhall 
Motors, but they laid him off in the 1990s. Since then, he’d been driving 
his taxi. He was happy with his job, as it paid well and suited his lifestyle. 
But Liaqat was morbidly overweight, suffered from Type 2 diabetes, high 
cholesterol and high blood pressure, all in addition to the indignity of 
supporting Manchester United. He claimed he had no time to exercise, 
play with his grandchildren or even watch his football team embarrass 
themselves every week.
The trouble is, now that I’m driving the taxi, I’m having to work 
more than I ever did in my entire life! With cabbing, you are your 
own boss. You set your own hours. You don’t answer to anyone. 
And you can make as much or as little money as you want. But the 
human being is greedy, no? So I now work on average a hundred 
hours a week, seven days a week. My wife tells me to calm down but 
I tell her ‘who’s going to pay for all the bills, and the weddings, and 
the mortgages?’ My sons are still studying, so I’ll stop when they 
decide to become men!
Liaqat worked hard for his family and, like Malik, regularly remitted back 
to relatives in his ancestral village in Pakistan. Over the years, his remit-
tances have accrued vast tracts of agricultural lands, and paid for the con-
struction of some lavish mansions. In Luton, he lived in an overcrowded 
three-bedroom terraced house. On average, he travelled to Pakistan once 
every few years and, being self-employed, could afford to take weeks and 
even months off at a time. Once in Pakistan, he managed his estate and 
relaxed in the mansion (koti) that he built for his brother, who remained 
in Pakistan. Whenever he tried to persuade his adult children to join him, 
they all declined. ‘They don’t like Pakistan’, he said with a grin. ‘They 
think it’s better here. They don’t trust them … but I can’t abandon my 
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own’. Liaqat, like so many men of his generation in Luton, struggled to 
convince his children that keeping permanent links with South Asia is 
a good thing. Young Muslims with whom I spent time cited a number of 
reasons for their apathy towards their ancestral home.15 Some claimed 
that their parents were being swindled by greedy relatives. Others were 
not impressed by the oppressive heat, mosquitos, power cuts, food and 
lack of running water. Some (especially women) also had issues with the 
culture, claiming they felt restricted and could not relate to their cousins’ 
tastes and interests. Young people’s attitudes towards Luton, however, 
could not have been more different.
Omar was a seventeen-year-old male of Pakistani heritage. He 
described himself as ‘pure English’. This was unusual as he was the only 
respondent to self-identify as English. The vast majority were not com-
fortable with the term, as they claimed it denoted a white ethnic identity. 
Almost all of my informants, however, were comfortable with identifying 
as ‘British’. When I asked Omar to explain why, he simply replied ‘chicken 
and chips’. Bemused, I asked him what he meant by that, and after a little 
thought he replied:
My mum and dad speak English to me and all my brothers and sis-
ters. I grew up in Luton, it’s my home. We go back to Pakistan now 
and again, but I hate it there. All my brothers and sisters complain 
when we’re there. We complain so much that my dad got the mes-
sage, and doesn’t force us any more. Actually, he doesn’t go as much 
as he used to. I’m not used to being over there. The people are differ-
ent, they’re all weird; they talk about things that I don’t care about, 
and are always after your money. In Luton I have my friends, and 
my football team. I can understand the people here. What do I have 
over there apart from a huge house that nobody lives in, and goats 
and chickens? They don’t even have a park where you can have a 
kick-around in. Nah, it’s not for me. I prefer Luton.
Omar loved Luton. And he was not the only one. Almost all of the Brit-
ish-born Muslims whom I spent time with claimed that they were loyal 
to Luton before anywhere else in the world. Some of the more religious 
respondents argued that Luton was the place in the country to be a prac-
tising Muslim. They suggested that the high concentration of Muslims in 
the town, the number of mosques and seminaries (madrasas), and a state 
attitude of tolerance towards religious minorities meant that Muslims in 
the town were free to practise their religion without fear of sanction. This 
also meant that Muslims were able to live much better lives than some 
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of their co-religionists around the world. Although this may be a some-
what romantic view given the subsequent emergence of the EDL in the 
town, it is one that was reiterated over and over again by ‘practising’ and 
‘non-practising’ young Muslims alike. Kamal was a twenty-seven-year-old 
Salafi Muslim male whom I met at a mosque run by the sect. He was very 
observant and organised his life around the daily rituals. He could often 
be seen at the mosque, even when there were no congregational prayers 
or events happening, reading the Qur’an in the corner of the prayer hall, 
or in conversation with another devotee. Kamal claimed that Luton is sec-
ond only to Saudi Arabia as a Mecca for the pious:
Luton is full of Muslims. There are more practising Muslims in Luton 
than [there have been] ever before. You only have to walk around 
the streets to notice so many women wearing the hijab [Muslim 
headscarf] and men with long beards and dressing in Islamic 
clothes. There are halal shops everywhere; even in the schools and 
universities you can find halal food; this shows that even non-Mus-
lims have accepted our way of life.
[…] I’ve been to London and other big cities up north, and 
I never get the feeling of safety and homeliness as I do in Luton. 
Maybe because I was born and raised here, I don’t know. But cer-
tainly, I find it much easier to be Muslim here than other places 
in the country. I don’t even get this feeling when I go to Pakistan; 
people there seem to be far from Islam compared to here. The only 
other place in the world I would move to and feel totally comforta-
ble in is Saudi Arabia.
Luton, then, is clearly not so horrible for its Muslim inhabitants. The 
‘elders’ seemed satisfied with what the town had provided for them. 
Here, they were able to find employment, settle with their families, and 
get on in life. Their children and grandchildren, observant Muslims or 
not, also spoke well of the town and regarded it as their home. Some, like 
Omar and Kamal, never wanted to leave, albeit for varying reasons. Omar 
was happy playing football with his friends, going out with his White girl-
friend, and the abundant supply of ‘chicken and chips’. Kamal had all 
he needed in Bury Park: religious freedom in the form of mosques, halal 
food, and community spirit.
I ended up in Luton by pure chance. Originally (and rather naively), 
the idea was to have two field sites: one in Pakistan, and the other in Britain. 
The initial project was focused on the dissemination and flows of religious 
knowledge between the two countries, in order to assess to what extent 
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religious devotion and attitudes shifted or remained the same in the two con-
texts. Needless to say, the highly sensitive nature of the proposed research 
(involving working in many madrasas which, at the time, were accused of 
harbouring pro-Taliban terrorists and sympathisers), meant that securing a 
research visa was next to impossible. Given this set-back, the focus of the 
research became exclusively on Britain. The difficulty then lay in trying to 
find a suitable place to situate the study. In the first instance, I had planned 
to conduct the work in one of the northern mill towns that had housed so 
many Muslim migrants in the 1950s and 1960s. However, access proved 
to be too difficult to secure. An opportune moment arose, however, when 
an organisation based in Luton advertised for a position as a researcher on 
an Action-Research counter-radicalisation project funded by the European 
Union (EU). I figured that the position would provide an ideal gateway to 
gain access to young Muslims, who were the target group for the project. I 
applied and, fatefully, was offered the position.
The project was run by a group of second-generation Salafi Muslim 
men in their thirties and forties of South Asian heritage who were (and 
remain) particularly active in Luton. It was a sister organisation to the 
central Salafi mission in the town. The latter was based at an old syna-
gogue in Bury Park that had been converted into a mosque in the 1990s, 
and where I spent a lot of time. There I either shadowed my key inform-
ants from the EU project conducting interventions and holding public 
meetings, or met worshippers in my own time and capacity. The coun-
ter-radicalisation project – which I will call the Minority Skills Project 
(MSP)  – worked with a number of youth centres, schools, the local 
police force, Luton council and the Salafi mosque. Its aim was to iden-
tify vulnerable young men and discourage them from joining extremist 
organisations through theological interventions. The project had been 
established in 2000, and worked primarily with Black and Asian men 
who were ex-offenders returning from prison as well as with convicted 
criminals serving time within prisons, drug and alcohol addicts, and 
unemployed youth, helping them to re-integrate into society. Officially 
(and in the eyes of its state funders), the project involved the provision of 
advocacy services and vocational training, assistance with drafting CVs 
and job applications as well as providing counselling. In reality, it was a 
front for proselytising young Muslims (and some non-Muslims) into the 
Salafi sect. The organisers used interventions in prisons, schools, youth 
centres and at their offices to convince young men that a life of piety ulti-
mately yielded more rewards than a life of petty criminality, imprison-
ment, substance abuse and indolence.
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I first met the project leader, Fakruddin, when he picked me up in 
his car from Luton train station. It was the day of my interview. He was a 
kind man, and rather eccentric. When I first laid eyes on him, I was quite 
surprised. Prior to the interview, I had no idea that the MSP was run by 
Salafis. When a small, dark man, got out of his car, wearing a very large 
unkempt beard, skull cap (topi) and white salwar kameez,16 I was quite 
taken aback. I instantly recognised the garb and grooming as hallmarks 
of those belonging to the sect. I was quite perturbed as I thought this may 
cause problems if I got the job. In my experience, Salafis were intolerant 
of all Muslims that did not belong to their sect, and viewed the act of 
inviting (dawa) others to the sect as a fundamental religious obligation.17 
Being a Muslim myself, albeit one that did not observe all the daily ritu-
als, and belonging to a mainstream school of Sunnism, I was concerned 
that they might try to convert me. Fakruddin greeted me warmly with 
a shake of the hand and a robust hug. While we drove to the office, he 
formally introduced himself and briefly outlined the aims and objectives 
of the project, punctuated by the occasional pointing out of the sights of 
interest in Luton.
Fakruddin was an interesting character, and quite unlike any other 
that I met during my time in the field. He graduated from the London 
School of Economics in the late 1980s, where he attained a degree in 
Accounting and Finance. During his time at university, he was an active 
member of the Socialist Workers’ Party, and even spent a stint in jail for 
allegedly being involved in a violent confrontation during a demonstra-
tion against the Poll Tax in 1990. In contrast to the other staff of MSP, 
however, he was not from Luton. Fakruddin lived in St Albans, a town 
in the neighbouring county of Hertfordshire. After finishing his degree, 
he moved back in with his parents. He claims it was after he moved back 
that his transformation from radical socialist activist to a politically qui-
etist, puritanical Muslim began. He had been charged for his involvement 
in the Poll Tax riots and was awaiting trial. If found guilty, his chances 
of securing a respectable job would be severely compromised. During 
this period, he was deeply concerned for his parents’ welfare, as they 
had worked hard to provide him with a decent education. According to 
Fakruddin, the strain of the looming trial affected his parents’ health. 
While awaiting the trial, he started attending the local mosque and fol-
lowing regular visits he eventually became acquainted with a member 
of the congregation. Fakruddin knew this individual from childhood but 
had previously avoided him as he was always preaching to the youth and 
applying pressure for them to live a more pious life. An older, weathered, 
and politically wounded Fakruddin was more open to his call. After a 
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while, he accepted an invitation to attend a lecture in a mosque in Luton. 
There, he met other members of the British Salafi community, including 
his current colleagues and many of its prominent leaders and scholars. 
He unreservedly cited these meetings as the auspicious turning point 
of his life, as it was then that he not only ‘discovered Islam’ but, due to 
his earnest repentance and pious acts, God relieved him and his family 
of their turmoil. Fakruddin’s case was dropped in court for lack of evi-
dence and he was duly acquitted of any wrongdoing. By the time I met 
him, he was the most dedicated member of staff at MSP, which he also 
co-founded. His transition from an activist community of ‘workers’ to 
‘believers’ was thus complete.
Once we arrived at the offices of MSP, I was formally introduced to 
my team members for the research project. They included Ammar and 
Khidr. Ammar was in his mid-thirties, and Khidr was in his early for-
ties. Like Fakruddin, they were both married with children, and both of 
them (as well as all the other staff in the office) were male. They all had 
very long beards, and dressed in either traditional Pakistani clothes or 
in military/outdoor clothing and wore trousers that were too short for 
them as a display of modesty (all typical of British Salafis). Like many 
others working in the project, Ammar was a reformed local gangster who 
was now an experienced youth worker. Over the years, Ammar had also 
accumulated an impressive resume of vocational qualifications related to 
health and social care. He was a charming man: gregarious, generous 
and fun-loving. Over time, I realised he was enormously popular among 
all ages in Luton and its immediate environs. Wherever we ventured in 
and around town, we were bound to meet someone who knew him. And it 
made sense. Not only was his open character inviting, but he had reached 
the pinnacle of both criminality and piety in his lifetime – two areas of 
activity that commanded the most respect among the young Muslim men 
with whom I worked.
Khidr was the veteran of the gang. He had been a Salafi missionary 
(da’ii) since the early 1990s, and had spent years in Saudi Arabia training 
as a jurist under eminent Salafi scholars. He was fluent in classical Arabic 
(fusaha). Khidr was also very likeable. He was hospitable, amiable and 
highly charismatic – especially in large gatherings. Unlike the others, Khidr 
was married to a White convert to Islam, having been previously married 
to a Black convert of Caribbean origin. He had numerous children from 
both marriages, and was also significantly wealthier than his colleagues. 
He lived in a more affluent part of town, drove a luxurious, speed-hump-
crushing 4x4, and owned a number of businesses. Whereas most of Luton’s 
Pakistani diaspora originate from Pakistani-administered Kashmir, Khidr’s 
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family were originally from northern Punjab. Interestingly, although he 
was highly proficient in speaking, reading and writing Arabic, his Punjabi 
lingual skills were non-existent and he spoke with his Punjabi-speaking 
parents in English. When probed as to why this was the case, he replied 
that he did not see the merit of speaking Punjabi when he was growing 
up as he considered himself to be British, not Pakistani. It was only when 
he became more interested in Islam that he decided to learn Arabic, a lan-
guage that he claimed was integral to understanding Islamic scriptures.
Khidr was the senior khatib (public speaker) at the Salafi mosque. 
This meant that he often delivered the Friday sermon (khutba). This was 
the mosque where Fakruddin had experienced his epiphany, and it was 
the epicentre of social, educational and devotional activities for Luton’s 
Salafi community. A private Muslim primary school was also located on 
the premises, where Salafi parents from in and around Luton sent their 
children. In addition to national and international conferences that were 
held at the mosque (and where keynote Salafi speakers were invited from 
around the world), the space was also used for weddings and other social 
events. It was not uncommon to find scores of men socialising in clusters 
in the prayer hall, or loitering around the main entrance after congrega-
tional prayers. Among the congregation, Khidr was a highly respected 
and influential individual. He was famed for his knowledge of religious 
sciences, oratory skills and debating prowess. He was also lauded for the 
personal sacrifices he has made for the mission (daw’a). His influence 
also extended beyond the mosque and the Salafi community. He had 
frequently interceded in and arbitrated disputes between Muslim gangs 
engaged in turf wars for control of the lucrative and burgeoning drugs 
trade in the town. His piety and status as a pioneering and financially suc-
cessful local Muslim wielded considerable authority among the younger 
generations, many of whom felt compelled to honour his wisdom. Khidr 
was the intellectual heavyweight among the town’s Salafi contingent, 
and many of the MSP’s ideas and initiatives were directly inspired and 
implemented by him.
The interview commenced with formal introductions and a brief 
outline of the proposed project. Ammar would act as the Youth Liaison 
Officer, which entailed contacting teachers, youth workers and imams 
of mosques and informing them of the work and arranging interven-
tions. Khidr would be the key speaker and interventions coordinator. He 
was responsible for creative planning and delivery of intervention ses-
sions. Fakruddin would manage the entire project, including budgeting 
and logistical support. My role was to attend all the interventions, take 
minutes and make detailed notes of each session. I was also responsible 
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for writing the report to the EU at the conclusion of the project. For the 
next year, I spent a significant amount of time with these men. My initial 
concerns were allayed during the interview after it became apparent to 
me that they were pretty desperate to recruit a Muslim male with formal 
qualifications in the social sciences. They did not seem too bothered by 
my religious views, and I felt assured that they would not try to convert 
me, which was a huge relief. Fakruddin, Ammar and Khidr became my 
chief informants in Luton and, through them, I accessed a large portion 
of my subsequent respondents. The widespread respect that they were 
afforded in the community meant that being associated with them imme-
diately endorsed the credibility of my own work, and that made my task 
a lot less laborious.
***
Over the next year, I spent a lot of time with the team at MSP, especially 
with Khidr and Ammar. On some occasions, we would venture beyond 
Luton to other parts of the country, on camping residentials or meetings 
with project stakeholders, for example. Mostly, however, we spent our 
time in Luton. Our work was based at six different intervention sites: 
one high school, three youth centres, the Salafi mosque and the offices 
of MSP. Sometimes I attended interventions at local restaurants too. At 
the schools and youth centres, Khidr addressed large groups of mixed 
Muslim youth, aged between fourteen and eighteen. At the youth cen-
tres, we usually addressed boys, due to the relatively smaller number 
of Muslim girls attending our respective clubs. The age range at youth 
centres was also broader – we engaged with children from as young as 
eleven up to young adults in their late teens. At the MSP offices, inter-
ventions with older men were conducted. Sometimes, we even took 
men in their thirties out for dinner.
One such man, Lala, was a crack cocaine addict. He was in his late 
thirties, extremely slender and had been divorced twice. He was a sen-
sitive, personable man, who really liked to chat. At the time of research, 
Lala was dating a White woman who was also the mother of his fifth 
child, and her fourth. He was married to his cousin in Pakistan when he 
was in his teens. The marriage was arranged by his father’s older brother 
and patriarch of the extended family (biradari). Lala claims he tried his 
best to make the marriage work but, in his own words, they were ‘just 
different’. He was outlawed by his uncle following the divorce, and for-
bidden from travelling to his ancestral village in Pakistan. But Lala didn’t 
seem too bothered: ‘that was the best part!’, he quipped. His second 
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marriage was to a fellow British-Pakistani; a woman from Manchester 
with whom he shared a home for several years. But that marriage fell 
apart because of crack, he claims. Lala was a builder, painter decorator, 
and general handyman. On occasions, when he went into remission, he 
would find casual work at building sites for cash-in-hand. During these 
periods, he claimed to provide full maintenance for his children. Most 
frequently, however, he went missing for days. ‘It’s ruined my life, but I’m 
weak’, he told me. Lala felt very guilty for being an addict. He thought it 
was a grave sin (gunaa) to indulge in drugs and alcohol but couldn’t help 
himself. He said it made him feel better, by not feeling at all. The team at 
MSP came across Lala at the Salafi mission. When he felt depressed, he 
would often stroll into the mosque and sit in solitude in the prayer hall. 
If there was a study circle (halaqa) in progress, he would sometimes join 
the seminar as an observer. Khidr often led such sessions and – never 
missing an opportunity to preach (da’wa) – struck up a relationship with 
him.
I first met Lala on a weekend residential trip to an outdoor activities 
centre in Staffordshire. He sat next to me on the minibus from Bury Park 
and talked the entire way. He told me he decided to come on the trip 
at the very last minute after his girlfriend had pressured him. She was 
not Muslim but she thought religion would help Lala give up drugs. She 
was at the end of her tether and he was keen to make amends. Although 
Lala was not at risk of radicalisation, he was being groomed for recruit-
ment into the Salafi sect. Khidr had ‘converted’ many such individuals 
in the past, and the congregation included a disproportionate number 
of reformed ex-addicts. Whatever formula or antidote Khidr offered, it 
certainly worked for some. Lala, however, slipped in and out of piety, 
depending on his mental and emotional state.18 Although this was to 
be a dry weekend, Lala had other ideas. His suitcase contained a large 
bottle of Irish cream, a bottle of vodka and a huge bag of marijuana. He 
also brought a few crack rocks. I could see why he insisted on sharing a 
room with me. All the others on the trip were either teenagers or teeto-
talling ‘practising Muslims’ who would not only disapprove, but be highly 
offended at the mere sight of drugs and alcohol. Lala didn’t sleep. At one 
point, around three in the morning, I woke up and the light was on. There 
was also a pungent smell in the air. I looked down into the bottom bunk, 
and Lala was smoking a pipe. When he noticed me, unperturbed, he caus-
ally stretched out his arm and offered me the pipe. ‘Didn’t think you’d 
want some of this’, he said after I politely declined. And so he carried on.
Lala was the cause of much shame (sharam) and dishonour (besti) 
for his family, especially his parents. Divorce and substance abuse is a 
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great taboo among the older generation, and Lala’s condition was an 
open secret for those who knew him. His parents struggled both with 
with having an addict for a son and having everybody know about it. 
Lala was also aware of his parents’ suffering and it affected him. Over 
the years, he had tried different kinds of therapy and counselling, but 
nothing seemed to have worked. Being with ‘the brothers’,19 he claimed, 
gave him the most comfort. Lala stopped coming to the interventions 
after a while. The last I heard, he had left his girlfriend and moved to 
Manchester, where his ex-wife lived.
***
At this juncture, it is probably necessary to declare that, like some of my 
informants in Luton, I am also of Bangladeshi origin. This admission obvi-
ously complicates the dynamics of this work. Studying a group of indi-
viduals with so many similarities with my own formative development, 
therefore, is a major methodological and ethical tension of this work.20 
Like many of the families now settled in Luton, my family also arrived in 
the UK as a direct consequence of the 1971 Immigration Act. My father 
came to Britain in the mid-1960s as an economic migrant. Once in Brit-
ain, he lived for a time with his older brother in Sheffield, South York-
shire. My uncle had arrived in the late 1950s, and took up employment 
as a crane operator for British Steel. Like many others of their generation, 
my father and uncle never intended to stay. Again consistent with their 
generation, both men had left their wives and children in Bangladesh 
(East Pakistan at the time), hoping to re-join them eventually. In 1982, 
after years of lobbying, my mother finally managed to convince my father 
that moving to England was a good idea. Top of her list of reasons was the 
far superior opportunities available for children in Britain compared to 
newly independent Bangladesh, which was at the time a country ravaged 
by poverty and famine, natural disasters and endemic political corrup-
tion.21 Once in Britain, we eventually settled just beyond south-west Lon-
don, in the town of Kingston upon Thames, Surrey. This was an unusual 
place for a Bangladeshi family to move to as very few Bangladeshis (or 
other ethnic minorities) lived in that part of the country. Consequently, 
my early life was spent in a town with a majority-White population. In 
contrast, and totally unfamiliar to me personally, my informants in Luton 
had been raised in an area where the majority of the local community 
shared a common ethnic, religious and historical background.
At the time of migration, I was eleven months old. I had therefore 
no memory of my country of birth, unlike my three older siblings. Like 
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my friends in Luton, Britain was the only home that I knew. Despite this, 
throughout my childhood and adolescence, I knew that I was ‘different’, 
and that I didn’t quite ‘fit in’. Moreover, my family and I were frequently 
subject to racist abuse – both verbal and physical. The council estate in 
which we settled in those early years did not seem hospitable to South 
Asians. Our home was regularly vandalised by our neighbours: ranging 
from graffiti being sprayed on our walls (‘Pakis Go Home’, ‘Black Bastards’, 
‘NF’ etc.), to human faeces and fireworks being dropped through our let-
terbox. On one occasion, in the late 1980s, I was being taken to school 
in the morning by my mother. A young man approached her, spat at her, 
and told us that we were not welcome there. At school, I was constantly 
reminded by my peers that I was ‘Black’ and a ‘Paki’ and that I should 
‘go back to where I came from’. In my teenage years, I was victim to a 
number of unprovoked violent street attacks by neo-Nazi ‘skinheads’ in 
my local area. During one incident, I was dragged across the street on 
my back, the scars of which I still carry. Thus, during my formative years, 
Britain seemed like an inhospitable place. Although I always thought of 
myself as British, I was always aware that to some this was unacceptable. 
Moreover, such experiences only enhanced my perception that I was 
‘Other’ in society and that my skin colour and (to a lesser extent at the 
time) my religion were barriers to full integration. Being really British to 
me meant being White and Christian.
I learned that the young Muslims in Luton were not so different to 
me, twenty years on. Like me, they considered the English town in which 
they grew up to be their home, despite their darker shade of skin and 
‘exotic’ religion. They were also all too aware of their minority status in 
Britain. Moreover, they were aware that there was a tide of antagonism 
by some sections of society towards them, due to their Islamic cultural 
roots. Despite this, for many, self-identifying as ‘British’ was curiously 
natural.
For all the similarities, however, there were some significant dif-
ferences between myself and my young informants. The majority were 
of Pakistani heritage. Along with English, they often spoke Punjabi, 
Patwari, or Pahari with members of their kin, particularly with elders. I 
was not always familiar with particular customs and attitudes which had 
their origin in Pakistan. My first language is Sylheti, a regional variant 
of Bengali. Bangladeshi cultural norms and attitudes are, in many areas, 
significantly removed from those practised in Pakistan. Additionally, my 
informants found it difficult to understand why I had chosen to study 
them. I was often advised by both older and younger members of the 
community to get a job that paid well, or to think about becoming a 
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doctor or a lawyer once I had finished my degree. On one occasion, a 
young man whom I had met at a youth centre asked me why I was ‘doing 
a job that White people from the council did?’. Even though I shared the 
same religion, skin colour and minority status as my informants, they 
regarded me more often than not as an outsider in Luton. In this sense, 
my own pre-fieldwork perception of being a ‘native anthropologist’ was 
somewhat challenged. It occurred to me that I might share some super-
ficial demographic similarities with the community I was studying but, 
ultimately, I was as much of an outsider here as I was in my own home 
town in Surrey, albeit for different reasons. Unlike my informants, I had 
never lived in a close-knit South Asian community where the majority of 
my peers came from the same ethnic or religious background. Moreover, 
my family had always encouraged education for its own sake over purely 
economic pursuits. In Luton, the situation was a little different. The vast 
majority of my informants saw education as a means of yielding more 
income in the job market, or a waste of time altogether. They were con-
sistently bemused as to why I had spent so many years studying only to 
eventually earn less than the average taxi driver in the town.
The experience of fieldwork in Luton was thus an illuminating 
experience for me. I discovered that I shared many similarities with the 
people I studied, but also some overwhelming differences. Despite ini-
tially revelling in the prospect of ‘studying my own’, I was soon question-
ing my hitherto taken-for-granted status as an ‘insider’. My informants 
were always hospitable, warm and welcoming. I always felt assured that 
I was regarded as just another member of the community. However, deep 
inside, as my time in the field continued, it dawned on me more and 
more, that I wasn’t. I was not a participant in the process of community 
but merely an observer. And, no matter how much I wanted to believe it, 
my informants, generous and forgiving as they were, knew it too.
Notes
 1. See Castles 1987; Solomos 1993; Ballard 1994; and Ansari 2004.
 2. According to the 2011 National Census, Luton’s overall population is approximately 203,200. 
The largest ethnic group in the town is white, with 44.6% of the population. The Asian Brit-
ish comprise the largest ethnic minority with 26.3% of the population, with the black British 
forming the second largest ethnic minority with 9.8% of the town’s overall population. Per-
sons of Pakistani origin number 14.4% of the population – by far the largest minority group in 
the town. Persons of Bangladeshi and Black African origin form the town’s next largest ethnic 
communities; comprising 6.7% and 4.5% of the population respectively. In terms of religion, 
49,991 or 24.6% of the overall population of the town were Muslim; of which the most sig-
nificant were 29,353 of Pakistani origin and 13,606 of Bangladeshi origin. With regards to 
employment, 53,271 of the town’s population between the ages of 16 and 74 were working full 
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time; 18,407 were in part-time employment and 12,198 were self-employed. There were also 
8,059 full-time students and 8,337 unemployed. Of those who were economically inactive, 
10,703 were students; 5,496 were permanently sick or disabled; 9,660 were looking after the 
home or members of the family; 14,336 were retired; and 4,741 were inactive in other ways. 
Of those who were unemployed, 2,097 were aged between 16 and 24 years; 1,340 were aged 
50 and over; 1,648 have never worked; and 3,186 were long-term unemployed. The majority 
of those in employment were in the wholesale/retail trade sector, that is 17.8% of the over-
all population; 10.8% were employed in the human health and social work activities sector; 
12.6% were employed in real estate, renting and business activities; and 10.1% were employed 
in the transport, storage and communication sectors. Within the Asian population, 21.9% were 
employed in the hotels and restaurants sector; 14.3% were employed in manufacturing; 14.1% 
were employed in the wholesale and retail trade and the repair of motor vehicles; 13.9% were 
employed in transport, storage and communications; and 12.1% were employed in mining and 
quarrying. With regards to education, an investigation is currently pending on the accuracy of 
student information with the Office for National Statistics and thus these figures could not be 
included within this study.
 3. See Treadwell and Garland 2011; Barlett and Littler 2011; and Pilkington 2016.
 4. Salafism, also referred to as Wahabism, is a puritanical, literalist sect of Sunni Islam that origi-
nates from eighteenth-century Arabia. It is the official religion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
as well as neighbouring Persian Gulf countries, see Wiktorowicz 2006.
 5. See Taji-Farouki 1996; Mandaville 2001; Roy 2004; and Wiktorowicz 2005.
 6. An ethno-linguistic group originally from southern India.
 7. Compare with Bhachu 1985; Shaw 1988; Eade 1989; Werbner 1990; and Baumann 1996.
 8. See Castles 1987.
 9. See Holden 2003.
10. See Kundnani 2001.
11. See Allen 1971.
12. Prior to independence from Pakistan in 1971, present day Bangladesh was known as East Pa-
kistan. In the period in question, therefore, Bangladeshis identified as Pakistanis.
13. See Saifullah Khan 1977; and Anwar 1979.
14. See Gardner and Shukur 1994; and Gardner 1995.
15. Compare with Cressey 2006.
16. The national dress of Pakistan. It is a two-piece outfit consisting of very baggy trousers, and a 
long, loose shirt draping down to the knees.
17. See Mahmood 2005; Robinson 2008; Meijer 2009; Schielke 2009; Hamid 2009; and Inge 
2017.
18. Compare with Schielke 2009; Simon 2009; and Marsden and Retsikas 2013.
19. This is an affectionate term that refers to other Muslim men, and is commonly used in Luton to 
refer to co-religionists. Muslim women are often referred to as ‘sisters’.
20. See Oakley and Callaway 1992.
21. See Van Schendel 2009.
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Family
Luton’s Muslim community mostly originate from South Asia. Every young 
man I knew was a descendant of a pioneer economic migrant who made 
the journey to Britain in the post-war period. Although some of the pio-
neer migrants have since returned home (once their financial needs were 
met), most remained and permanently settled. The decision to remain, 
however, sparked a curious acculturation process, involving intergener-
ational negotiation and, sometimes, conflict.1 Although first-generation 
migrants had opted to stay, they also decided to maintain acute links with 
South Asia. Some of these links were financial, mostly involving migrants 
sending back remittances to relatives for upkeep, or for investments in 
land and property.2 Others were physical, with migrants periodically 
returning with their families for ancestral tours.3 In the other direction, 
however, cultural norms were also exchanged. Community ‘elders’ were 
keen to enact South Asian etiquette, social relations and moral/religious 
instruction within their households in a British setting.4 Whereas these 
norms were broadly accepted and expanded upon by many within the 
second generation – a significant proportion of whom moved to Britain 
as children or young adults – subsequent generations that have been 
born and raised in Britain are challenging the legitimacy of their her-
itage in providing a suitable cultural framework through which to live 
ostensibly ‘British’ lives. This chapter will aim to draw out some of these 
generational tensions and show how young Muslims successfully man-
age expectations from home alongside pressures from wider society. The 
chapter will demonstrate the way in which young Muslims accept, reject 
or hybridise discursive influences from both the ‘South Asian home’ and 
‘White liberal society’ to create unique identities and subjectivities that 
succeed in redefining established notions of what it means to be Brit-
ish in the twenty-first century. The chapter will chart the generational 
evolution of the community, bringing in voices from three generations 
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of the town’s Muslim community. It will provide ethnographic insights 
into how early migrants settled in the town, their encounters with racism 
and exclusion, and the ways in which community solidarity helped them 
overcome those early challenges. These accounts will be contrasted with 
how British-born Muslims manage to juggle (or not) expectations from 
home and those from the outside world.
***
I first met Omar during an intervention at a mobile youth centre in Bury 
Park. This was one of the three youth centres that Khidr, Ammar and I reg-
ularly attended in search of potential ‘terrorists’, in order to ‘disarm’ them 
with theological lectures. The mobile youth centre itself was a converted 
lorry. Inside, there was ample room to move around quite freely. At the 
rear of the cabin, there was a seating area, complete with cushioned seats 
and a modest table. The rest of the cabin contained a sequence of flat-
screen televisions attached to the walls and a corresponding chair situated 
in front of each screen. Each chair was occupied by a young Asian male, 
holding controllers and acting in a generally boisterous manner. They were 
playing a video game on the latest PlayStation called ‘Call of Duty’ – a vio-
lent military first-person ‘shoot’ ‘em-up’ which one can play against the 
computer, as a team or against each other. These young men were aged 
between sixteen and eighteen, and they all lived in the estates that sur-
rounded the recreational park where the lorry was anchored. In addition 
to providing space for seasonal sports, such as cricket and football, the park 
was notorious for being a centre for anti-social behaviour. Scores of youth 
could be seen loitering there at any time of the day. Some of them indulged 
in drug-taking, some dealt them, while others just came and played foot-
ball. The majority of them were young South Asian males. Occasionally, 
however, some young women did dare to venture into the park but, if they 
were not known to the young men, they were usually heckled. Some of this 
heckling was very aggressive and sexual in nature. The young men in the 
youth centre, as I later discovered, were a few of the chief culprits.
The youth workers ordered the young men to conclude their game 
and, once they did, they rather reluctantly joined us at the back of the 
lorry. The topic of the intervention was ‘Is Britain a Land of Peace or a Land 
of War?’. Quite bemused, the young men asked Khidr to clarify the ques-
tion. Khidr explained to them that these terms were taken from the Islamic 
Scriptures, and that they were terms to define Muslims’ relationships 
towards a foreign land, i.e. countries that were not majority-Muslim. Omar 
 FAMILY 43
immediately replied ‘How can it be a land of war?’. Khidr explained that 
some people think that Britain is a legitimate target for attacks, like the 
7/7 bombings, and asked the group what they thought about that. Omar 
responded again: ‘How can it be a land of war; we live here? It’s dumb’. At 
the time, Omar was seventeen years old and very outspoken. He lived with 
his family a few streets away and spent most of his time in the park with his 
friends when not at college. Omar had one older brother and one younger 
sister. His parents were both born in Pakistan but settled in Britain when 
they were children. As we know from the previous chapter, Omar consid-
ered himself to be ‘pure English’ and had an insatiable desire for chicken 
and chips – Bury Park’s most famous culinary contribution (Dunstable Road 
and the surrounding area is crammed with competing halal fried chicken 
outlets, each with its own unique spicy sauce). Omar also had a girlfriend 
of whom he was very fond. She was White, and they often met in the park. 
Omar’s parents didn’t know about her and he was keen to keep her a secret. 
When I asked him why, he said because his parents wouldn’t approve of 
him having a girlfriend. His sisters, however, did know about her, but kept 
it a secret from the ‘elders’. ‘That’s why we meet here, or outside of Bury 
Park’, he said. ‘Don’t want anyone to see us. No one comes here apart from 
people our age who are doing the same thing’. Although, in Omar’s words, 
his parents aren’t ‘typical Pakis’ and would probably accept a White girl if 
she converted to Islam, they were still strict in ‘certain things’, he claimed. 
Because of this, Omar had to delicately manage his social life alongside his 
home life, often suppressing his opinions and rebellious character:
There’s a massive switch when I get home, I’ve got to pretend to 
be someone else. If I told my mum that I had a girl, she’d disown 
me! I got to hide a lot of stuff [that] I get up to – normal stuff for 
Gorreh [Whites], like having girlfriends, drinking, going to clubs. 
But Pakistanis can’t do that stuff because it’s haram [forbidden in 
Islam] […] I think that’s all bollocks [because] every Pakistani does 
it, they just hide and do it [because] they don’t want people to know 
about them [because] it will look bad on them and their family.
Omar’s speech was laced with Punjabi words, most of his friends were 
Asian, and he claimed to never miss Friday prayers (Juma’a) at the 
mosque. Despite this, he could not speak Punjabi with any level of flu-
ency, could barely read the Qur’an, and spent most of his free time smok-
ing cannabis in the park – sometimes in the company of his long-term 
non-Muslim White girlfriend. However, when I asked whether he’d be 
happy for his sister to have a boyfriend, he got into a bit of a frenzy:
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I’d kill her! Then I’d kill him! I don’t want her to have a boyfriend. I 
know what boys are like, they will take advantage of her. It’s wrong 
for Pakistani girls to have boyfriends. It’s not right. Especially not 
my sister.
[…] Alright, maybe I’m not 100% English, but that’s the only 
thing! [laughs]
***
In 1971, Britain changed its immigration laws. Prior to this, unskilled 
workers from the ex-colonies were permitted free access to the UK. How-
ever, fierce debates raged in parliament in the 1950s and 1960s that 
eventually led to the Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and, finally, 1971.5 
Although the 1971 amendment meant that New Commonwealth citi-
zens were no longer permitted unrestricted entry, it did allow migrants 
that were already resident in Britain the right to bring over their imme-
diate families. This, obviously, directly affected the thousands of New 
Commonwealth migrants – mostly men – who had moved to Britain to 
answer the government’s call for labour in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. They had witnessed a radical shift in their residency status 
over the course of nine years. Ever pragmatic, South Asian migrants 
quickly moved to encourage kinsmen and fellow villagers to migrate to 
Britain before the restrictions came into place. Thus, instead of restrict-
ing immigration from the New Commonwealth, the 1960s witnessed an 
explosion of ‘chain-migration’ prior to the Act coming into place.6 Ini-
tially, migrants already in Britain sponsored kin and fellow villagers to 
make the journey for work. They remitted funds for the procurement 
of a passport and ticket for the voyage. Once in Britain, new migrants 
were provided with accommodation and work by their sponsors. This 
not only created areas in South Asia where there was a high concen-
tration of ‘out-labour’ to the UK,7 but also facilitated the emergence of 
distinctly South Asian areas within British inner cities and towns in close 
proximity to various industries.8 Secondly, with the introduction of the 
1971 legislation, the South Asian population of these areas were further 
bolstered with the arrival of wives and children throughout the 1970s. 
This seminal period led to the eventual consolidation of the presence of 
South Asian and Caribbean communities all across Britain, not least in 
Luton.
For those early migrants from South Asia, not only was the ‘myth of 
return’ permanently dispelled by the arrival of their families,9 but it also 
meant that the children of first-generation migrants were to be schooled 
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and socialised in a cultural environment that was completely different 
to that of their parents and ancestors. Fearing a loss of their ‘culture’, 
first-generation migrants sought to re-apply South Asian customs in dias-
pora, primarily within the home.10 Interactions within the household 
were expected to be conducted with appropriate decorum depending on 
age, domestic rank and status, as was common in households in South 
Asia.11 Within South Asian families, individuals were expected to be pri-
marily loyal to the collective interests of the group – in practice, this usu-
ally translates into obeying ‘elders’ and performing deference. That is not 
to suggest that they had forsaken or repressed their own individuality 
or agency,12 but that their sense of personhood is intimately intertwined 
with group solidarity and family honour.13 Consequently, some scholars 
argued that the second generation were caught ‘between two cultures’ 
and were resigned to juggling the conflicts and contradictions that 
came with honouring their cultural heritage at the same time as being 
‘British’.14 In addition to conforming to kinship hierarchies and codes of 
honour, other cultural conventions were typically played out in the fam-
ily home through the observation of ceremonies and social events15. To a 
large extent, British-born Muslims in Luton today continue to be social-
ised within this household structure. While, some forty years later, this 
conception still retained some resonance among my informants, British-
born Muslims have developed novel ways of self-identifying that valorise 
their ethnic and religious heritage16 while, at the same time, creatively 
situating such identities firmly within nationally accepted multicultural 
discourses.17 Young Muslims in Luton saw no contradiction between 
being originally South Asian and being British.18 Curiously, on the issue 
of religion, every young Muslim claimed that Islam does not necessar-
ily belong to any particular country, but can be observed and practised 
anywhere, including Britain. This ‘de-territorialisation’ of Islam is con-
sistent with youth attitudes seemingly pervasive in diaspora settings in 
the West,19 and is a discussion that I shall return to in the final chapter 
of the book. For our purposes here, however, it is important to note that 
although young Muslims self-identified as British, they had nevertheless 
been uniquely socialised to recognise and negotiate hybrid and ambiva-
lent moral and cultural registers in their everyday lives.20
***
Pre-war migration to Britain from South Asia was usually confined to sea-
men (lascars) ‘jumping ship’ at British ports and seeking work as casual 
labourers in the booming catering and manufacturing industries. There 
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was plenty of work to go around in those times, and migrants were gen-
erally welcomed by the ‘host’ population.21
Coming to Glasgow, 1937, I run away from Arcade ship, to London. 
Other people telling, ‘London very good’. That time, England very 
good, people very respect colour people.
– Mr Sona Miah, Bangladeshi migrant from Sylhet
When I came [to Liverpool in 1944], I had nowhere to go – no 
address, nothing. I was sitting in the train – very quiet and miser-
able. One lady and gentleman were there with their child, and the 
child said, ‘Look Mummy, there is a black man!’ Black man! You 
know, little kiddies – they say whatever comes into their minds. The 
mother kept saying, ‘Stop it, he is a gentleman!’ Then he would stop 
for a while, then again start. Then I said, ‘I don’t mind, he is only a 
little kiddie, and after all my skin is black.’ She said, ‘Oh – thank you 
very much.’ The father gave me a cigarette, and asked me where I 
was going, and I said, ‘Birmingham.’ After get out in Birmingham, 
they ask me if I got address, I say, ‘Yes.’
And show address. They say, ‘You wait here in front of the sta-
tion, while I take my wife home, then I come back.’ He came … he 
brought a tram fare … he took me to house where I got address – one 
of my village men. One English lady opened the door and said, ‘You 
want Karamat? Come on in.’ Then I sat down and that gentleman 
gave me ten shillings, said, ‘Here you are – buy cigarettes.’ Then he 
went.
– Mr Syed Rasul, Pakistani migrant from Mirpur (Adams 1987:137; 
184–5)
With the mass influx of migrant men in the 1950s and 1960s, the subse-
quent unification with their wives and children, and the demise of man-
ufacturing industries, attitudes began to change. Pioneering migrants, 
such as Mr Miah and Mr Rasul, entered Britain as subjects of the British 
Empire. Although, technically, they did not have permission to work – as 
they had absconded from their contracts with respective shipping com-
panies – immigration and employment laws at the time were much more 
relaxed. Over time, they were naturalised with relative ease. The early 
welcome, however, turned to hostility throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
as the hard impact of economic decline set in. In the beginning, migrant 
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men lived and worked together. They lived in lodging houses, and took 
up jobs that the native population refused. Lodging houses were over-
crowded and luxuries were out of the question. Malik, now a successful 
businessman, recounted those early years to me with manifest pride:
Eighteen of us shared [a] house and slept in the beds in two shifts. 
We all worked in the same factories. The day shifters would sleep 
in the beds during the night, and the night shifters would sleep in 
the same beds during the day […] When I first came, I was working 
night shifts, and it took me a long time to get used to the routine. 
Even on my day off, I was expected to wake up at a certain time, 
because the day shifter would want to sleep […] there was no space 
anywhere as all the beds were full of bodies […] My house was full 
of people from Kotli22 […] Those days were tough, but everybody 
lived like that. It was the best way to save money, and send it back 
home. If I didn’t live like that in those early days, I wouldn’t have 
been able to bring my entire family to England.
Pressed by time and charged by the knowledge that they would return 
home one day, migrants worked as many overtime hours as they were 
offered. Once they had enough money, their sojourn would be over. Of 
course, it did not quite transpire this way. Immigration restrictions, the 
loss of jobs, and demands from relatives to continue to remit, all pointed 
towards settlement. As a single man, it did not cost much to survive. As 
a family, however, the situation was altogether different. The unification 
with wives and children led to a demand for housing and, with many 
migrants unable to afford a home outright due to their low wages, they 
applied for social housing.23
Early migrant men mostly resided in urban areas, in close prox-
imity to their place of employment. Due to their relatively low income, 
homes were rented in deprived neighbourhoods and wards already 
occupied by similarly impoverished ‘natives’, who also worked in the 
same industries. While the going was smooth, relations between work-
ers were, on the whole, convivial. However, when wives and children 
began to arrive from the 1970s, these relations took on a more sinis-
ter complexion. The arrival of families coincided with a loss of jobs for 
natives as well as migrants. Thus the pressure on the welfare state in this 
period reached chronic proportions. Migrants and families were par-
ticularly affected by institutional racism on the part of the local author-
ities. The burgeoning Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets, for 
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example, faced discrimination on both an individual and institutional 
level throughout the 1970s.
There was an urgent need for more accommodation, and the 
Bengalis faced more than their share of problems. First there was 
discrimination in council house allocations. Much of this was built 
into the system, but a lot was due to conscious or unconscious prej-
udice and assumption. An independent report commissioned by 
the GLC [Greater London Council (1965–86)] in 1983–4 gives a 
picture of deep-seated racism in the housing bureaucracy; a view 
confirmed by the squatting activist, Terry Fitzpatrick. He recalls 
accompanying a Bengali to request a transfer away from the ter-
rorism of racist neighbours, only to be told that the requested 
empty flat was ‘for white people’. (Glynn 2004:10)
The council homes that were eventually offered to them were situated in 
outlying areas of the borough, predominantly occupied by white work-
ing-class communities.24 In a period of popular racism towards immigrant 
communities, spurred on by xenophobic right-wing parliamentarians 
such as Enoch Powell and his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, isolated 
Bangladeshi families faced hostilities in all-white housing estates. For 
most, living in such conditions became untenable:
The danger of racist violence on outlying white estates meant 
that re-housing in the Spitalfields area came to be seen as a mat-
ter of survival. As a contemporary report pointed out, the housing 
officers’ original biased allocations reinforced this racism because 
they ‘gave those white families the feeling that they had the ‘right’ 
to keep their estates white.’ Many Bengali families who were allo-
cated council housing on white estates returned to Spitalfields pre-
ferring to face the extreme discomfort of a squat to the constant 
danger of racist attack. (Glynn 2004:10)
The picture was similar for South Asian communities in northern mill 
towns. In Bradford and Oldham, the phenomenon of ‘white flight’ meant 
that those natives who could afford it moved to outlying suburbs as soon 
as mass migrations to the city commenced. Like Tower Hamlets, those 
natives who sought social accommodation, were prioritised by the predom-
inantly White council staff. In a relatively short period of time, these struc-
tural machinations led to the consolidation of segregated neighbourhoods, 
divided on the basis of ethnicity in dozens of cities and towns across Britain.
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The fear of racial harassment meant that most Asians sought the 
safety of their own areas, in spite of the overcrowding, the damp and 
dingy houses, the claustrophobia of a community penned in. And 
with Whites in a rush to flee the ghettoes, property prices were kept 
low, giving further encouragement to Asians to seek to buy their own 
cheap homes in these areas. It was ‘white flight’ backed by the local 
state. The geography of the balkanised northern towns became a 
chessboard of mutually exclusive areas. (Kundnani 2001:107)
Bury park, it seems, evolved in a comparable manner. Through the com-
bined processes of ‘chain migration’ and ‘white flight’, culturally distinct 
areas of Britain’s post-industrial towns and cities took shape, and became 
the ethnic enclaves of today. With the burgeoning population, however, 
came the need to fortify economic pursuits. Social networks therefore – 
and, in particular, ties with kinsmen and benefactors – became all the 
more important in the face of an ailing labour market. Such networks 
were instrumental in generating capital for the opening of businesses, 
the buying of houses,25 and the building of community spaces.26 The 
presence of female migrants introduced South Asian customs of ritual 
gift-giving (lena-dena).27 Migrant women would organise social events in 
their homes, where the exchange of gifts, and the subsequent sequences 
of reciprocity, would help engender relations between families. With the 
advent of the second generation, further ties were forged through the 
arrangement of agnate marriages. These developments led to the grad-
ual consolidation of novel communities, united by a common culture and 
migrant status.
Before I first came to England, I was very excited. People from my 
village who were already there, used to write letters back home. 
And I remember people talking about how the Pakistanis used to 
work side-by-side with White people. It seemed strange to me, 
because I never met a White person. So, when it was my time to go 
to England, I was very excited. I thought it would be a good expe-
rience working with English people, and seeing how they lived. I 
wanted to make White friends and play cricket with them. Back 
then, I was a pretty good spinner [laughs].
But when I came here, everything was different to what I 
expected. The Asians were working on different shifts to the Whites. 
We usually worked the night shift at the factory, and it was very 
difficult to meet White people […] Other White people in the town 
were very distant, and many of them used to call us racist names 
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in the street […] Those who didn’t, felt hatred inside – you could 
just sense it. In the end, I decided it was better to stick to my own. 
Pakistanis won’t hate you because of the way you look, because they 
look the same! We used to live together, work together, play cards 
and cricket together on our day off. That was our lives. Of course, 
these are the days before the wives arrived, so no one was there to 
tell you what to do! [laughs].
– Malik, 64
***
The majority of Muslim households in Luton were patriarchal hierar-
chies. The patriarch – most often a first- or second-generation migrant – 
commanded absolute respect and obedience from all others in the 
household, at least in theory.28 He controlled family finances, had the 
final say on wedding arrangements and funerals, and arbitrated any dis-
putes between family members. When a patriarch died or became inca-
pacitated, he was usually succeeded by his eldest son. The women in the 
household were subservient to the men, except when their age or rank 
within the family was above a man’s. For example, the wife of the patri-
arch had less ‘power’ to make key decisions than her husband. However, 
she outranked any sons while her husband was alive. Similarly, an older 
sister outranked all younger siblings, including any brothers. Despite 
this, in practice, once a man matured, his decisions and choices often 
trumped those of any female peers and even his mother’s in most cases. 
Many of my male informants, young and old, claimed that women in 
their household were their ‘honour’ (izzat), and that they should be ‘pro-
tected’. Furthermore, rules that applied to them did not apply to their 
sisters. Omar’s insistence that his sister should not be allowed to have a 
boyfriend, for instance, was typical.
Perhaps the most striking manifestation of patriarchy within the 
Pakistani diaspora was the institution of the biradari29 (literally ‘broth-
erhood’, for which read: extended kinship group or clan), which remains 
functional and avidly observed in Luton even today. Again a throwback to 
rural South Asia,30 clan solidarities were mobilised by pioneer migrants 
when sponsoring kinsmen in moving to Britain through the process of 
‘chain migration’.31 Once in Britain, new arrivals would settle in the 
vicinity of pioneer migrants, who would be a source of support in those 
early years. Wards and neighbourhoods in migrant areas became steadily 
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populated by members of the same clan or village.32 Over time, this sys-
tem of patronage developed into a social network, where clan members 
and fellow villagers would visit each other in their homes and congregate 
on special occasions, such as Eid.33 The importance of biradari networks 
among the Pakistani community (and to a lesser extent, the Bangladeshi 
community) in Luton cannot be overestimated. Through biradari net-
works – controlled exclusively by men – weddings are endorsed and 
arranged, social and cultural spaces are created, business partnership 
are established, mosques are funded and built, and political alliances and 
conflicts are enacted.
Individuals are subordinated by its demands and its economy – 
social, moral, and cultural – which operates through the regulatory 
mechanisms of honour and shame, policing their behaviour, and 
inhibiting actions that might threaten cohesion and self-identity of 
the clan. (Mondal 2008:143)
The various actors and players within the biradari dictate the fortunes 
and reputation of the clan. Throughout their formative years, young 
Muslims become well acquainted with them. They also become familiar-
ised with the structure and mechanisms of their respective biradari, in 
addition (to a lesser degree) to those of others.34
A major space within which biradari solidarities were affirmed or 
denied is the local mosque. Luton had twenty-five mosques of different 
denominations, mostly situated in the Bury Park area. A significant num-
ber of these mosques were owned and run by clan groups. The mosque 
was a place for Muslims, particularly men, to meet and socialise in addi-
tion to observing prayers and religious ceremonies. Muslim children 
(boys and girls) also regularly attended the mosque to learn to read the 
Qur’an in Arabic and how to perform the daily prayers. The mosque also 
acted as an arena for local-level politics between different clans vying to 
maintain or take control of the mosque committee or to assert their com-
munity leadership credentials to the congregation.35 Young Muslims were 
expected to behave according to religious and cultural tenets when in the 
mosque environment. They were also expected to attend the mosque 
that their respective biradari supported. Attending other mosques poten-
tially damages the honour (izzat) of the clan. Building and controlling a 
mosque was the source of great social capital, and crystallised the hon-
our of a given clan. It was interpreted as a spiritually and socially benev-
olent deed. Thus the mosque was where young Muslims received their 
earliest religious instruction, a place where they continued to frequent 
52 BEING YOUNG, MALE AND MUSLIM IN LUTON
throughout their lives to perform prayers, to consult the imam, as well as 
to attend religious festivals and ceremonies. It was also a place where the 
elders of the community met and socialised, and asserted their personal 
and clan interests and ambitions to the congregation. Young Muslims 
were expected to observe the protocols of the mosque with diligence as 
it was seen, first and foremost, as a place of spiritual reflection and reli-
gious instruction. To many of my young informants, however, it was also 
the arena where the honour and prestige of the biradari was reified.
In addition to the mosque, the local neighbourhood was an impor-
tant stage where community relations are played out. Some wards and 
neighbourhoods in Bury Park were almost exclusively populated by 
Muslim households. Local businesses were also often owned and man-
aged by local Muslims. The close-knit nature of the community meant that 
young Muslims were aware of the gaze of community elders and family 
members when out and about in the neighbourhood. A trip to the local 
shop may entail the passing of an elder from the mosque on the way and 
the exchanging of salutations (salams). Once at the store, the clerk at the 
desk may be another family friend who is addressed as ‘aunt’ (khala). On 
the way back, older cousins and their friends may be loitering in the local 
park. Displays of respect and appropriate etiquette, therefore, were con-
stantly observed in the local area. A youth cannot be seen drinking alcohol, 
wearing immodest clothes, or flirting with the opposite sex, for example. 
Such behaviour would bring shame and embarrassment to their respec-
tive families, and lower their social standing. Throughout their formative 
years, Muslims in Bury Park were encouraged to internalise the role and 
significance of the family and local community. Moreover, they were fur-
ther expected to embody the status and reputation of their family and clan, 
and add to it through their good manners, deeds and achievements.
***
Pnina Werbner notes that ‘the very notion of izzat [honour] connotes, 
ambiguously, status, rank, honour and dignity’ (2002:19). For first- 
generation migrants in Luton, preservation of izzat was an imperative. 
Izzat could be attributed to a particular individual or collective. Religious 
piety, altruism, wealth and philanthropy, caste and education were all 
factors that contributed towards the consolidation of izzat. Those who 
were lacking in these respects brought shame (sharam/besti) not just 
on themselves, but to their families. If a family developed a bad repu-
tation, they may suffer stigma in the community. Business pursuits may 
be disrupted, potential marriages may be annulled, and social exclusion 
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may be enforced. The onus was thus upon all the members of the family 
and/or clan to uphold its honour. Liaqat, 57, explained to me what izzat 
meant to him:
Izzat is very important. It makes you who you are. People will look 
at you in your community and think good thoughts of you, if you are 
from a good family. I always say it doesn’t matter how wealthy you 
are, or what caste you are from, if you don’t act in a good way. That’s 
what izzat means to me. You must always be honest and worship 
God. Your children and family members must be good people. If 
they are not, what’s the point [of living]? Not only will you be hated 
by [other] people, but also by God.
For Liaqat, izzat represented a code of behaviour which was heavily asso-
ciated with religious morality. He dismissed wealth and other worldly 
aspirations in favour of being a ‘good’ person, usually represented by 
good moral conduct. Omar also associated izzat with good behaviour:
You don’t wanna bring shame on the family [because] you’ll get 
murdered! My old man’s always banging on about it these days, 
as I’m getting older and know what it means [now]. They want 
you to act in a way that doesn’t embarrass them. Y’know, don’t get 
hooked on drugs, don’t fuck around, go to the mosque, that sort of 
thing. It is good, because it means you won’t go astray like other 
people [in the neighbourhood], but it’s hard [because] there’s a 
lot of temptation around. I’m not that good at it, to be honest. I do 
try my best, [but] sometimes I fuck up. Have a spliff, miss prayers. 
Actually, I do that a lot! [laughs]. But I definitely see the need for 
it. It makes us better, doesn’t it? Although sometimes people take 
it too far and starts fights over it – if someone insults someone 
– happens all the time with Pakis, even at the mosque. ‘You’ve 
insulted my izzat’; ‘you’ve done my besti’. That’s when it gets silly.
Other young informants were also quick to point out that the biradari 
system is easily manipulated by the nefarious intentions of some of 
its patriarchs. Amin was a twenty-three-year-old history teacher who 
lived at home with his parents,36 along with his older sister and brother. 
Like Liaqat and Omar, his family were originally from Pakistan. Amin’s 
father was a taxi driver, while his mother worked as a dental nurse. 
Like Amin, his sister also went to university and trained as a television 
producer. His older brother worked as a delivery driver at a well-known 
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pizza chain. Amin was very critical of the way ‘honour’ and clan status 
was cynically appropriated by some within the community to suit their 
own ends:
Biradari isn’t there so you can take advantage of people, look down 
on them, or use your status for your own goals. A lot of people do 
that. They abuse its meaning. To me, a family is good if they don’t 
do that. I’ve seen elders start feuds between other rival families so 
they can get into the mosque committee and become powerful in 
the eyes of the community. Or use the fact that they’re rich, and 
effectively bribe people to fuck up business deals so no one can com-
pete with them. No one says anything because they’ve all been paid 
off, or have their own interests. The women are just as bad. They go 
around spreading rumours about other women – about their char-
acter. This is so they can’t get married. Purely out of jealousy. [And] 
because they are from good biradaris, people listen to them. This is 
bullshit. I’m sure izzat isn’t supposed to mean this.
Amin’s frustration with clan-based rivalries and intrigue reflected the 
attitudes of a number of my older informants, especially those I met 
through the Salafi Mosque and at the offices of MSP. Many claimed 
that clan politics created disputes, divisions and tensions (fitna) in the 
community and argued that it was forbidden (haram) in Islam to hold 
on to such loyalties. As a member of the second generation, Khidr was 
very familiar with biradari politics and very critical of it. He argued that 
loyalties towards one’s clan over other Muslims was a throwback to the 
ignorance (jahaliyya) of pre-Islamic Arabia. He referred to it as ‘asabi-
yya’, an Arabic term roughly translated as tribalism. According to Khidr, 
such tribalism was a symptom of pre-Islamic decadence, and the purpose 
of Mohammed’s mission was to challenge such inharmonious doctrines:
People should be loyal to God, not to their blood. Muslims should 
be united, as brothers and sisters. We are one. Unfortunately, a lot 
of the older generation still hold on to these backwards concepts, a 
lot of which comes from the village [in South Asia].
Khidr went on to describe the problems from his own extended family 
when he decided to marry his first wife. She was of Caribbean origin 
and had converted to Islam. Even though she was a ‘good, pious Muslim’ 
who wore the headscarf (hijab) and thobe (jilbab) and observed correct 
Islamic manners (akhlaq), many members of his biradari disapproved 
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of the marriage. Fortunately for Khidr, his own parents were very sup-
portive and so the marriage ultimately went ahead. Khidr’s parents 
were impressed with the fact that his prospective wife was a good Mus-
lim, despite being from a non-Muslim background. However, this atti-
tude remains quite rare among the older generation. The majority of my 
informants claimed that their parents and/or grandparents (depending 
on their age) still maintained preference for consanguineous marriages 
within the biradari or caste group.37
***
Marriages among cousins was still very common among the Pakistani 
community in Luton, with many of my younger informants either antic-
ipating it in the future, or already preparing resistance against it. The 
practice had its roots in rural Mirpur, where a combination of factors, 
such as the retention of wealth within the kin-group, facilitated by 
Islamic laws on endogamy and inheritance, and consequent intensifica-
tion of sibling ties, had created a preference to marry ‘within’. In addition 
to the practice’s rural roots, mass migrations from Mirpur in the twen-
tieth century, and the considerable increase in wealth that came with 
it, further consolidated the practice in diaspora, especially in the early 
phase of settlement.
Although the majority of British Mirpuri marriages are still birade-
ri-endogamous, it does not follow that all such marriages involve 
Pakistan-based partners; many are arranged between British-
resident couples. Nevertheless, although many younger British 
Mirpuris have now grown […] doubtful about the viability of 
matches with spouses from back home […], their parents often find 
their hands are much more closely tied, feeling duty-bound to con-
sider offers of riste [marriage proposals] from Pakistan-based bira-
deri members just as seriously as those proposed by local residents. 
(Ballard 1990:243)
Over two decades on since Ballard’s observations, in Luton at least, the 
pressure on young people to marry cousins remained seemingly acute. 
Many young third-generation Muslims expressed grievances when the 
issue of arranged or cousin-marriages was raised. The primary concern 
was a lack of choice. Despite this, they were all aware of the importance 
of marriage in maintaining biradari ties, and great effort was still made 
by parents in trying to preserve this central institution.38 Accordingly, any 
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potential or proposed marriage must be endorsed by biradari members 
in order to avoid stigma or marginalisation by the family. Whereas, in the 
early phases of settlement, the stigma may have been overbearing, my 
informants were finding ways of negotiating with their parents, particu-
larly utilising reformist religion as a means to counteract ‘cultural’ pref-
erences in marriage. Shahed was a nineteen-year-old economics student 
whom I initially met in a prayer room at a prominent London university. 
Shahed’s family were members of one of the largest biraderis in Luton 
and he had many female cousins there who were of marriageable age. 
Being academically gifted, pious and of gentle character, he was consid-
ered to be a highly eligible bachelor. His eligibility was heightened when 
many of his male cousins dropped out of school early and were involved 
in petty criminality. Reluctant to marry a cousin, Shahed was nevertheless 
resigned to the notion that, ultimately, the decision was ‘out of his hands’:
Given a choice, I want to marry someone outside the biraderi. I have 
to be able to get along with her and share the same interests. I don’t 
think any of my cousins fit that role, and I don’t really know the 
ones in Pakistan. But in the end, I know I’m going to have to go with 
whoever my parents like […] I’m just going to have to say no until I 
like someone they like. But I’m not really thinking about that now. 
I want to finish my degree and get a job. Maybe then the situation 
will be different, who knows?
Shahed’s stance was unusual when compared to many of his peers. He 
was willing to bend to the wishes of his biraderi, whereas others were 
more critical. An increasing trend among such critics was a countering 
of the ‘village mentality’ of the elders with ‘pure Islam’. They were quick 
to point out that, according to Islamic law, a man could marry anyone so 
long as they were Muslim. Those who were a little more learned in the-
ological matters, even argued that Muslim men were allowed to marry 
Jewish or Christian women who were ‘chaste’, as they were considered 
‘People of the Book’ (Ahl al-Kitab). (Although the same was not the case 
for Muslim women.) This fact was an ‘ace up the sleeve’ for the majority 
of my informants and many intended to pull it out at the right time as a 
bargaining tool. If Islam allowed it, how can the elders refuse? Especially 
since they were led to believe that the doctrine of izzat was synonymous 
with religious morality and etiquette? Omar, for example, categorically 
rejected any prospect of an arranged marriage, let alone marrying a rela-
tive. However, he was far more open to marrying a Muslim:
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I don’t want an arranged marriage. I think they’re stupid. First of 
all, I don’t even like any of my cousins. And even if I did, they’re 
too ugly. I’d rather marry someone I get on with, and find her 
myself. My parents don’t have a clue what I’m like, how can they 
find me someone? […] I don’t mind marrying a Muslim, but I want 
to choose who it is, not my parents. As long as she’s Muslim, it 
shouldn’t matter to my parents, but I know they want me to marry 
one of my cousins – it’s not happening though!
Even though the rebellious Omar was resistant to an arranged marriage 
to one of his cousins, curiously, he maintained a preference for marrying 
a Muslim, despite having a White girlfriend. When I asked him whether 
he would consider marrying his girlfriend or a non-Muslim in the future, 
he said it ‘wouldn’t work’ with his family. He argued that she would find it 
hard to settle in or accept the customs at home. He claimed that it would 
just be easier to marry a Muslim girl as she’ll be able to understand his 
family, and get on with his mum; ‘at the end of the day, I’m Muslim’.
The idea that a non-Muslim was unable to ‘fit in’ to the family was a 
pervasive one for many of my informants. While the majority expressed 
a desire to ‘marry out’, or have the final say in the marriage, a few con-
sciously opted to marry a cousin from Pakistan of their family’s choos-
ing. Of these, all were second generation. One such informant claimed 
that British girls had ‘corrupted’ moral values, whereas a ‘village girl’ 
in Pakistan was typically ‘innocent’ and, furthermore, because she was 
related to him, would have a vested interest in looking after the family. 
Such attitudes, however, were admittedly rare among my informants. The 
majority acknowledged that it would be difficult to assimilate non-Mus-
lim partners into the family structure. Kaiser was a twenty-one-year-old 
man whom I met at the offices of the MSP. He was unemployed, and had 
been moonlighting as a cannabis dealer to supplement his income. Kaiser 
had been involved with an older White woman since he was seventeen 
and claimed the relationship was quite serious. So much so that she 
had converted to Islam in the hope that they could get married without 
any issues. In spite of this, Kaiser was pessimistic about the future. He 
couldn’t imagine any circumstance where his wider family would accept 
the marriage, as they were quite ‘traditional’ and set in their ways:
I know my family will never accept her because she’s White and not 
from my biradari. So I haven’t told them about her. They’ve lined me 
up with a girl from back home and I can’t really get out of it because 
my whole family will switch on me, and not speak to me and shit. If 
58 BEING YOUNG, MALE AND MUSLIM IN LUTON
that’s the way they want it, then I’ll marry her and carry on seeing my 
girlfriend. I’ve spoken to my missus about it and she understands. At 
the end of the day, my mum’s really important to me and I know my 
dad will stop me from seeing her if I don’t get married back home. 
So I’ll do what they want me to do, and [then] carry on with my life.
Kaiser’s insistence on continuing with his relationship even after he’s mar-
ried another was consistent with attitudes held by others, particularly 
among some older second-generation men. According to Khidr and Ammar, 
there were a number of men in Luton, many of them their childhood friends, 
who had married in Pakistan due to family pressure but simultaneously 
continued with their previous relationship. Some even had children from 
both partners, and juggled their time between the two households. In most 
cases, the first partner knew of the second, however, the latter or her family 
had no idea, at least initially. Once again, some justified these marriages 
through the prism of Islamic law, arguing it was religiously acceptable for 
men to engage in polygamous marriages. In fact, some were associates of 
the MSP through the Salafi mission, and were engaged in the dawa (preach-
ing) circuit. For them, religious piety offered a socially acceptable way out 
of the ‘culturalist’ confines of the biradari structure. For my young inform-
ants, however, only time will tell how the issue of marriages pans out for 
them. In the buoyant words of Shahed, when the time for marriages comes, 
‘maybe the situation will be different, who knows?’
Broadly speaking, young Muslim men in Luton were aware of their 
responsibilities to their family and clan. They had been socialised within an 
environment where loyalty and solidarity towards the family was a given. 
This included embracing certain overarching customs, attitudes and patterns 
of behaviour. The home and local community, (which also extended to their 
ancestral villages in South Asia), was the arena where such relations were 
enacted. For many, this was a necessary part of life, and brought a number of 
benefits. As we shall see in the following chapter, being bonded to the family, 
and its extended social networks, reaped material and emotional benefits. 
It remained, in some cases, the basis for political solidarity against antago-
nisms from beyond the community, both real and perceived – as it had also 
been for the pioneer generation. On the other hand, many of my informants 
found some aspects of the bondage to be oppressive, not least in the spheres 
of maintaining ‘backward’ village, caste and clan rivalries from ‘back home’, 
which many had deemed obsolete. By far the most contentious issue, how-
ever, was marriage. Young men (and indeed, the majority of women that I 
encountered), sought a choice in the matter. Some were altogether contemp-
tuous. Of those, religion was utilised to counter the normative structures of 
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South Asian (read: ‘un-Islamic’) ‘culture’, rendering them inappropriate for 
the rigours of modern life in diaspora. This ‘tactic’39 is both compelling and 
increasingly efficacious. ‘You can’t argue with God’, Khidr reminded me. ‘The 
elders are slowly coming round to that fact’. For now, at least, they remain 
seemingly intransigent.
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3
Friends
The previous chapter showed how the early settlers in Luton tried to 
carve out a community space when faced with the prospect of settling 
permanently in Britain. It charted the way in which the migrants grap-
pled with pressures to provide for their families while, at the same time, 
managing the relative alienation that came with moving to a foreign 
country at a time when economic outputs were low and racial tensions 
were high. We also saw the way in which ‘chain migration’ and ‘white 
flight’ shaped the physical contours of the neighbourhood, and estab-
lished communities clearly stratified along the lines of race and class. 
Recognising the nascent sense of permanence, early migrants set about 
adjusting to life in Britain for the long run. Children were sent to school, 
homes were acquired and a whole host of new commercial enterprises 
took root. Relationships with fellow migrant kin and villagers were con-
solidated, and effort was made to forge lasting social networks of ritual 
exchange and reciprocity in order to ease the settlement process. Within 
the home, the second generation were socialised in a curious way. They 
were expected to observe and maintain certain cultural practices that 
developed in rural areas of South Asia, superimposed by their parents in 
an effort to maintain their ‘roots’.
These practices and attitudes contrasted with those that were 
pervasive beyond the boundaries of the community. At times, they 
conflicted. The offspring of early migrants, therefore, attempted to tac-
tically navigate these often contradictory moral registers in their every-
day lives. Some eventually succumbed to parental and extended family 
pressures and accepted consanguineous marriages, for example. Others 
rejected such pressures outright, and faced the wrath of the community 
by being shunned and stigmatised. Others still, tactically appropriated 
religious law as a way of countering the unreasonable and obsolete ‘vil-
lage mentality’ of their parents and wider clan. Despite these pressures, 
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young Muslims were, naturally, exposed to ‘others’ from different eth-
nic and religious backgrounds from an early age. In addition to those 
influences from home, these interactions had profoundly shaped the 
way they self-identified and how they viewed others in society. In many 
cases, young Muslims had an array of non-Muslims who are regarded as 
friends, mentors, colleagues, teammates and even lovers.
This chapter attempts to explore such relationships and their role 
in shaping unique identities that have emerged through the experience 
of living as a minority with complex loyalties and moral outlooks. It 
will investigate the role of social environments and spaces beyond the 
‘home’  – such as school, university, sports and social clubs, holidays 
abroad and the workplace – in making friends and socialising. Curiously, 
young Muslims did share stark similarities in attitudes with their elders 
when it came to earning a living and contributing to the family. They all 
recognised the need, as ‘men’, to earn as much as possible so that they 
could ‘provide’. Some chose to go to university, in order to command a 
higher salary upon graduation. Others went straight into work after fin-
ishing school. Some even ventured into crime in order to ‘give something 
back’ to their parents. This chapter will thus also explore the role of work 
in the lives of young men in Luton – what motivates them to work? What 
kind of work? And, when they are not working, how do they spend their 
free time?
***
Ali was nineteen and academically gifted. His parents (from the second 
generation) were followers of the Salafi creed, and were regular attend-
ees at the mission. He was the youngest of three and the only son. Ali’s 
parents never made it to university and, consequently, there was some 
pressure on him to follow his sisters and win a place at a reputable one. 
Although his parents’ preference was for him to study medicine, he hadn’t 
been offered a place. At the time of fieldwork, he was sitting two further 
A-levels in order to boost his chances. Like many young men of his age 
in Luton, Ali was a keen sportsman and played for a local cricket club. 
Unlike many of his teammates, however, he was an observant Salafi – or 
so his parents thought. On the surface, Ali prayed five times a day, fasted 
during Ramadan and abstained from mixing with the opposite sex. When 
with his friends, however, he was less stringent. Ali claimed that he ‘prac-
tised’ Islam because he believed in its message but also because his par-
ents insisted. He also went on to concede that there were many moments 
of slippage.
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Salafism is an austere and puritanical form of Islam that requires 
meticulous attention to personal codes of behaviour and observance of 
daily rituals (of which there are many). The doctrine is bound by a form 
of conservatism that strictly forbids any imposition of modern innova-
tion (bid ‘a) into religious thinking or practice.1 Only the content of the 
Holy Scriptures (i.e. the Qur’an and the Tradition of the Prophet) are to 
be taken as sources of human inspiration. Any authority beyond that is 
rejected as heresy and the malevolent murmurings (waswasa) of the devil 
(Shaytaan). Salafis also reject all other sects and schools of law and the-
ology in Islam. They argue that all of them have skewed the True Path 
to God throughout history, and introduced a host of non-Islamic innova-
tions to the religion, including doctrines of rationalism, mysticism and 
the ‘cult of jurists’. Rather, they hold that the True Path lies in the strict, 
literal application of the Text in everyday life. Further, they argue that 
this application requires no further conduits (such as a cleric or saint) 
for a lay Muslim, other than the ability to engage with the Text directly. 
Knowledge of the Qur’an and the Tradition, therefore, is highly prized 
within the Salafi movement, somewhat ironically. Without knowledge of 
classical Arabic (fusaha), for example, a lay Muslim is unable to directly 
access the scriptures, as they are written exclusively in that language. In 
such circumstances, any ‘believer’ in the Salafi method (manhaj) is com-
pelled to consult someone who possesses such knowledge and training 
(sheikh). Ali, like his parents, had not received such training. Thus they 
relied on the interpretation of learned individuals such as Khidr for reli-
gious instruction (although Khidr would deny that he is, in any way, an 
‘interpreter’). Due to this approach to Islamic knowledge, Salafis refer to 
themselves as the ‘saved sect’, but under the rubric of the ‘People of the 
Tradition and Community of Believers’ (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al’Jama’ah) 
shared by Sunni Muslims more broadly. Salafis take their name from their 
proclaimed exclusive following of the ‘Pious Predecessors’ (as-Salaf us-Sa-
lih) who lived during and shortly after the time of the Prophet (and there-
fore held ‘true’ knowledge of how Islam should be practised according to 
Prophetic Tradition/Example). Ali was only too aware of this founding 
creed (aqidah), having been introduced to it at an early age. Moreover, 
Salafis (whether lay or learned) made a conscious effort to cyclically reaf-
firm this religious identity in their everyday rituals and practices.
Although Ali claimed to be a genuine member of the sect he was 
also aware of his laxities, especially when with friends. He didn’t admit to 
having a girlfriend to me, but did concede that many of his closest friends 
were not ‘practising’, and smoked weed, drunk alcohol and partied. When I 
asked him whether he joined in with the mischief, he responded with a wry 
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smile: ‘I just chill with them’. Ali was clearly torn between the abstinent 
demands of his committed parents and being a young man in twenty-first 
century Britain. Unlike Ali, however, the majority of my young male inform-
ants were not from a ‘Salafi family’. Comparatively, the Salafi community 
in Luton remained quite small, although numbers are rising (a point I shall 
return to in the final chapter). The majority of Muslims in Luton followed 
the Sunni Hanafi school of law,2 which is the dominant strand of Islam in 
South Asia.3 Most of Ali’s friends, therefore, were not Salafi. Some were 
non-Muslims, including those of Sikh, Black Caribbean, and White British 
heritage. The fact that his friends included those who were not practising 
Muslims, or Muslims at all, was a point of concern for Ali, as his parents 
had always encouraged him to seek ‘pious’ friends. Having such friends 
equated to good company and thus good influences. Of course, being 
‘pious’ meant being Salafi. Although Ali did have some friends from the 
mosque, he preferred spending time with his ‘actual’ friends. In this Ali was 
not alone and many others had similar dilemmas. Although their families 
were not always Salafis, like Ali’s, they too were nevertheless burdened 
with comparable morally conservative demands from home. For many, 
being economically active and providing an income to the family was pri-
oritised,4 and formed the basis of an essentialised masculine sensibility.5 
This meant getting a job as soon as one could. Or, if academically compe-
tent like Ali, attaining employment on completion of further studies. Once 
economically viable, marriage and settling down was the next step. All the 
while, one was expected to preserve the ‘honour’ (izzat) of the family and 
to actively promote its status and prestige in the community. This included 
acting with decency and in accordance to established protocol when in the 
public eye; abstaining from all forms of proscribed excesses, such as drink-
ing and gambling; and totally limiting all forms of sexual or criminal scan-
dal. Naturally, reality was some considerable distance from the ideal. All 
of my informants struggled to put these expectations into practice.6 Some 
didn’t even bother.
A key chasm between early migrants and their British-born descend-
ants was the level of exposure to wider society. Early migrants were 
pressed for time and were chiefly concerned with earning as much money 
as possible before their time ‘ran out’. As we have seen, this never actually 
happened and the majority remained in Britain and settled their families 
here. Despite this, working hours, ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods 
and social networks, and a yearning to continue cultural ties with South 
Asia, meant that a process of collective ‘insularity’ took root. Exposure to 
non-migrants was limited to colleagues at work (if any), when liaising 
with local authorities and the state, or other quotidian encounters beyond 
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the confines of the community. The second and subsequent generations, 
however, were schooled and socialised in Britain and so, in comparison to 
their parents and grandparents, were far more exposed to non-commu-
nity members in their everyday lives. Crucially, they had more time for 
leisure and recreation. More time to access the arts, the media, to shop, to 
play and to make new friends. In essence, to have ‘fun’.7
When my family came, I had many new responsibilities on top of my 
job. I had to find somewhere to live. I had to find places in schools 
for my children. Take them to the doctor. Everything changed, 
y’know? My wife needed help with the shopping, so I used to spend 
my day off going to the market and doing things around the house. 
You didn’t have time to do anything apart from working and taking 
care of your family. My friends all lived near me, but I hardly ever 
saw them. Every now and again you would see them in the mosque, 
or invite them round for tea. Apart from big occasions such as Eid, 
or at weddings, you never really had the time to see them. But, in 
England, that’s how life is.
– Malik, 64
Although young Muslim men in Luton generally worked long hours, the 
overall time that they spent at work was still considerably less than their 
forebears. Moreover, the types of jobs that they were engaged in were far 
less gruelling in comparison, and paid considerably more. This is due to 
the fact that the range of jobs available to them was more diverse, as a 
consequence of their formal education, language proficiency, or special-
ised skill-sets. Furthermore, unlike early migrants, young Muslim men 
did not have to reconcile the pressures of being an integral financial pro-
vider for a large number of dependents, both in Britain and South Asia. 
Thus, they were in a more privileged position than their predecessors 
and could enjoy a richer and more varied social life. Those who pursued 
higher education were in a unique position where they would leave the 
community for a few years, make new friends and acquaintances, and 
return home wielding a more elevated social status, and harbouring fresh 
tastes and perspectives. Young men such as Omar and Ali, who were nei-
ther working nor attending university, spent a lot of their time socialising 
with school and college friends, playing sports, and planning mischie-
vous ‘nights out’, in the firm knowledge that it was a fleeting period in 
their lives as men and as Muslims. ‘I can’t always be this way’, Omar said 
to me ‘One day, I’ll have to be a good Muslim’.
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***
Muslim men of all ages in Luton demonstrated an indefatigable will to be 
economically active – an attitude that remained heavily informed by the 
memory of migration. On the whole, Muslim men in Luton tended to be 
employed as low-skilled manual workers in factories and warehouses, or 
are petty entrepreneurs. Most commonly, they were found in the retail, 
wholesale or catering sectors. Driving taxis was also popular among the 
first and second generation, due to its flexibility in choosing hours and 
the relatively decent pay. In recent years, and particularly among the 
younger generation, a trend has developed where employment has also 
been sought as private security officers. The long working hours, good 
pay and more reticent nature of the job appeared attractive to many. 
Interestingly, some also claimed that, given the choice, they would prefer 
to work for ‘Whites’ (goreh). By this, they meant working in an environ-
ment where wages are regular and paid on time. Faheem, a third-gener-
ation Bangladeshi, worked for a large electrical retail company in Luton 
as an assistant store manager. He left school at sixteen and immediately 
ventured in to the world of work. He described his decision not to go on 
to the sixth form as ‘the best [he’s] made’ because, aged twenty-three, he 
was financially better off than some of his ‘pathetic’ friends, who were 
unemployed having returned from university:
I’m always teasing [them] that they wasted years of their lives when 
they should’ve been working. I feel sorry for them as many of them 
either don’t have a job, or are just starting out at jobs they could’ve 
been doing years ago.
I’ve been working now for seven years, and I have saved quite 
a lot of money in that time. When my fourth sister got married 
recently, I was in a position where I could help my dad and contrib-
ute to the wedding. I’ve also managed to buy some properties over 
the years, and now I’m financially secure at quite a young age.
My friends should be in the same position – as Asians, you 
live at home and don’t really have many outgoing costs. You can 
save a lot of money and continue the work of your parents. To me, it 
doesn’t make sense to go to university if you’re not going to become 
a doctor or lawyer.
When I asked him why the usual allure of fun and adventure didn’t sway 
him to go to university, Faheem responded that he was always pushed 
to make something of his life by following in the footsteps of his father, 
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paternal uncle, and paternal grandfather – the pioneer migrant. The 
latter had been a successful businessman and landlord, who owned a 
number of Indian restaurants and residential properties. Faheem cited 
the old migrant adage to me, that his grandfather had come to England 
from Bangladesh with ‘nothing’ and, at the time of his death, was a very 
wealthy man. After his death, Faheem’s father (the elder brother of two) 
and his uncle took over the businesses and ran them together. Faheem, 
however, chose not to go into the family business due to the anti-social 
hours. He also wanted to do something different. Despite this, he insisted 
that his work ethic and desire to expand the family’s combined portfolio 
were driven into him at an early age. He was very proud of his family’s 
reputation in the community as ‘hard workers’ who did well. It seemed 
important for him to maintain that image. Even if it meant not going to 
university and ‘wasting’ valuable time: ‘if you’re Asian in this country, 
you have to work. That’s why we came here in the first place, and that’s 
the way it should always be’.
Riaz was nineteen and worked for his family at their grocery store 
on Dunstable Road, the main thoroughfare in Bury Park. Like Faheem, 
he left school at sixteen and decided to go straight into work. However, 
unlike Faheem, Riaz’s decision wasn’t solely based on his desire to con-
tribute to the family, but on how they perceived him:
In my family, you’re expected to work for the family when you get 
older. You can’t sit at home and get everything provided for you – 
you have to earn it. A few of my friends don’t work, and they get a 
lot of bother at home from their parents [for it]. My parents think 
they’re a bad influence.
I don’t want to let down my family. I don’t want them to look 
bad in the community because of me. It doesn’t go down too well 
if you have people in the family that can work [but] choose not to. 
Especially when you have a family business.
Riaz had a strenuous working schedule, which was typical of many Mus-
lim men in Luton. Interestingly, he provided his labour to the family 
without demanding a formal wage. He worked six days a week at the 
shop, starting at six in the morning and usually not finishing until seven 
or eight in the evening. His family did provide him with some spending 
money for his efforts. The amount varied from week to week:
I live at home, so I get off paying for rent and food. To be honest, 
although I feel like I’m always working, it’s alright – at the end of 
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the day, it’s my business. I’ll get a share in the end, so it’s okay – fam-
ily always takes care of you.
Nizam was in a similar predicament. At twenty-five, he was a few years 
older than Faheem and had more responsibility. He too started working 
for his family straight after he left school. The family ran a wholesale fruit 
and vegetable company, supplying to small businesses all across London 
and the Midlands. All the male members of Nizam’s paternal family were 
involved in the business. Unlike his brothers, however, Nizam was book-
ish. He always harboured ambitions to go to university and read history. 
At the time of research, Nizam had been accepted at the London School 
of Economics to attend a short introductory course in Modern Euro-
pean History. Like Faheem and Riaz, Nizam chose to work for his family 
because it made his father happy:
For me, the family is the most important thing. I’ll do anything for 
them […] My old man wanted me to help him out in business after 
I finished school, as he was getting old […] He wanted me and my 
brothers to take over. So I didn’t think twice.
Almost ten years on now, I’m still doing the same thing; get-
ting up at four in the morning to drive the van down to Spitalfields; 
breaking my back grafting in the freezing cold; spending the day 
delivering all the goods. It’s a hard life, but it makes my old man 
happy.
Nizam’s father was the chief patriarch of his clan (biradari). Back in Paki-
stan, his father, with the assistance of relatives based there, had built a 
business empire in commercial and residential property development. In 
England, Nizam’s family owned and rented out a number of residential 
properties, in addition to their wholesale business. Despite this success, 
his father remained ambitious, and insisted that his three sons expand 
the business in his absence. His two sisters have been married off to 
cousins (of his father’s choice) in Pakistan and, shortly after the con-
clusion of fieldwork, Nizam himself married a British-Pakistani cousin, 
despite being in a long-term relationship since he left school. Although 
he claimed to be very much ‘in love’ with his girlfriend, in the end, he 
chose to honour his family and grant them their ‘wish’, as ever. By ‘fam-
ily’ however, Nizam seemed to be referring exclusively to his father. It 
appeared to me that his mother was conspicuously absent from all for-
mal decisions pertaining to the ‘family’, despite Nizam’s very close rela-
tionship with her. When I asked him why this was the case, he replied 
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that women in his family never make such decisions and that these were 
firmly in the remit of ‘men’. In Nizam’s family, like so many other Muslim 
households in Luton, there was a division of labour along gendered lines. 
Men made the key decisions and were the chief breadwinners, whereas 
women took charge of all domestic work – cooking, cleaning, shopping, 
hosting guests as well as remaining hidden from gaze (purdah) and being 
obedient to the men. When unmarried men or women reached marriage-
able age (usually eighteen-plus), they were matched up with a suitable 
partner of the patriarch’s choosing. Of course, over time, the power of the 
patriarch in the British context has been waning. Young Muslims have 
been registering resistance to such polities, which are seen in the main 
as antiquated and inappropriate for life in Britain. However, in Nizam’s 
family’s case, progress had been less forthcoming.
Nizam graduated from secondary school with ten GCSEs,8 five of 
them at grade A*, the top grade. His teachers had always encouraged him 
to further his academic prowess by going on to university and attaining a 
degree. Although he was interested in doing so, Nizam was aware of his 
responsibilities at home. I asked whether it would ever be possible for 
him to return to his studies and he remained, on the whole, optimistic:
Well, you never know, do you? At the moment, I’m doing this course, 
which I really enjoy. I spoke to my dad and [older] brother about 
starting a course in September, but they think it’s not a good idea.
My dad doesn’t see the point of me starting a degree at the 
age of twenty-five. He says to me: ‘why you do you need a degree? 
You have a good job. You make a lot of money working with your 
brothers’.
My father is ‘old school’, so he doesn’t agree with the idea 
of studying to enrich your mind, and neither do my brothers. For 
them, people should only study to get a better job and earn more 
money. Obviously, studying history isn’t going to put me in that sit-
uation is it?
And he makes a pertinent point. Most Muslim men in Luton wanted to 
make as much money as possible. The method for achieving this was 
working long hours as well as disciplined thrift. My young informants 
who were working, all lived at home. This meant that they did not pay 
for board. Many of them worked for their families, like Riaz and Nizam, 
which allowed for wealth to be pooled in order for it to be spent on collec-
tive ends, whether new business ventures, funding weddings, or building 
mansions (koti/basha/rajbari) in South Asia. The income contribution 
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from young male members of the family was therefore integral. Further-
more, the family network was an important means of providing employ-
ment. Members of the community who occupied a considerable position 
of power and influence within a company were, on occasions, obliged to 
recruit friends and relatives upon request. Faheem admitted that he had 
recruited friends and family in the past, some of whom continue to work 
with him:
My friends are always asking me for jobs […] because they know I 
got a job for a couple of my cousins. I don’t mind helping them out, 
as we look after our own. But sometimes people ask you who have 
criminal records and drugs problems, and it’s really difficult to help 
them out. I try to do what I can without getting into trouble.
A significant proportion of Luton’s young working males, therefore, 
shared the workspace with members of their family or other Muslim 
friends and peers. However, some also strayed into illegal work, such 
as dealing drugs. Importantly, their motivations for doing so remained 
consistent with the rest. ‘Working’ and ‘making money’ were valued sta-
tus symbols for young Muslim men, just as they had been for their gen-
erational predecessors.
***
Among my informants, a number of young men between the ages of six-
teen and early twenties, held ideals of becoming a drug dealer. Some 
even sold drugs on a casual basis, while still at school (under sixteen). 
According to my colleagues at MSP, consumption and supply of drugs 
within the Muslim community had rapidly increased in the past ten 
years. When I inquired as to why this was the case, they explained that 
Muslim gangs possessed sole control of the drug trade in the town. Pre-
viously, they claimed it was ‘the Jamaicans’. However, over the course 
of a series of bitter and violent turf wars in the 1990s and the early part 
of the 2000s, Muslim gangs eventually triumphed, and came out on 
top. According to my interlocutors at Bedfordshire Police, gangs con-
trolled the drugs trade in the town and its hinterland. Over time, the 
groups fragmented into rival factions. During my time in the field, Mus-
lim gangs were embroiled in violent turf wars with each other. One of 
the earliest comments Fakruddin from the MSP made to me (while he 
was conducting an impromptu tour of the town on my first day), was 
that it was the ‘drug capital of the Midlands’ and, somewhat facetiously, 
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that ‘Muslims ran the show’. This information had not been lost on Bury 
Park’s youngsters. Some of the more charismatic leaders of the gangs 
were venerated as heroes by many of the young men with whom I spent 
time. A few had assumed mythical status, especially those perceived to 
have sacrificed their lives or those who were spending lengthy stints in 
prison. Mukhlis, a Muslim man in his twenties with Pakistani heritage, 
was an experienced youth worker for Luton Borough Council. He was 
an expert in mentoring young men with behavioural problems who had 
a history of petty criminality. He had worked with a number of young 
Muslim men who had either been, or were later to become, professional 
drug dealers.
They grow up idolising these big gangsters they hear stories about 
[…] who they see around the neighbourhood in their flashy, expen-
sive cars; wearing expensive clothes and jewellery. It’s also a bra-
vado thing. Being a gangster means you’re tough and powerful. 
[For them], it’s the ultimate sign of manhood. They hear stories 
about shootings and fights […] They are impressed by the danger 
of that kind of life.
As Mukhlis points out, the young drug dealers with whom I struck up 
a relationship embraced the cosmetic appeals of being a member of an 
organised gang. However, at the same time, they were keen to point out 
to me that, ultimately, they were just earning a living and that was the 
primary attraction. Hadi was a nineteen-year-old man who came from a 
large family. He suggested to me that beyond earning a living, the ‘image’ 
of being a gangster was also an appealing factor in his choice of work. 
However, he remained convinced that his primary motivation was purely 
financial:
Yeah, the whole deal is appealing. Who doesn’t like having nice 
things? […] Being able to do whatever you want? But, at the end 
of the day, I got into this because I didn’t want to work […] in a shit 
job for shit money. [My dad] worked all his life for shit money, and 
we always had money problems. I don’t want my life to be like that. 
If you’re clever, you can make a lot of money from shotting9 with-
out getting banged up. My two older brothers drive taxis, and work 
around the clock. I give as much money to the family as they do, so 
who’s laughing?
 Fr IENDS 71
Hadi had managed to keep his occupation a secret from his family and 
regularly lied to them regarding his income. His parents were under 
the impression that he worked part-time as a security guard in Milton 
Keynes. He did, however, admit that some of the younger members of his 
family may have worked it out through hearsay or by catching glimpses 
of him around town. Even so, Hadi was steadfast in his stance of not con-
firming their suspicions. He was particularly concerned that this may 
lead to problems with his father with whom he had had a fraught rela-
tionship throughout his childhood and adolescence. Hadi and his father 
were not on speaking terms. This was because Hadi had been charged 
with shoplifting and other minor crimes in the past. The relationship 
between him and his mother on the other hand was generally amicable, 
and it is through her that all his communications with his father were 
accomplished: ‘I get on with my mum, but my dad still hasn’t forgiven me 
[for the past]. He leaves me alone these days, as I give money to my mum, 
but if he found out [about the dealing], he’ll probably kick me out of the 
house’. Hadi’s father had a long-term illness that forced him to retire 
early. Since his retirement, his older brothers have taken over the role of 
maintaining the household. Hadi himself had recently started contribut-
ing financially to the family. Although his work is illegal and stigmatised 
in the local community, he vehemently defended his choice:
Look, I know I’m messed up […] but I make sure I take care of my 
family. Yeah, I’m selling drugs, but I give a lot of the money to my 
parents, so they don’t think I’m doing nothing. If I sat around at 
home, waiting for my family to feed me, it would kill me. Everybody 
works in my family […] I don’t think I’m doing anything wrong. I 
don’t sell to kids. I sell [drugs] to people who know what they’re 
doing.
Even though involvement in illegal work, such as drug dealing, attracted 
considerable social stigma for both the individuals involved and their 
family or clan, this did not seem to deter some of the young men. Hadi 
deliberately avoided publicly disclosing his profession. This was both 
in order to prevent the inevitable ‘shame’ (besti) that such news would 
attract and more importantly, perhaps, to avoid offending his parents. 
He was also a victim of his past. Previous criminal convictions had 
meant that Hadi struggled to secure ‘legitimate’ jobs that he felt suited 
his talents and aspirations. After a period of unemployment and being 
financially reliant on his family, Hadi made the decision to sell drugs. 
Although quite austere in his mannerisms, and often quite melancholic, 
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he struck me as highly intelligent, articulate and, notably, a conscien-
tious person. He possessed a burning desire to provide for his family, 
especially his mother.
As Fakrudddin pointed out to me early on in my sojourn, the drug 
trade had a ubiquitous presence in the town. This was especially so in 
Bury Park, where top-end ostentatious sports cars, laden with young 
Asian males being driven up and down the thoroughfare, were a com-
mon feature of the landscape. It was also common to witness young 
‘runners’ sitting in cars parked up in various side streets, awaiting 
calls from prospective clients or ‘the boss’. Eighteen-year-old Hashim 
was one of them. A runner was the most junior member of the gang 
and also its most publicly visible component. He was the street-level 
conduit between the local supplier and his clientele. His job entailed 
receiving instructions from the supplier to meet and deliver drugs to 
clients at a designated location. Runners were issued with a mobile 
phone and, if they’re lucky, a mode of transportation – usually a car or 
a bicycle. Hashim’s supplier was his paternal cousin, and he worked 
within a wider team consisting of male members from his clan (bira-
dari). He had been a runner since leaving school at sixteen, and had 
ambitions of one day becoming the ‘boss’: ‘I’m happy shotting on the 
streets [for now], but one day I’m gonna move on to bigger things […] 
I work with my cousins [so] they look after me. The higher you go; 
the more money you make. But I’m doing alright’. Hashim had wanted 
to be a dealer while still at school, and claimed to have occasionally 
sold cannabis on school premises. He explained that the transition to 
full-time dealing was made possible by his cousins paving the way. 
They were significantly older, had built up connections in the trade 
and offered him a role as soon as he left school. Hashim was expelled 
from school before he could sit his final examinations and left with-
out any formal qualifications. At school, he was considered to be a 
Special Educational Needs (SEN) student, and had a history of violent 
conduct: ‘School was shit. The teachers hated me, and I hated them. 
I couldn’t wait to leave. I knew I could always work with my cous-
ins. I couldn’t wait until I started making some money, and I’m doing 
alright now’.
Hashim’s father, a taxi driver, was the head of a household of seven. 
Hashim had two older brothers and two younger sisters. His two older 
brothers, who were both married with children, ran a fast-food restau-
rant together. But Hashim refused to join them, despite pressure from 
his father. This led to arguments and caused a fracture in the relation-
ship between father and son. Hashim mentioned that his father had 
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apprehended him while he was dealing in the street on many occasions. 
But he kept carrying on without any further sanctions from home. Like 
some of the other young men in this study, Hashim also felt the need to 
contribute to family finances and did so, albeit irregularly. Although his 
family were well aware of where his money was coming from, they nev-
ertheless accepted his contributions.
Everyone knows what we do, but they don’t complain when the 
money comes in, do they? Money talks. My dad tells me off all the 
time, but I just stay out of his way. I give money to my mum, every 
now and again [and] that keeps them happy.
Even though they were both involved in a profession where income was 
potentially limitless, both Hadi and Hashim still earnt a relatively modest 
amount. It is doubtful whether they will ever be able to command the 
income that they aspired to. The prospect of lengthy bouts in prison was 
a permanent risk in such a precarious and peripheral industry. The possi-
bility and consequences of physical violence was also a mainstay in their 
minds. However, despite these risks, both Hadi and Hashim were unwill-
ing to take ‘conventional’ jobs due to the lower pay and longer hours. By 
selling drugs, they had discovered a lucrative means by which to earn a 
living that did not require formal qualifications or clean criminal records, 
yet provided the scope for a comfortable lifestyle as well as, crucially, the 
ability to contribute to the family. In ensuring that they were economi-
cally active, and through their contributions, Hadi and Hashim demon-
strated a wider attitude among young Muslim men in Luton, that working 
and providing for their family was an immutable symbol of ‘good’ mascu-
line moral character.10
***
When I was young, I knew I was different in this society. You knew 
you were living in England, that you were Pakistani, and that you 
were Muslim. You knew this because when you looked around 
[…] there were people who weren’t Pakistani or Muslim. But even 
though you know you’re different, it didn’t stop you finding out 
about the world.
For example, I love football. I love playing football, I love watch-
ing football, I love talking about football. I always have. When I was 
young, Eric Cantona was my hero. I loved him more than I loved my 
family! The fact that he wasn’t English, he wasn’t Pakistani, he wasn’t 
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Muslim, made absolutely no difference to me whatsoever. I wanted to 
be Eric Cantona as a child, and I still do!
– Amin, 23
Issues of race and ethnic difference heavily informed the formative lives 
of many of my friends in Luton. Moreover, ideas about themselves and 
the place that they occupied in society continued to manifest in attitudes 
towards wider society, and helped shape socialisation patterns. Eric Can-
tona – an iconic footballer known for his technical flair and charismatic 
personality – was a hugely popular figure in England throughout the 
1990s. As Amin, a history teacher and poet, passionately pointed out, 
Cantona was a hero for many, regardless of one’s religion, nationality or 
race. As a cultural figure, he was interpreted and reinterpreted in differ-
ent ways by his devotees, including Amin. I asked him why he was in such 
awe of him:
He represented everything that I was and wanted to be. He wasn’t 
[ethnically] English, neither am I. He was temperamental, so am I. 
He always got into trouble with the authorities, so did I. As a foot-
baller, he was the best. Nobody came close. That’s what I wanted 
to be. All my friends, whether they were Muslim, Black, White, 
Sikh or whatever, respected Cantona. Football brought us together. 
Cantona made us equal.
Amin had always dreamt of playing professional football. He watched 
the sport on television when growing up, played for numerous ama-
teur and semi-professional teams, and even went as far as Manchester 
to watch matches. He was an avid reader of highbrow football maga-
zines, and was generally very knowledgeable and passionate about the 
game. Amin was a goalkeeper, and first started playing while at school. 
Over the years, he played for a number of local teams and shone as a 
talent. Northampton Town FC, a nearby professional club, took him on 
after scouting him at a local match. Amin often mused about his ‘failed’ 
football career but, even though he hadn’t ‘made it’ and decided to 
become a teacher, he remained hopeful. He stated that the two primary 
reasons why he failed were his temperament and his ethnicity. On the 
field, Amin had serious disciplinary problems. He could not remember 
the number of times that he had received a red card and been ordered 
straight off the pitch. Although his general demeanour was very pleas-
ant and jolly, albeit quite manic, in his own words, once he gets onto 
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the pitch ‘something happens’ to him. Amin had been sent off for exces-
sive swearing, dissent against the referee, ungentlemanly conduct, dan-
gerous play, violent conduct and many other eccentric charges (such 
as intimidating supporters). Off the field, he was full of shame for his 
actions. ‘I just don’t understand it’, he admitted. ‘I can’t control my tem-
per. I’m mad. Totally mad’.
The other reason he didn’t make it as a professional goalkeeper was, 
according to him, because he was a ‘Paki’:
How many Pakis play football? You can count them on one hand – 
ever! There’s definitely a reason for it, beyond [South Asian] moth-
ers not letting their little princes fuck up their GCSEs. You’ve seen 
how many Asians play football, they love it. Look at all these Asian 
leagues. You telling me that can’t find good technical players there? 
Athletes? Bakhwas! [Rubbish!]
Bedfordshire amateur football and cricket leagues were full to the brim 
with Asian players. However, as Amin highlights, barely any of them 
became professionals in their respective sports. One notable exception 
was Monty Panesar, a cricketer of Sikh heritage from Bedford, who 
went on to star in the England team. Amin accepted Panesar’s success 
but argued that it was an unfair comparison because Panesar was ‘world 
class’, a rare talent. He was always going to shine. In addition, cricket was 
a sport in which South Asians have contributed significantly throughout 
its history. The current teams from South Asia are some of the best in 
the world. Cricket, for Amin, was more tolerant towards Asians. Whereas 
football, he argued, was institutionally racist. It was the territory of dom-
inant ‘White Others’. When he was playing for Northampton Town, Amin 
played with mostly White and Black players. For his local teams, how-
ever, his teammates were almost exclusively Muslim of South Asian ori-
gin. Although he was always open to playing in multi-racial teams, and 
did so when he was at university, Amin had a preference to play with 
fellow Muslims:
I’ve played for various football teams as a goalkeeper […] With the 
exception of Northampton Town, and my university team, all of 
them have comprised of mostly Muslims – usually local lads who 
love playing football. Although we played against non-Muslim 
teams, we were only comfortable with playing with other Muslims. 
A few tried to get into White teams, but they’re always harder 
because you’re Asian.
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Another reason why we always played in [predominantly] 
Muslim teams, is because we all knew each other; it was always lads 
from the local area that you grew up with. Who are all mostly Muslim.
[…] Because I have a temper, I get into fights on the pitch. 
In those situations, you can only rely on your close friends to back 
you up.
Amin was quite obviously happiest when playing, watching or talking about 
football. He often travelled significant distances up and down the country 
(and sometimes abroad), in racially and culturally diverse arenas, to watch 
his favourite team. His living hero, Eric Cantona, was White and a non-Mus-
lim. On the other hand, and quite paradoxically, his love and appreciation 
for football was ambivalently challenged by experiences of playing the 
game. He recognised, rather poignantly, that full participation in wider 
spaces of society was restricted for ‘Asians’, whom he perceived as excluded 
from the top echelons of the sport, despite possessing the necessary talent. 
Left somewhat disenfranchised, Amin settled for playing with his friends, 
locals with whom he grew up and shared a religion and ethnicity.
Participation in organised sport, particularly football and cricket, 
was an enormously popular leisure activity in Luton and its surround-
ing areas. Young South Asian men dedicated hours of their free time 
to organising sporting events, some travelling all over the country 
to attend amateur tournaments. Of course, these sports were not just 
popular with British Muslim men but are embraced in similar ways by 
different communities all across Britain. The participation in sport by 
young Muslim men in Luton was indicative of their wider engagement 
with communities and groups beyond their ethno-religious counter-
parts. It was also evidence that there was a will to integrate with the cul-
tural mainstream, unlike their generational predecessors. However, as 
Amin’s account illustrates, young Muslims often hesitated to consciously 
include themselves within that same cultural mainstream. Nonetheless, 
their persistence in organising matches, and following their favourite 
team, was an encouraging sign that, despite such perceptions, the desire 
to engage and interact with wider society remained undeterred.
A brief exploration of a group of friends tells a different but related 
story. The group consisted of four Muslim men of Pakistani origin, named 
Rashid, Faisal, Shakeel and Afzal, all of whom were in their early twen-
ties. They grew up in the same neighbourhood and attended the same 
primary and secondary schools. One member of the group went on to 
university, whereas the other three pursued careers in retail. Shakeel and 
Faisal owned and ran a fast-food restaurant in nearby Aylesbury. Rashid 
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worked locally for a large high-street mobile phone chain, while Afzal 
had been driving taxis since he graduated from university. I first met the 
group while waiting for a kebab at a famous grill house on Dunstable 
Road. After overhearing their conversation concerning holiday plans for 
Ibiza, I was intrigued and decided to introduce myself. The men received 
me warmly, seemed unperturbed by my interest and invited me to eat 
with them. Over the course of a series of conversations, the cultural com-
plexities of their lives, and the varied and hybrid attitudes they possessed 
became more and more obvious to me. So many facets of their character 
and appearance were ‘Western’; from the manner in which they dressed 
and the urban colloquialisms they employed in their speech to their 
obsessions with the latest electronic gadgets. At the same time, the ‘East’ 
was also palpable; from insistence on never missing Friday (Juma’ah) 
prayers in the mosque, to living in the same house as married siblings 
and their children as well as singing along to Hindi movie songs when 
driving in their cars. I asked them why they picked Ibiza as their holiday 
destination:
Shakeel: We always go on holiday together. Since we were about 
eighteen or nineteen … I can’t remember now, but it’s been a regu-
lar thing since then.
Afzal: We went to Ibiza last year as well, and really liked it. So 
we decided to go again.
Rashid [pointing to Afzal and laughing]: He really liked it 
because he was out of his face every night chasing butters [ugly] 
girls. Shakeel, on the other hand, was in bed by twelve!
Shakeel [to Rashid]: There’s only so much clubbing you can 
do. After a few days, you get sick of it!
Shakeel: … Anyway! As I was saying, we go on holidays a lot. 
It’s easy because of cheap EasyJet tickets, and Luton Airport is just 
round the corner.
Despite insisting on teasing and scolding each other at every available 
opportunity, there was an obvious bond between these friends. It was 
ostensible in the way that they spoke to one another and the disguised 
esteem in which they held each other. The nature of the interchange 
between them was typical of any group of close friends. Moreover, the 
fact that they took advantage of cheap flights to visit European holiday 
destinations that specifically catered to young people, like Ibiza, Prague 
or Krakow, was demonstrative of their embeddedness within wider social 
and cultural norms in Britain. A venue such as Ibiza, which was notorious 
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for hedonism – wild partying aided by the consumption of drugs and 
alcohol, and sexual activity – is seldom associated with impressions of 
Muslim youth in the West.
Once we had completed the meal, the oldest member of the group, 
Shakeel, insisted on paying for everyone, including me. When I protested, 
he retorted that as the oldest among his friends, he was obliged to pay. 
Especially when they were in the presence of a ‘guest’. Further resistance 
forced Shakeel to explain to me how his act of generosity would ‘look 
good in the eyes of Allah’, and the divine blessings (suaab, Arabic tha-
waab) he would inevitably receive for footing the bill. Over the series of 
meetings and discussions that I conducted with this group, I learnt that 
their friendship occurred as a consequence of decades of close acquaint-
ance between their parents. Their fathers all attended the same neigh-
bourhood mosque over this period, and became friends in due course. 
Their families regularly visited each other’s homes, and had even been 
on holiday to Pakistan together. They were the product of Bury Park’s 
recent history and its distinct migrant community that had endured since 
the 1960s. What was most interesting to observe, however, was how this 
generation has modified old notions of how one lives and works in Britain 
as South Asians, to suit their more sustained exposure to wider British 
society and cultural practice. In this regard, they were constituents of an 
emerging generation managing to innovatively merge cultural influences 
from home and wider society, to create distinct and illuminating subjec-
tivities particular to twenty-first-century ‘multicultural’ Britain.
Notes
 1. See Hamid 2009, 2016; Meijer 2009; and Wiktorovicz 2006.
 2. There is also a small but active Pakistani Shia community in Luton. However, my interactions 
with its members was relatively limited during fieldwork, due to lack of access.
 3. See Robinson 2008; and Metcalf 1982.
 4. See Hoque 2015.
 5. Compare with Osella and Osella 2000.
 6. Compare with Simon 2009.
 7. See Deeb and Harb 2017; Werbner 1996; and Bayart 2007.
 8. General Certificate of Secondary Education. This is the first formal qualification within the 
UK education system. Students are required to sit GCSE examinations when they are in their 
eleventh year of compulsory schooling.
 9. Colloquialism for dealing illegal drugs.
10. See Osella and Osella 2000.
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Religion
According to Olivier Roy (2004), young Muslims, particularly in dias-
pora, are being increasingly attracted to what he refers to as ‘globalised 
Islam’. He argues that they are resisting the segregationist narratives of 
the modern nation-state. At the same time, they also resist the unfamiliar 
customs and expectations of their migrant families by overtly valorising 
religious identity and consciously associating with an international col-
lective of co-religionists. Roy contends that the combination of globalisa-
tion, westernisation and the increase in worldwide Muslim diasporas has 
led to a reimagining of the international Muslim community (ummah). A 
global Muslim can mean either:
Muslims who settled permanently in non-Muslim countries (mainly 
in the West), or Muslims who try to distance themselves from 
a given Muslim culture and to stress their belonging to a univer-
sal ummah, whether in a purely quietist way or through political 
action. (2004:ix)
Second and third generations in diaspora are particularly attracted to 
the doctrines of globalised Islam due to the fact that they are ‘de-terri-
torialised’ from the Islamic heartlands. Moreover, they are attracted to 
this form of Islam due to the alienating cultural proclivities of both the 
host community and particular non-Islamic cultural preoccupations of 
preceding generations. Thus the appeal of being a member of the ummah, 
united by a common belief that transcends race, ethnicity and nationality 
is particularly powerful. In the post-colonial world, the ‘ummah no longer 
has anything to do with a territorial entity’, but now must be ‘thought of 
in abstract or imaginary terms’ (2004:19 my emphasis). The egalitarian 
doctrines of Islam provide a comforting antidote to experiences of racism 
and social exclusion which are now part of everyday life in the West for 
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Muslims. Moreover, the notion that Islam is no longer fixed to a particu-
lar geo-political space adds substance to the doctrine of ummah, particu-
larly among those who are living in diaspora communities.
Muslims in diaspora are also captivated by the notion of a ‘glorious 
Islamic past’ promoted by various reformist thinkers and groups – the 
idea that Islam and Muslims once spawned a great civilisation notable 
for its conquest of vast lands, its contribution to the arts and sciences, 
and responsible for the spreading of the religion to distant and remote 
places around the world. This pursuit for a ‘pure Islam’, devoid of pollut-
ing cultural influences, is consistent with the phenomenon of ‘decultur-
alised Islam’:
The construction of a ‘deculturalised’ Islam is a means of experienc-
ing a religious identity that is not linked to a given culture and can 
therefore fit with every culture, or, more precisely, could be defined 
beyond the very notion of culture […] The new generation of edu-
cated, Western born-again Muslims do not want to be Pakistanis or 
Turks; they want to be Muslims first. (2004:22–5)
Although Roy’s argument implies an effective rejection of established 
state narratives, it nevertheless does not suggest that young Muslims 
prescribing to a ‘globalised Islam’ will necessary evolve into terrorists. 
Rather, that young Muslims are re-appropriating their faith by challeng-
ing culturist approaches to the religion espoused by previous generations. 
At the same time, recourse to an abstract global community of Muslims 
reconciles perceived race and class disparities in their home nation.
***
Islam played a significant role in the lives of all of my informants. Every-
one whom I met valued and prioritised their ‘Muslim identity’ above all 
else.1 What this identity specifically meant varied from person to person 
but most were keen to show pride in their religion and solidarity with 
their co-religionists, both at home and abroad. This sense of belonging 
to an abstract creed (din) and imagined community (ummah) was one 
of the most prominent and powerful ontological forces shared by Mus-
lims in Luton. Even so, there appeared to be a marked difference between 
the generations. Older men whom I spoke with agreed that Islam played 
a crucial role in their lives. Among the most avid attendees during the 
five daily congregational (jam’aat) prayers at the mosques, were men of 
retirement age or those approaching this age. Many such men claimed 
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that they had worked hard all of their lives precisely for the privilege of 
being able to ‘turn to God’ in retirement and therein make amends for the 
mistakes accrued throughout a lifetime. It was also common for many 
older men and women to perform the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca once they 
retired and were financially secure. Becoming ‘religious’ in old age, when 
family and work pressures relatively subside, was almost customary and 
expected of the older generation.2 However, this trend is shifting. More 
and more young people in Luton were turning towards religion and a 
pious lifestyle. Moreover, young people were seemingly more attracted 
to reformist and revivalist variants of Islam than the traditional folk var-
iants associated with South Asian Islam. These stressed the universalis-
tic and ‘de-cultured’ expression of Islam, as Olivier Roy suggests, rather 
than the ethno-religious or localised variants that the older generation 
practised.3 The majority of my British-born informants claimed that the 
‘village Islam’ espoused by their parents or grandparents was ‘backward’ 
and inauthentic, and that they couldn’t relate to it.
Luton has a varied and diverse Muslim community. The town’s 
twenty-five mosques catered for a number of sectarian, ethnic and kin-
ship-based congregations. Some are mostly frequented by those of 
Bangladeshi origin, others by Shia Muslims or the Salafi community 
and so on. Some of my young informants told me that they experienced 
pressure from home to only attend those mosques where members of 
their extended family and clan (biradari) made up a significant portion 
of the congregation, and/or where they controlled the mosque commit-
tee.4 Even though most Muslims attended their preferred mosque most 
of the time, there were some for whom attending a mosque was a prac-
tical choice more than anything else. They might choose to attend the 
closest mosque for example or, notably, mosques where the imam spoke 
English. This latter point, and its concomitant implications, is crucial 
for our purposes in this chapter. Many young men with whom I spoke, 
harboured a mistrust for imams who were unable to speak English and 
could not explain the religion to them in a discernible manner. The 
Friday sermons (khutba), one of the distinguishing features of the wide-
ly-attended Friday prayer services (jum’ah), were given in either Bengali, 
Urdu or Arabic at most of the mosques in the town. The notable excep-
tion was the Salafi mosque. Some imams would on occasions embellish 
their speeches with some English commentary but, for the most part, 
English was a secondary language. Moreover, guest speakers would 
often be invited from South Asia or other parts of the Islamic world to 
give lectures and speeches, the vast majority of whom did not address 
the congregation in English. However, such events were, by and large, 
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organised with the older generation in mind and consequently very few 
young Muslims would attend. In contrast, the Salafi mosque employed 
a policy of addressing the congregation primarily in English. On occa-
sions where a guest speaker (many of whom came from Saudi Arabia) 
could not speak English, his speech was translated live by a supporting 
mosque official. Consequently, the Salafi mosque boasted a much higher 
percentage of young people from different ethnic backgrounds within its 
congregation than any of the other mosques that I attended.
In addition to the problems with communication at mosques, young 
people also complained about the ‘magic’ and ‘superstition’ associated 
with South Asian folk Islam. Many of my informants felt practices and 
rituals performed at these mosques, particularly those associated with 
the Barelvi Sufi sect, were cultish and cultural, rather than anything 
associated with the ‘pure’ teachings of the Qur’an or the practices of 
the Prophet Mohammed. Barelvi Sufis are particularly devoted to the 
Prophet Mohammed, arguing that he is still alive and present (hazil/na-
zil) in the world. In most Berelvi mosques, a vacant chair is placed at the 
front of the prayer hall during prayer times to indicate that the Prophet is 
also praying with the congregation. This doctrine was fiercely defended 
by the older generation and other committed Barelvi Sufis, especially 
in light of the persistent attacks from revivalist sects like that of the 
the Salafis. To almost all of my young informants, this ritual was irra-
tional and based on superstition rather than reference to proper Islamic 
scripture. They claimed that such practices were for uneducated, rural 
Muslims in South Asia. In a sense, debates around the clash between 
sober ‘scholarly’ Islam and syncretic ‘folk’ Islam are not new, and anthro-
pologists have been keen to highlight this apparent theological tension 
in the Muslim world for quite some time.5 More recently, others have 
argued that Sufi orders6 have resisted and survived the disenchantment 
of modernity and adapted their practises to suit the times7 or witnessed 
a growth in their congregations as a consequence of it.8 However, what-
ever the anthropological literature suggests, in Luton there was an appar-
ent chasm between those who were born there and those who were not. 
More and more young Muslims were rejecting the folk Islam of their 
parents and grandparents, and relating more to the literate, puritanical 
Islam of the reformists. They were not doing this without encountering 
problems. Similar to the insights garnered by Samuli Schielke among 
young men in northern Egypt, Luton’s young Muslims likewise struggled 
to live pious lives ‘according to the book’.9 Nevertheless, unlike Schielke’s 
informants, Islam also formed the basis of nascent political identities for 
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young Muslims in Luton that I suggest are symptomatic of an emerging 
generation of Muslims living in the contemporary West, and native to it.
***
Even though revival or reform Islam appeared to be most attractive to my 
young informants, the institutional presence and influence of traditional 
South Asian Sufism remains strong for the time being. As I have men-
tioned, the majority of the mosques remained firmly in the hands of the 
‘elders’ (exclusively men). This meant that community elders recruited 
imams, ran the associated seminaries (madrasas), were responsible for 
estates and maintenance, and organised religious and cultural events. 
Thus all religious learning and services very much remained in the con-
trol of the older generation (apart from the Salafi Mission, which I shall 
return to later).
Growing up, all of my informants attended the mosque for congre-
gational prayers, religious festivals and seminary school – where they 
were taught how to perform the daily prayers (salat) and other important 
rituals, in addition to learning how to read the Qur’an in Arabic. Young 
boys and girls of schooling age were regularly packed off to the mosque 
after school and on Saturday mornings. This was a practice taken directly 
from many parts of the Islamic world, not least South Asia.10 For many, 
the experience of attending lessons at the mosque made an indelible 
impression. It was seldom positive. They complained of being regularly 
beaten by the imam if their work (sabbak) was unsatisfactory, if they mis-
behaved or even when the imam ‘just felt like it’.
The imam used to make us memorise the Qur’an and practice namaz 
[daily prayers]. He couldn’t speak English, and only spoke to us in 
Urdu, which a lot of us didn’t understand. Also, he never explained 
to us what any of the Arabic meant. We were just expected to mem-
orise it all. For a long time I thought that was it, that was all Islam 
was – praying and memorising the Qur’an […] Actually, it put me 
off Islam [for a bit] because when we didn’t get our sabbak [daily 
tasks] right, we were beaten and told we would go to hell if we kept 
getting it wrong. Now though, I’ve found out what Islam is really 
about by speaking to older cousins and people at the mosque, and 
reading books about Islam in English.
– Abbas, 18, A-level student
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Abbas’s account of his experiences of madrasa were typical. Corporal pun-
ishment was a common pedagogic practice that most parents approved of. 
Moreover, chapters of the Qur’an were learnt by rote in Arabic, without 
translations or commentary on complex concepts and verses. Imams, more 
often than not brought over from South Asia for low salaries, could not 
speak proficient English and thus could not relate to their students. Despite 
this, however, and quite surprisingly, Islam remained important to many 
of my informants’ lives in adulthood. Abbas, who claimed he was ‘put off’ 
Islam, argued that his experiences were just the product of being taught in 
a Pakistani way and that future generation should be taught differently:
In Pakistan, this is how they learn about Islam […] They know 
Urdu, so they can ask questions and get a better understanding. 
But here, most of us weren’t interested in going to the mosque after 
school, and when we [were there] our questions never got answered 
because the iman didn’t care or we couldn’t understand him […] 
We should get taught about Islam by people who can speak English, 
so we can understand our religion better.
Abbas didn’t harbour any lasting antagonism towards Islam. In fact, he 
was making concerted efforts to indeed try to understand the religion 
better. Like so many other young men in the town, he was attracted to 
the Salafi Mission and, in particular, to the preaching of Khidr. He was 
a regular attendee at the mosque for Friday prayers and also came to 
events and lectures organised by the mosque. He especially enjoyed Khi-
dr’s lectures and sermons because, he claimed, Khidr was from Luton 
and spoke perfect English as well as perfect Arabic. Abbas also felt Khidr 
wasn’t a hypocrite, but a kind, sincere and pious man, making huge sac-
rifices for the sake of his religion. Despite this, Abbas was not quite sure 
whether he himself was a Salafi. ‘It’s a big thing, a lot of hard work’, he 
told me. ‘I’m not sure I can be like that, but hopefully one day’. Abbas was 
concerned that the austere discipline and abstinence required to fully 
‘practise’ Salafism was beyond him for the time being. He also claimed 
that he didn’t quite possess ‘knowledge’ about Islam, and that he was still 
re-learning all the basics. Coming to the Salafi mosque, therefore, was a 
means to re-educate himself about Islam. Being ‘pious’ and one day like 
Khidr clearly appealed to him, however. More so, it seemed, than emulat-
ing the religious teachers of his childhood.
***
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Zulfiqar was an IT consultant in his mid-twenties, who often visited his 
friends at the MSP offices. He wore a very large black beard, along with 
a long white Arabian-style thobe to work (even in winter). Zulfiqar also 
owned a selection of the attars (perfumed oils) produced in Saudi Arabia. 
Whenever Zulfiqar was in the office, a pungent waft of his chosen scent 
for the day circulated the building. On occasions, this was oppressive. He 
claimed that wearing attar was ‘sunna’, something that the Prophet did 
and encouraged. Salafi Muslims are particularly keen on Prophetic mime-
sis. For them, like most Muslims, Mohammed was the living guide on how 
to live one’s life according to the ‘Book’. However, Salafis adopt a literal 
meaning to this, arguing that everything that the Prophet did should be 
emulated as he did it, regardless of the rational, logical or practical prob-
lems that this may cause. Zulfiqar’s choice of fragrance, therefore, could 
be seen as an act of piety and religious obligation (rather regrettably for 
the rest of us). But this mimesis as an act of piety was a certainty from his 
point of view. When I asked him if he had ever ridden to work on a camel, 
as the Prophet did, he replied: ‘The scholars have said that the car is halal, 
Ashraf’. Then, after a slight pause, he chuckled: ‘maybe we can order one 
for lunch?’ Zulfiqar was a devout Salafi Muslim. He prayed five times a 
day, almost all of which he performed at the mosque during the congre-
gational hours. He was a regular at the dawn (fajr) prayers, which in the 
summer months meant waking up around 3am. During Ramadan, he 
would fast the entire month in addition to his daily prayer routine. Then, 
when Ramadan finished, he would continue holding the voluntary (naw-
afal) fasts after Eid because ‘the Prophet recommended it’. It is also said 
to be Prophetic tradition to fast on Mondays and Thursdays, precedents 
that Zulfiqar often also observed. He had been to Mecca on the Hajj and 
the minor (Umrah) pilgrimages several times, the first as a child. He paid 
his obligatory religious alms (zakat) promptly every year, he never took 
nor received interest in any form nor did he socialise with any unrelated 
women (mahram, i.e. socialising only with wife, mother, sister, daughter, 
niece). He was also friendly, well-meaning and light-hearted.
Zulfiqar had not always been so piety minded, however. Like Abbas, 
he was disenfranchised by the ‘village Islam’ of his parents. He was yet 
another Muslim of his generation that was highly critical of the madrasa 
religious schooling system, arguing that it needed serious reform. Zulfiqar 
claimed that he had not learnt anything of note at madrasa, beyond the 
act of reading Arabic and memorising chapters of the Qur’an. He argued 
that there was no intellectual development, and that important and 
classical Islamic subjects such as language (lugha); history (tarikh); law 
(kanun); jurisprudence (usool-ul-fiqh); creed (aqidah); theology (kalam) 
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and methodology (manhaj) were not taught to students at the madrasa. 
For Zulfiqar, this lack stunted the progress of students and their knowl-
edge of Islam. Furthermore, he noted that his teachers could barely speak 
English and couldn’t adequately explain the complex meanings of the 
scripture. He didn’t know it at the time but, looking back, he felt that he 
was completely misguided by his religious teachers growing up. His atti-
tude towards the religious learning he gleaned from his family did not 
fare much better. ‘They just wanted me to pray, and fast, and stay away 
from girls’, he declared. ‘They didn’t really care about gaining knowledge 
of the din [religion]. It was all about being a good, sharif [respectable] 
boy’. Zulfiqar’s parents maintained close ties with Pakistan and loosely 
followed the Berelvi sect. Despite this, they were not zealous, and encour-
aged their children to be good, God-fearing Muslims above any sectarian 
loyalties or allegiances. Consequently, Zulfiqar’s conversion to Salafism in 
his adulthood (or ‘reversion’, according to him), did not cause tensions 
in his relationship with them. This is because the Salafi lifestyle is based 
on personal piety and ritual discipline which, for his parents, were the 
hallmarks of a ‘respectable boy’. His parents were thus not concerned with 
the theological underpinnings of his new beliefs. All they cared about, 
according to Zulfiqar, was that he was ostensibly praying and fasting, and 
not chasing girls.
Zulfiqar converted to Salafism while he was at university but said 
he was aware of the ‘brothers’ (read: congregation) in Luton while he 
was growing up. At the time, he just thought Salafis were like any other 
Muslims but just more committed to religion. It was only when he 
engaged in deeper conversations with practitioners that his opinions 
and lifestyle began to change. Prior to going to university, in his words, 
he lived an ‘ignorant’ (jahil) life. This term forms a regular feature of 
Salafi discourse, made in allusion to the ‘Age of Ignorance’ (jahiliyya) of 
pagan pre-Islamic Arabia, which directly preceded the era of the Prophet 
Mohammed that was marked by the revelation of the Qur’an. Despite 
smoking cannabis on rare occasions with his friends, and talking to 
girls at school and college, Abbas claims he did not do much wrong, as 
he always tried to pray and fasted without fail during Ramadan. It was 
only when he gained knowledge (‘ilm) of Islam that he was compelled to 
change his outlook and practices:
When I first started university, I only knew what the local imam and 
what my parents had taught me, [but] I was very interested in reli-
gion. I was questioning a lot of things as I was growing up. A lot of 
the things the community did didn’t make any sense to me – the pirs 
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[saints] and the magic and all that – I just didn’t believe in all that. It 
just seemed really backward and stupid […] Some of my friends [at 
university] were meeting up with these brothers from the [student 
union] Islamic Society who would take them to Islamic talks. They 
asked me to go, but I always refused until one Ramadan when, for 
some reason, I decided to go. It was a talk on Islam and econom-
ics, and I remember being really confused at the title as those two 
things don’t mix, at least I thought they didn’t […] Looking back 
now, that decision completely changed my life.
Going to university was a life-changing experience for Zulfiqar. He 
became involved with Salafi missionary activity on campus (da’wa), and 
started living a more puritanical life, giving up all his previous excesses. 
He made lasting relationships with devout Salafis from all over the coun-
try, particularly Birmingham, where the sect has its largest presence in 
terms of numbers and activity. Zulfiqar often made regular visits to Bir-
mingham to attend lectures and seminars, and catch up with friends. 
After graduating, he returned to Luton and continued living with his 
parents. Once back, he decided that he would also engage in the ‘da’wa’ 
on the local scene, transferring the missionary work he had embarked 
upon on campus to his home town. This was highly important to Zulfiqar 
because, as mentioned previously, the act of da’wa is a religious obliga-
tion for Salafis. As per their belief in mimesis, this importance stems from 
the traditions that hold the Prophet Mohammed spent his lifetime prose-
lytising. Luton was also fertile ground for this kind of Salafi da’wa activity. 
The town boasts a large Muslim population, many of whom are Brit-
ish-born, English-speaking and seeking alternatives to the impenetrable 
perspectives on Islam offered by more mainstream institutions. Zulfiqar 
thus teamed up with the other members of the Salafi mission (some of 
whom he knew through community networks prior to his conversion), 
and set about his work. Despite his obvious zeal, clear intentions and 
experience on the national da’wa circuit, Zulfiqar was not very good at it. 
He found it difficult to bond with youths that frequented the offices, who 
couldn’t relate to his ‘geeky’ mannerisms and overly complicated and dry 
theological arguments. By his own admission he was also quite lazy. He 
found it challenging to motivate himself for preaching, often comparing 
himself with the likes of Khidr and Ammar, and concluding that he was 
just simply not on their level. For the most part, however, Zulfiqar was 
happiest going to the mosque, learning about his religion, and playing 
video games in his spare time. It was apparent that he enjoyed the ‘black-
and-white’ coherence and certainty that the Salafi doctrine brought to 
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his life – trying to emulate the spiritual example of the Prophet in all that 
he did even though, at times, this caused him strife and self-doubt. Fol-
lowing the Prophetic tradition was the ‘safest’ option, because only the 
Prophet knew the true meaning of the Qur’an and, by implication, Islam 
itself. Importantly, he was a member of a quietist branch of the Salafi sect 
who maintained a conscious distance from political affairs and thought 
Luton, in his own words, was ‘the best place on Earth’.
***
Although my friends at the MSP were very active and well known in the 
town, and generally enjoyed a good reputation for their piety, manners, 
youth and rehabilitation work, they were not the only Islamic revivalist 
group operating in Luton. Also significant was the presence of Tablighi 
Jammat (TJ) another transnational revivalist organisation.11 TJ, like the 
Salafi sect, also maintain a quietist stance and distances itself from poli-
tics. In terms of religious or missionary activity, TJ is again similar in its 
theological and methodological approach to the Salafis. There is a strong 
emphasis on personal piety and daily ritual observance, and an obliga-
tion to carry our da’wa wherever its members are, regardless of their 
social or economic circumstances. Moreover, TJ Muslims that I spoke 
with believed that Muslims in general had lost their way in the modern 
world. This was as a result of the cultural effects of Westernisation and 
colonial domination, which led to Muslims abandoning the true essence 
of their faith. This, they argued, resulted in the wrath of God that was 
undeniably demonstrable by the relatively lowly plight of the contem-
porary global Muslim community (ummah). By way of an antidote, TJ 
Muslims advocate a ‘back to basics’ doctrine, where ‘non-practising’ and 
‘lapsed’ Muslims were gently encouraged to attend the mosque, seek pen-
ance and regularly perform religious rituals and obligations. By reverting 
to a basic code of personal ethics and discipline, thereby creating a more 
pious entitled community in the eyes of God, Muslims could build a foun-
dation for eventual revival and a return to past glories.
Ostensibly, there is seemingly not much difference between TJ 
and Salafi Muslims. Both emphasise and value personal piety, ritual 
adherence and a yearning for the ‘purity’ of the past. Similarly, many TJ 
Muslims that I came across were invited to the movement by committed 
preachers (da’is), and many of the ‘converts’ were hitherto lapsed in their 
faith or had been disillusioned by traditional alternatives. However, there 
were distinct and insurmountable differences between the two sects in 
the realm of creed (aqidah) and theological methodology (manhaj). 
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Much of this discussion is beyond the scope of this book but, for our pur-
poses here, it is worth noting that Salafis claim that their creed is the only 
one that is totally devoid of human innovation (bid’a’) and polytheistic 
practices (shirk). They argue that the classical scholars of Islam inserted 
their personal reasoning and biases into sacred rulings. This was unac-
ceptable according to the Salafis, since Islamic scriptures were divine 
and could not be tampered with by human agents. Consequently, Salafis 
interpret the scriptures literally, rather than the analogous and herme-
neutic approach taken by every other Sunni and Shia legal and theolog-
ical school throughout the ages. Since TJ Muslims, by and large, follow 
mainstream Sunni schools of law (mostly Hanafi), Salafis reject them as 
‘deviant’. Salafis also argue that scholars rulings on issues where there 
is no direct evidence from divine sources is akin to polytheism, both on 
the part of the misguided scholar and also on the part of the uncritical 
devotee, who has rendered trust in matters of religion to a fallible human 
agent. The logical charge for Salafis, therefore, is that such individuals 
were following themselves and/or other humans, fraught with imper-
fections, rather than the infallible example of the Prophet Mohammed. 
This, they argue, is associating partners with God and wholly against 
the Prophetic message of monotheism (tawhid). Differences aside, my 
friends at the MSP and TJ were both politically quietist. However, as we 
shall see, not all Salafi groups in Luton were politically disengaged and 
neither were all political movements there secular.
Luton was also a centre of activity for two of the most notorious 
‘Islamist’ movements that were openly recruiting in the town at the time. 
One of these organisations, formerly known as Al-Muhajiroun (AM), has 
since been banned in the UK after an amendment to the Terrorism Act 
in 2010. The other, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), holds a similar political vision 
but its activities remain legal in the UK, for the time being at least. Both 
AM and HT call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate (Khilafah) – an 
imagined Pan-Islamic nation-state where sharia law forms the basis of 
the constitution and public life.12 Activists from both groups argue that 
only God’s law should be applied on Earth, as man-made laws are prone 
to error and, of course, following them is akin to polytheism (shirk) 
because rule (hukma) is the exclusive domain of God. The leader of AM, 
Omar Bakri Mohammed (OBM), was once the leader of HT in the UK. 
AM was created in the mid-1990s after a disagreement on HT’s method-
ology (manhaj) among its then leadership. OBM took a literalist view and 
argued that the establishment of the Caliphate was a religious obligation 
anywhere in the world, including Britain. HT’s position on the other hand 
had always been to establish the state in a Muslim-majority country for 
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practical and strategic reasons. Both organisations cited evidence from 
the Qur’an and Hadith literature to justify their political mission and 
claimed that working for the re-establishment of the Islamic state is the 
foremost religious obligation (fard) for all Muslims living anywhere in 
the world. The absolute necessity for living under an Islamic state was 
further predicated on the argument that living a righteous and pious 
Muslim life was only possible within such a polity. Both argued that it 
was incumbent on all Muslims to work for this goal above all others and 
that, through this, they would bring an end to the humiliation of Muslims 
around the world that began with the advent of colonial domination of 
Islamic lands and its people. This particular expression of anti-colonial-
ism, from my observations, maintained great traction with many of my 
informants but, curiously, it compelled very few of them to join either 
organisation. In fact, both HT and AM were widely ridiculed by the 
majority of my informants who knew of them and what they stood for. 
Many dismissed their agenda as idealistic and impractical, while others 
questioned the theological legitimacy of such a position. Consequently, 
both these groups wielded a very marginal influence among the youth or 
the Muslim community as a whole.
***
People say America is the Great Satan. They’re wrong. Britain is the 
Greatest Satan. Look what they’ve done to the world. The Americans 
are amateurs compared to the British […] They [the British] went 
around the world and took whatever they wanted. Thieves and mur-
derers. Muslims should take back what is theirs […] Look at what 
they’re doing to Muslims today – [Muslim] sisters being attacked in 
the street because they wear the hijab [headscarf], [Muslim] broth-
ers can’t get a job unless they shave their beards […] You’re Muslim 
aren’t you? Do you think they [non-Muslims] like you here, bruv? 
[…] The kuffar [non-believers] are at war with Muslims because 
they want our wealth and stop the spread of Islam […] Allah says 
in the Qur’an: ‘They may plot and plan, but I am the best of plotters 
and the best of planners’.
– Hamed, 25
There were very few members of HT and AM who were active in Luton 
at the time of my research. Of those members who were, a significant 
portion came in from other parts of England to preach. Bury Park’s high 
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concentration of Muslims made it a fertile ground for recruitment, at least 
in theory. HT activity in the town at the time was, by and large, mostly 
out of sight. They chose to recruit members through social networks and 
staged events. While AM also employed a similar strategy they ran, in 
addition, a ‘da’wa’ stall on Dunstable Road in Bury Park. Almost every 
day, from late morning to early afternoon, a group of bearded, predomi-
nantly South Asian men, dressed in robes, combat gear or a combination 
of both, stood around this stall looking to strike up a conversation with 
passers-by. They would disperse into smaller groups of twos or threes at 
busy periods. Sometimes, if the debate was particularly contentious, the 
various clusters would unify with all focusing on the battle between one 
set of opposing individuals. Such debates have been known to get rather 
heated on occasion. Most of the time, however, people passed by without 
noticing them. On the stall itself, one could find a rich assortment of fun-
damentalist literature. Some incited violence, others were anti-semitic, 
and a few sought to provide critiques of capitalism. At the same time, 
one could also find leaflets and pamphlets promoting ritual piety, the 
importance of monotheism and Qur’anic exegesis. By far the most sali-
ent topic, however, was the Caliphate. More specifically, on how it was a 
fundamental duty of all Muslims to re-establish the Caliphate wherever 
they find themselves in the world (as contrary to the HT methodology 
of establishing the Caliphate in the Islamic world for practical reasons).
Activists at the stall spent most of their time talking among them-
selves. It appeared that they shared a close bond with each other. Some 
of them were close friends and were constantly eager to remind me that 
they loved each other (as brothers), ‘for the sake of Allah’. Others were 
less interested in the social aspect of the work but committed solely to 
the ‘da’wa’. In my first encounter with members of AM, they were not 
aware that I was a researcher. I approached the stall out of curiosity and 
began to scan through the literature, while the others were either talk-
ing to passers-by or to each other. After a while, I was approached by 
an individual who introduced himself as Hamed. He asked me if I was 
interested in ‘the Truth’. We chatted for a while about the need for the 
Caliphate, the West’s war on Islam and the urgent need to join a political 
party. Anticipating a longer sermon, I disclosed to him that I was actually 
a PhD student, studying Muslims in Luton, and would very much like to 
talk to him about his beliefs. I suggested that we meet for lunch after his 
duties were completed, and he agreed.
We arranged to meet at a fried chicken shop a few metres away. 
On arrival, I was immediately greeted by over a dozen other AM activ-
ists, some of whom were present at the stall earlier. After some pleasant 
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exchanges with the activists, I was ushered to a table with a few other 
activists, and immediately offered food. Hamed was of Bangladeshi ori-
gin and had lived in Bury Park all his life. He studied Computer Science 
at a university in London and, upon returning to his home town, starting 
questioning the role and relevance of Islam in his life. After a period of 
investigation – attending lectures at the mosque, reading Islamic books 
and contacting prominent local religious personalities – he decided to 
join AM. I asked him what ultimately swayed his mind:
The Muslim ummah is divided. Our Muslim brothers and sisters 
are being oppressed every day. As a Muslim, it’s my duty to defend 
the honour of the ummah […] We have a glorious history; we con-
quered so much of the world and led the world in so many fields, 
we were able to achieve all of this because of Islam […] We have 
lost that power now, and every Muslim should work in the path of 
Allah to get that back. I work with these brothers to re-establish the 
Islamic state because Allah orders me to do so.
Although this response seemed somewhat rehearsed, it struck me how 
similar the recruitment methods and rhetoric employed by Hamed and 
his comrades were to those employed by HT. As mentioned earlier, the 
key difference between the two groups was on methodology (manhaj) 
and creed (aqidah). HT took a ‘rational’ approach to all of their activi-
ties, even in creedal matters. AM, on the other hand, argued that human 
rationale is flawed and akin to grave innovation (bid’a). When fulfilling 
one’s religious obligations, they argued, one should adhere strictly to the 
text without besmirching its purity with human inference. In this regard, 
AM members self-identified as Salafis or, more precisely, Salafi-jihadis. 
This attribution was, however, fervently contested by my informants at 
the MSP – who themselves were members of the quietist and most popu-
lar branch of global Salafism. My colleagues at the MSP argued that AM 
members were ‘misguided’ and ‘lacked knowledge about the din [reli-
gion]’. They took it upon themselves to engage in debates with the AM in 
order to bring them back into the fold of ‘orthodoxy’. Consequently, del-
egations from the Salafi mission were frequently sent to the stall for the 
purpose of debate. Without fail, however, these ‘debates’ digressed into 
highly charged inter-sectarian public slanging matches, with either side 
refusing to yield. Despite the evident lack of progress, the debates con-
tinued. I always wondered to what extent the two groups were actually 
trying to persuade each other, rather than merely parading their self-per-
ceived superior knowledge and consequent piety for the public gaze.
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Back at the chicken shop, we moved on to discussing the differ-
ence between HT and AM. I suggested to Hamed that, to me, his mis-
sion seemed identical to that proposed by HT. The only difference being 
that AM members were quite content to establish the Caliphate in the 
UK, for example, whereas HT members were not. Hamed replied with 
a theological justification discussed above but also cited the credentials 
of his leader, OBM. He argued that OBM was once the leader of HT in 
the UK and that it was always his intention to establish the Caliphate 
in the UK. Moreover, Hamed added that this was the reason why HT’s 
global leadership (based in Jordan) decided to expel him from the role. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, OBM was responsible for the recruitment of 
hundreds of young British Muslims to HT. By 1996, his charismatic hold 
on the group in the UK began to cause consternation within the global 
leadership of the party. They feared that a cult of personality, centred 
around OBM, was replacing loyalty to the organisation. In addition, 
OBM’s rogue, Salafist-inspired methodology to re-establish the Caliphate 
went directly against the leadership’s strategy of focusing efforts in the 
Muslim-majority Middle East – an area they referred to as the ‘majaal’ 
(domain). For HT, its role in the UK was simply to garner support for the 
ideology of the party and to recruit high-profile members of the inter-
national Muslim elite that frequented its shores. The idea was to send 
these individuals back to their countries of origin (in the majaal) where 
their prominence, social capital and further recruitment activities could 
contribute to the eventual goal of staging an ‘Islamic revolution’ through 
a military coup.
Initially, AM was a non-violent organisation, imitating HT’s 
approach of calling Muslims into action (da’wa) and encouraging radical 
political engagement. However, after 9/11, the organisation underwent 
a methodological reformation. In the aftermath of 9/11, OBM declared 
himself a Salafi and defended the attacks as a necessary military tech-
nique in the obligatory jihad against the West. This positon only inten-
sified leading up to the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. Following the 
bombings, OBM left the UK for Lebanon. While there, the Home Office 
identified him as a key agent in the radicalisation of British Muslims (such 
as the 7/7 bombers), and informed him that he could no longer return to 
the UK. At the time of research, OBM had been absent from the da’wa cir-
cuit in the UK for three or four years, but his influence remained as potent 
as ever. ‘He is our sheikh. Our leader and our teacher’, insisted Hamed. 
‘He instructs us in Islam using the Qur’an and Sunnah as the only source, 
and his knowledge of the din [religion]’. It was obvious that Hamed was 
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impressed by his ‘sheikh’. He frequently referred to OBM’s wide training 
(in Saudi Arabia), moral character and wisdom on all matters.
At the time of writing, OBM is serving a six-year sentence in a 
Lebanese prison for terrorism charges and links to Syria’s Al-Qaeda-
inspired Nusra Front. Since his exile from the UK, AM has taken on 
many guises under the leadership of Anjem Choudary – a British-born 
Muslim of Pakistani heritage and loyal lieutenant to OBM. At the time of 
research, AM operated legally in the UK. In 2010, however, the organ-
isation was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Despite this, the 
organisation has continued to operate under various aliases, promoting 
violence against non-believers (kuffar), and encouraging Muslims to 
engage in jihad against the forces of the West. In 2016, Choudary was 
also imprisoned for supporting and inviting others to support and/or 
join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), after the latter 
declared itself to be a bona fide Caliphate in 2014. Since then, a number 
of British Muslims who were members or affiliated with AM have trav-
elled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. I never saw Hamed again after our 
meeting, and I often wonder what may have happened to him, fearing 
the worst. His austere views and chilling anger towards ‘the West’ left me 
quite shaken. I found that I simply couldn’t reason with him. Although 
his interpretations, and those of his friends, were very marginal in Luton, 
the potent sense of conviction, coupled with a highly politicised explana-
tion for the lowly status of Muslims in the contemporary world, clearly 
chimed with some, both here and abroad.
***
HT and AM are marginal voices within the Muslim community, not just 
in Luton but among British Muslims in general.13 Although their ideas 
are radical, they are predicated on the fundamental belief that the holy 
scriptures of Islam (the Qur’an and Prophetic Traditions/Hadith) are the 
only source of authority for Muslims. This implies the rejection of any 
non-Islamic cultural influences within the sphere of belief and conduct. 
Although AM and HT adopted an extreme interpretation of this doctrine, 
all Islamic revivalist and reformist movements (including TJ and quietist 
Salafis) seemingly share the same concern vis-à-vis the need to ‘purify’ 
the religion, and restore it to its previous glories. These ideas profoundly 
resonated with almost all of my British-born informants in Luton. The 
abstraction of Islam into a de-culturised, ethical and political identity was 
highly appealing to young Muslims seeking alternatives to the ethno-re-
ligious identities held by their parents. In addition, it also appears that, 
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for a disturbing proportion of my young informants, wider perceptions of 
Muslims in the era of the ‘war on terror’, and the constant barrage of neg-
ative press relating to Muslims,14 had consolidated a sense of ‘Otherness’ 
in relation to wider British society. My informants constantly claimed to 
be ‘Muslim’ above and beyond all other identity markers, and emphasised 
a will to demonstrate to non-Muslim others that Islam was not a religion 
of terror or violence. Many argued that Islam was a peaceful ‘way of life’ 
that could be applied anywhere in the world – whether one was in the 
minority or majority – and that this was Islam’s ‘beauty’. Moreover, and 
quite paradoxically, this ‘beauty’ required the stripping of idiosyncratic 
cultural syncretisms borrowed from South Asia in order to be realised.
The appeal of revivalist Islam, therefore, is two-fold: firstly, in the 
sphere of ritual piety and ethical practice; and secondly, through concep-
tions of group solidarity that transcend the nation-state. Young Muslims 
welcomed the existential security of a ‘back to basics’ doctrine of cer-
tainty, because they were necessarily disenchanted after centuries of epis-
temological deviances. They warmed to the powerful idea that Muslims 
should do ‘as the Prophet did’, and reject all of the innovations that came 
after him. Furthermore, the egalitarianism and inclusivity implicit within 
the concept of ‘ummah’ played a crucial role in identity formations. For 
many, concern for the plight of the international community of believ-
ers was not only a religious obligation but a political reality. The ‘war on 
terror’ and its consequent geo-political effects were palpable in the con-
versations that I had with so many of my informants. Events in Palestine, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir and so on, were important because co-reli-
gionists in these places were perceived to be battling against the forces of 
oppression, poverty and violence. My informants identified deeply with 
these strangers in distant, unfamiliar lands, and wanted something to be 
done about it. Some of them, like Hamed, wanted to fight neo-imperial-
ism through establishing a bellicose Islamic state, others wanted to raise 
funds for charitable causes in the Muslim world, while others still con-
cluded that prayers (salawat) and constant mindfulness (fikr) were the 
best options during such dark political times.
As I have argued in this book, such events and developments have 
seemingly given rise to novel forms of religious identity intrinsic to Luton 
or, by extension perhaps, to Britain. In accordance with Talal Asad’s 
famous intervention, we may be witnessing the rise of a localised ‘discur-
sive tradition’ (1986), where British Muslims are striving for a sense of 
text-based orthodoxy that suits their particular temporal and genealogical 
positionalities as a post-colonial diaspora. However, as Samuli Schielke 
(2009) rightly notes, not all Muslims are pious all of the time and, equally, 
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not all transgressors are morally apathetic. Rather, Muslims everywhere 
are in a constant process of negotiating conflicting and incoherent ‘moral 
registers’ in the practice of everyday life, none more so than those living 
in societies where Islamic values are marginal or ‘Other’, as is the case 
with Britain. Although ‘the text’ was undoubtedly important for all of my 
informants, many of them (in fact the vast majority) did not consciously 
adhere to religious rulings in everything that they did. One such inform-
ant, Joynul, was a seventeen-year-old young man of Bangladeshi origin, 
whom I met at a Bangladeshi-majority youth centre in the heart of Bury 
Park. In his own words, Joynul didn’t ‘practise’ Islam but held aspirations 
to do so in the future. Although he frequently visited Bangladesh with his 
family, and shared a close relationship with many relatives there, he did 
not identify as a Bangladeshi in the same way as his parents did. Curiously, 
he was also uninterested in claiming to be English either, arguing that he 
couldn’t be fully English as he was not White, but a Muslim. Rather, he 
was most comfortable to be referred to as a ‘British Muslim’.
Do I think I’m British? Yeah, I’ve got a British passport, so I’m British, 
but I’m not English. I’m a Muslim […] I don’t pray five times a day or 
anything, […] I’d like to when I get older, but I’m still Muslim, and 
I’m proud of that, even if people look down on us in England.
Clearly, Joynul’s ethnic identity did not matter too much to him, as he did 
not fully identify as either a Bengali or an Englishman. Instead, he priori-
tised his religious identity without being, as he claimed, ‘a religious person’. 
Thus, Joynul’s Muslim identity was not just about being religious, but it suc-
ceeded in creating a cognitive space where his ethnic, religious, sociologi-
cal and political differences with wider society could be reconciled. Joynul 
did not feel at home with his peers in Bangladesh. At the same time, while 
he conceded that he may be ‘more Westernised’, he nonetheless refused to 
be labelled ‘English’. In this regard, as we have seen, his views correlated 
with the majority of my British-born informants. I asked Joynul whether he 
thought his Bangladeshi cultural roots complicated a strictly Muslim iden-
tity based solely on adherence to the Qur’an and Prophetic Tradition:
Not really. Every one there [Bangladesh] is Muslim, and all 
the Bengalis in Luton are Muslim as well. But I don’t think I’m 
Bangladeshi, just like I’m not English. Bangladeshis of my age are 
different to the ones in Bangladesh, we’re more westernised […] 
But you can live here and still be Muslim, can’t you? You can be 
Muslim anywhere. It doesn’t matter where you’re from. That’s why 
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America is trying to fight Muslims everywhere. They [America] 
know how big the ummah is.
His final remark was also telling. Joynul argued that Islam can be observed 
anywhere and this for him was the reason why America had declared the 
‘war on terror’. Even though the universal time-space applicability of Islam 
was a common trope, to jump from religious observance to geo-political 
commentary was curious. Nevertheless, this was certainly not unusual 
among Joynul’s peers in Luton. Young Muslims often conflated a sense of 
being Muslim with affinity to the political affairs of fellow Muslims around 
the world. The more pious ones, such as Zulfiqar, justified this ‘concern’ 
(fikr) for fellow Muslims by citing scripture, such as the following hadith: 
‘The ummah is like a body; if one part of it is wounded, the whole body 
responds with sleeplessness and fever’. In contrast to Zulfiqar, however, 
Joynul was not a member of any revivalist or reformist group. Nonethe-
less, he still advocated the need for solidarity with fellow Muslims, wher-
ever they were. Moreover, even though he was not a ‘practising’ Muslim, 
he not only self-identified as a Muslim but claimed it was his primary 
identity – above and beyond ethno-linguistic or nationalist allegiances of 
his parent’s generation. In this regard, his views were consistent with the 
vast majority of my British-born informants who were mostly comfortable 
with identifying as British, but were quick to point out that their Muslim 
identity was just as important to them, if not more so.
Notes
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dead saints (awliah). These ideas and practices are regarded as heretical (bid’a) by revivalist 
and reformist sects.
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Conclusion
In her seminal paper ‘Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab 
World’, Lila Abu-Lughod concludes that the focus on the Muslim world 
should move beyond the concerns of ‘classical’ anthropology, and incor-
porate ‘transnational cultural forms, global communications, labour 
migration, and international debt’ (1989:300). She identifies three ‘the-
oretical metonyms’ in the anthropological study of the Arab world at the 
time: segmentary lineage theory, harem theory and Islam. Although 
some of this historical focus can be attributed to the wider development 
of anthropology as a discipline in the Middle Eastern context, this is also 
in keeping with, she argues, Orientalist scholarship and the particular 
power relations invoked by the mores of colonialism. Thirty years on, 
the anthropology of Islam has taken some heed for her vision. Studies of 
Muslims, in transnational/global contexts where political and economic 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors have given rise to new social forms beyond the 
Islamic heartlands, have been burgeoning.1 This book is a contribution to 
this emerging literature.
Recent anthropological debates on the anthropology of Islam have 
focused on a ‘lived’ approach when studying Muslims.2 This challenges 
Talal Asad’s view that Muslims are defined primarily by their religion, 
which unites them discursively through time and space (1986). In the 
former view, Islam forms merely an important aspect of a given Muslim’s 
life, which she manages and negotiates in accordance to other co-exist-
ing and sometimes contradictory moral and ethical registers. The latter 
view, however, privileges Islam as the central binding textual tradition 
that informs and gives rise to social forms and behaviour. I have sym-
pathies with both positions. My experience in Luton taught me that 
Islam is indeed the most important identity marker for my informants. 
Muslims there were striving for coherence in their religious practices and 
outlooks. The Qur’an was a guiding text to both those who were famil-
iar with it and those who were less so. The Prophet Mohammed was 
regarded as the exemplar of appropriate social and spiritual conduct. Yet 
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my informants were only too aware that coherence and discipline were 
always ever fleeting in the face of so many other arresting social and 
personal pressures. This ranged from keeping up daily rituals (such as 
salat) and avoiding ‘free mixing’ with the opposite sex, or socialising with 
non-Muslim friends and colleagues. Even though so many of them persis-
tently ‘lapsed’ in the ‘proper’ observation of religious conduct, very few 
were ultimately dissuaded from the pursuit. All of my friends in Luton 
wanted to be a ‘good Muslim’ one day. In this sense, Asad’s insights are 
invaluable. Muslims in my fieldsite did consider Islam to be a unifying 
tradition that should inform every facet of their lives. I heard the phrase 
‘Islam is a way of life’ so many times during my fieldwork from so many 
varying sources, young and old, pious and sinful.
In addition to representing a moral and spiritual guide, Islam was 
also a political identity to my informants. They shared a common emo-
tional attachment to co-religionists both in their immediate vicinity 
and beyond.3 Many cited global events affecting Muslims to be the driv-
ing force behind such affinities. Others pointed towards perceptions of 
Muslims in the media in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. My older inform-
ants, who were familiar with popular and institutional racism growing up 
in the 1980s and 1990s argued that only Islam provided an alternative to 
divisive ideologies, such as ethnic nationalism. The idea of the ummah, 
therefore, was a concrete one, albeit for different reasons, depending on 
the person. My informants all bought into the notion that they were equal 
in front of God. If the community bled anywhere in the world, so did they. 
This powerful political outlook sat side by side with a sense of individu-
ated Britishness. British-born Muslims did not identify with their coun-
tries of origin beyond the spectre of ancestral loyalty and pride. Some had 
visited South Asia on school holidays, for family weddings or other formal 
occasions. Given the choice, however, they preferred partying holidays in 
Ibiza or pilgrimages to Mecca. It is this paradox that is central to identity 
production among my informants. I have suggested throughout this book 
that transnational migration and the specific conditions of settlement and 
subsequent generational renewal has led to the production of such com-
plex intersectional identities. With these interventions in mind, I ask the 
question: ‘where does the anthropology of Islam sit in relation to post-
colonial diasporas, minority citizenship and stigmatised masculinities?’
Anthropologists of Islam should consider moving beyond the nexus 
of observing discursive piety and associated incoherencies in majoritar-
ian Muslim societies. A more sustained effort must be made to explore 
nebulous and transnational social forms that develop outside of the clas-
sical Islamic world. Muslims in diaspora, particularly those living in the 
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West, face a unique set of sociological challenges that inform self-making 
processes, which are otherwise absent from the ethnographic gaze in the 
Islamic heartlands. This absence may be in some way linked to the epis-
temological development of anthropology as a discipline, with its gene-
alogical and territorial emphasis on the exotic Other.4 It may also be due 
to the historic tensions between the ‘worlds’ of Christendom and Islam, 
and relations of dominance and subordination representative of colonial 
encounters that have, in turn, manifested in fetishised Orientalist schol-
arship.5 Whatever the reasons, the events of 9/11 proved to represent a 
watershed moment not just in terms of a shift in global polity but also in 
the rendering of academic attention to a new generation of Muslims who 
have been forced to reconcile their background, beliefs and loyalties in 
the face of ever-increasing hegemonic scrutiny from non-Muslim observ-
ers and commentators. This is nowhere more acute than within diaspora 
contexts in the West.
Second- and third-generation Muslims find themselves in a pecu-
liar situation where they are stigmatised in their own countries for their 
cultural and religious background.6 This ‘9/11 generation’7 has had to 
contend with wider ‘moral panics’, critical of conceptions of honour, 
patriarchal attitudes and the oppression of Muslim women.8 Muslim men 
are viewed as hyper-masculine ‘folk devils’ prone to acts of devastating 
violence and antipathy towards Western liberal ‘values’.9 Although, from 
my experience, patriarchal dominance did exist to worrying degrees in 
Luton and there was a disproportionate involvement of Muslim men in 
crime and gang-related violence, ethnographic scrutiny suggests that 
Muslims, even in such a relatively small community as Luton, cannot be 
described or analysed as the homogenous group that these wider dis-
courses perpetuate. This is also not lost on my informants, where many 
of them cited negative stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists and abusers 
of women as a reason to further uphold their Muslim identity in defi-
ance of perceived injustice.10 This particular set of temporal and mate-
rial circumstances, I believe, adds further nuance and sophistication to 
the anthropological study of Islam even in majority-Muslim countries. 
In an ever-globalising world, to what extent are Muslims really sepa-
rated by national borders and imagined civilizational barriers? In an 
era where Islamic discourses are transmitted through de-territorialised 
spaces, how long can vernacularised local forms of Islam resist transna-
tional influences? And what types of Islamic expression flourish within 
socio-economically marginalised immigrant communities?
This book has attempted to familiarise the reader with the distinctive 
cultural habitus that my informants were born and raised within, much 
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of which was constructed by pioneer post-war migrants as settlement in 
Britain became realised. Mostly escaping poverty and social upheaval in 
their home regions, migrants sought protection and solace within their 
own ethnic or national groups in the face of widespread racial and cul-
tural hostility. In the preliminary phase of migration, South Asian village 
and clan networks facilitated ease of passage and the subsequent settle-
ment for migrant men. With the arrival of wives and children, however, 
these networks were innovated to loosely resemble those in operation in 
their South Asian villages of origin. Migrants not only re-worked these 
networks in an effort to combat hostility from the host society but also as 
a means to provide social and economic stability in an unfamiliar land. 
The re-application of biradari networks, for example, ensured economic 
protection and provided a means by which first-generation parents could 
transfer South Asian cultural knowledge to their children. Thus, crucially, 
continuing its reproduction within diaspora. Muslim parents I spoke with 
commonly cited wanting to protect their children from the perceived cor-
ruption and moral malaise of wider British society.
The ensuing creation of distinct Muslim enclaves in British towns and 
cities, that exist to the present day, bears testament to this process. In these 
areas, mosques, halal butchers, Muslim-owned clothing and food estab-
lishments, and the sight of Muslims going about their daily business cannot 
escape notice. Luton is one such place. Young Muslims there were raised 
within this inimitable landscape. I have argued that British-born Muslims 
in Luton strategically conform to the conventions and protocols of the 
home and community in varied ways.11 Although many are now critical of 
the application of South Asian ‘culture’ in Britain, a potent sense of respect 
and cooperation towards parents’ wishes and aspirations was generally 
maintained. However, this is not to suggest that they did not attempt to 
persuade parents and community elders to compromise on certain issues. 
This was particularly pronounced on the issue of marriage, for example.
Despite being exposed to wider society in a more concerted way 
compared with previous generations, young Muslims in Luton predom-
inantly continued to work and socialise with fellow Muslims. This does 
not necessarily suggest that they were antagonistic towards non-Mus-
lims – many of my informants, particularly those who went to univer-
sity, maintained social and professional links with non-Muslims. Rather 
that, in their everyday lives, broad access to non-Muslims was restricted 
due to work commitments and a desire to continue social relationships 
forged during childhood and adolescence. These relationships were 
usually established with other Muslims who lived and worked in and 
around the Bury Park area. Furthermore, my informants were obliged to 
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financially contribute to the family once they reached employable age. 
Some of them were employed within family businesses, and spent long 
hours at work for little or no pay. Those who held managerial positions in 
large companies often supported friends and family members by secur-
ing employment for them within their companies. Some went as far as 
delving into organised crime with older brothers and cousins, the profits 
from which were remitted to parents.
Additionally, being Muslim provided a sense of solidarity and emo-
tive belonging situated in opposition to wider social profiling.12 As post-
colonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha (1994), Stuart Hall (2000) and 
Paul Gilroy (1994) remind us, diaspora identities are strategic choices 
made by actors in order to compensate for material and discursive reali-
ties. Moreover, they suggest that subjectivities are contingent to relations 
of power that operate within and without the individual and the nation 
state.13 Much like the pioneer generation, British-born Muslims continue 
to live in a society that remains seemingly hostile to cultural and reli-
gious difference.14 Many of my informants felt that the nation did not 
include them within Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ (1991). 
It is here that the idea of the ummah was particularly efficacious for my 
informants. Post-9/11 discourses and the ‘war on terror’ has fuelled the 
feeling that Muslims are the de facto ‘Other’, not just in Britain, but across 
the globe.
This book has aimed to ethnographically explore the complex iden-
tities emerging among British-born Muslim men in Luton. My informants 
in this controversial English town sought respite in an overt yet multifar-
ious ‘Islamic’ identity that attempted to reconcile their sense of perceived 
‘difference’. The rejection of official narratives of the nation and the inad-
equacies of South Asian ‘village culture’ was consciously negotiated on 
an everyday basis. Through this process, young Muslims were developing 
distinct articulations of the ‘self’ that departed from hegemonic under-
standings of Muslims as a homogenised group. Through their refashion-
ing of what it means to be Muslim and British, my informants in Luton 
demonstrated that diaspora identities are always in motion, historically 
determined and culturally hybrid.
Notes
1. See Wikan 2002; Silverstein 2004, Ewing 2008; Hopkins 2008; Werbner 2002; Mandel 2008; 
and Jouili 2015.
2. See Schielke 2009; Marsden and Retsikas 2013; and Masquelier and Soares 2016.
3. Compare with Marranci 2008.
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